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Introduction
A central theme in economics is the asymmetric information between players, or
market-participants. The theory of mechanism design provides powerful tools to
resolve this information asymmetry, in order to achieve an improvement relative
to the status quo. While resolving information asymmetry is often possible, it is
typically costly (see e.g. Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). A players willingness to
participate in the mechanism depends on his outside option, that is, on the situation
that prevails if he refuses to participate. Often these outside options are modeled as
exogenously given. As a consequence, the mechanism is designed in isolation and
independent of the characteristics of the interaction, prevailing if the mechanism
does not come into existence.
Common to the articles of this thesis is the emphasize on the less well-studied
channel of endogenous outside options: In chapter 2 we consider the problem of
a cartel, colluding prior to an auction. If a bidder does not participate in the car-
tel’s mechanism, the non-cooperative play of the auction determines his payoff.
In chapter 3 we solve the problem about how to best design an alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism that minimizes the number of cases entering the formal
litigation process. If a player does not participate in the mechanism, litigation is
played non-cooperatively.
Key channel in both chapters is the interaction between the default game and
the characteristics of the mechanism. The play of the default game is influenced
by the mechanism, because the former’s characteristics determine the players in-
ference about each other if the default game prevails. In turn, the mechanism is
shaped by the characteristics of the default game, because these characteristics im-
pact the player’s process of inference if the mechanism fails to resolve the informa-
tion asymmetry completely.
Collusion in Auctions
Chapter 2 consists of two articles. The first one analyzes bidder collusion in a
second-price auction (hereafter SPA) and the second article analyses bidder collu-
sion in a first-price auction (henceforth FPA). Absent of collusion, an auction creates
competition between buyers, to elicit their private information, i.e. their valuation
for the good that is for sale. However, the effectiveness of auctions threatened by
bidders collusion. Before the auction takes place, bidders organize in cartels to
suppress competition.
The main novelty of the articles contained in chapter 2 is that an insider proposes
the collusive mechanism. So far, the literature has typically looked at models in
which collusion is organized by an outsider, not a member of the cartel. In such
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models there is no strategic interaction between the cartel members present. The
outsider proposes some efficient mechanism, i.e. the cartel member with the high-
est valuation receives the good.
In our model an insider organizes collusion and we solve a non-standard informed-
principal problem. These problems differ from standard mechanism-design prob-
lems in that they do not answer normative questions, i.e. how to best designs the
cartel’s collusive mechanism. In contrast, informed-principal problems take a pos-
itive standpoint and answer the question what kind of mechanisms can arise in
equilibrium as a choice of privately-informed players.
We find that efficient collusion cannot always be achieved in the SPA and can
never be achieved in the FPA.
If an uninformed outsider organizes collusion, the cartel members do not learn
anything from the proposed terms, so efficient collusion arises both in the SPA and
FPA. Instead, an informed insider that designs collusion has an incentive to strate-
gically reveal part of his private information via the collusive mechanism, and in
this way gain a stronger bargaining position. Therefore efficient collusion cannot
always be achieved in our model. We also find that the resulting strategic interac-
tion depends on the auction format. The agent’s bargaining position is determined
by the non-cooperative play of the auction, following the agent’s rejection of the
collusive mechanism. As the non-cooperative play of the SPA is in weakly domi-
nant strategies, the principal’s mechanism proposal has no impact on this play. In
contrast, in the FPA the principal designs the collusive mechanism to rationalize
beliefs that punish the agents rejection.
Our results suggest that if the seller is only interested in welfare, like for example
a government holding a procurement auction, he should propose a SPA. On the
other hand, collusion in the SPA it is more profitable for the cartel than collusion
in the FPA. Outside the model, if there are costs of being detected while colluding,
the FPA should be less suspicious to collusion than the SPA.
Managing a Conflict
Chapter 3 is joint work with Johannes Schneider. This normative paper answers
the question how to best design an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that
minimizes the number of cases entering the formal litigation process, while at the
same time keeping the rule of law in place.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (henceforth ADR) takes place before two litigants
face each other in court. Litigation is an all-pay contest between players who are
privately informed about their cost of evidence production, i.e. the quality of their
cases. The player that produces the most evidence wins the case and receives a
prize.
The main novelty of this paper is to consider a hybrid model between pure me-
diation, where the mechanism cannot enforce any allocation, and mechanism de-
sign, where full enforcement is feasible: An ADR mechanism can only propose and
commit to settlement-shares, but cannot screen the player’s private information
directly, nor can dictate the player’s behavior if litigation prevails. To screen the
player’s information, the mechanism has to rely on the non-cooperative litigation
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play. To assure the players voluntary participation in the ADR mechanism, full set-
tlement is not always achievable. Thus, an optimal ADR mechanism breaks-down
on the equilibrium path.
"Belief Management" plays the key role in the optimal mechanism: the way litiga-
tion is played after the break-down of ADR crucially depends on the information
the players can infer from the breakdown of ADR, given the commonly-known
features of the ADR mechanism. We find that the optimal mechanism induces be-
liefs such that the post-ADR litigation play is less cost-intensive than litigation play
without ADR. As a consequence, litigation can be avoided often, while at the same
time players are still willing to participate in the mechanism.
Besides highlighting the importance of belief management, we derive charac-
teristics an optimal ADR mechanism satisfies: it gives rise to asymmetric break-
down beliefs, i.e. one player thinks his opponent has a good case, whereas the
reverse is true for the other player. Moreover, an optimal mechanism is such that
if full-settlement is not possible for all case combinations, then it does not promise
full-settlement for any case combination, i.e. even if both players have bad cases
they face each other in court with positive probability. These two conditions make
the post-ADR litigation play relatively less cost-intensive. Finally, to assure truth
telling in the ADR process, whatever a player infers from the breakdown of ADR
is independent from his behavior during ADR, or in technical terms, a player with
a good case holds the same beliefs about his opponent as a player with a bad case.
These features can guide practitioners.
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Signaling and Inefficient
Collusion in Auctions
2.1 Introduction
Auctions are pervasive allocation mechanisms. English auctions and sealed-bid
first-price auctions are commonly used both in the public and private sectors to
allocate and procure goods with limited supply and services among bidders who
are privately informed about their valuations.1 Collusion in auctions is a well-
documented phenomenon: Before the auction takes place, potential bidders form
a cartel and organize their joint bidding behavior to limit competition.2 How does
information asymmetry affect the strategic interaction between the cartel members?
How does the auction format influence the cartel members’ strategic interaction?
Key insights from the theoretical bidder-collusion literature suggest that the car-
tel can resolve the information asymmetry between its members at no cost, inde-
pendently of the auction format. By employing an efficient mechanism that allots
the member with the highest valuation the right to be the cartel’s only bidder in the
auction, the seller’s rent is entirely absorbed. Yet, this literature has not analyzed
how the bidders design the collusive agreement. Rather it generally assumes that a
third party, outside the cartel, proposes the mechanism (see, for example, Graham
and Marshall, 1987, Mailath and Zemsky, 1991, McAfee and McMillan, 1992, and
Marshall and Marx, 2007).
In this paper, collusion is organized by cartel members, an assumption that squares
with prevalent empirical evidence.3 In the model, a member of the cartel (the prin-
cipal) proposes the collusive side mechanism to the other cartel member (the agent),
and all are privately informed about their types. The interaction between the cartel
members boils down to a signaling game, and the collusive side mechanism is the
signaling device. Its content can reveal part of the principal’s private information,
1See, e.g., Marshall, Marx, and Meurer (2014) and Bichler et al. (2006).
2See, e.g., Marshall, Marx, and Meurer (2014) and Marshall and Marx, 2007 for various antitrust
cases involving cartels that met prior to the auction.
3For example, in April 2008 the British Office of Fair Trading (OFT) closed one of its
largest Competition Act investigations. 103 construction firms were found to have colluded
with competitors on building contracts. In the course of this investigation, attention was
drawn to the so-called "Calorie Club", consisting of rival builders frequently meeting and bar-
gaining over the terms of collusion (e.g., see http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/may/
01/construction). More cases can be found in the OFT’s decision, pages 395-425, accessible
at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/
competition-act-and-cartels/ca98/decisions/bid_rigging_construction.
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which influences both the play of the side mechanism and, depending on the auc-
tion format, the auction’s non-cooperative play in case collusion breaks down. By
this, the auction format affects the agent’s process of inference of the principal’s
type from the principal’s proposal, and thus has an impact on the interaction in the
cartel. The main contribution of this paper is to solve such a non-standard informed
principal problem.
We derive and compare the implications of the auction format on the character-
istics of bidder collusion. In particular, we are interested in whether the cartel can
achieve its joint profit-maximizing benchmark of efficient collusion when it is orga-
nized by an insider. If collusion becomes less profitable then it is less likely to occur
(see e.g., Tan and Yilankaya, 2007). The welfare implications of our analysis can
guide the antitrust agency’s decision about how much monitoring effort to exert
on different auction formats (see Lopomo, Marshall, and Marx, 2005).
We take the following modeling approach: A passive seller auctions off an in-
divisible good with some public reserve price, either at a first-price auction (here-
after FPA) or a second-price auction (hereafter SPA).4 Before the auction begins,
the two potential bidders privately learn their type, i.e., their private valuation for
the good, drawn by nature from commonly-known and independent distributions.
Afterwards, the bidders might collude against the seller. Bidder P , the principal,
proposes bidder A, the agent, a collusive side mechanism. Upon acceptance, the
play of the side mechanism determines the enforceable5 collusive allocation, con-
sisting of side transfers between the two cartel members and a policy allotting the
right to be the only bidder in the auction (henceforth the right). Upon rejection, the
auction is played non-cooperatively.
Different types of principal prefer different collusive allocations. Thus, the prin-
cipal’s proposal potentially reveals part of his private information, influencing the
agent’s acceptance decision. This signaling possibility restricts the set of collusive
allocations that can be supported in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Our main result is that collusion is in general inefficient, both in the SPA and FPA.
Inefficiencies in the SPA are entirely driven by the principal’s signaling motive.
If he could commit himself ex-ante, before learning his type, to a side mechanism,
collusion would be efficient: By proposing a mechanism that replicates the SPA’s ef-
ficient non-cooperative play in weakly dominant strategies, the principal can fully
extract the seller’s rent.6 That is, independently of his type, the principal obtains a
constant payment equal to the expected profits that the seller would receive if the
auction were to be played non-cooperatively.
4As the SPA is strategically equivalent to the English auctions, all our results concerning collusion
in the SPA also apply to collusion in an English auction.
5The cartel’s possibility to enforce the collusive agreement might be due to repeated interaction
between the two potential bidders, either in future auctions or, if the bidders are firms, in some
other market (see e.g., McAfee and McMillan, 1992). Given this, we essentially assume that the car-
tel possesses short-term commitment power, but long-term commitment is not feasible. When the
environment (i.e., the distributions of the bidders’ valuations) changes over time - for example, ca-
pacity constraints of firms colluding in a procurement auction - short-term commitment is a much
less demanding requirement than long-term commitment. Whereas short-term commitment requires
a collusive agreement only to be conditional on the commonly-known environment, long-term com-
mitment requires the arrangement to be contingent on every possible future evolution of the envi-
ronment.
6See Mailath and Zemsky, 1991, in which such mechanisms are presented.
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However, if the principal proposes the mechanism after having privately learned
his type, the efficient ex-ante optimal allocation cannot always be supported in
equilibrium. Suppose there is a pooling equilibrium in which every principal type
proposes a mechanism implementing this allocation. The principal’s high types
may have the incentive to deviate from this candidate equilibrium. Since the agent’s
outside option decreases in the principal’s type, by using the collusive side mech-
anism as a signaling device, a high-type principal can increase its collusive rents.
Essentially, he can credibly signal his type by proposing a mechanism that imple-
ments him the right with larger probability. Hence, signaling implies that rents are
shifted from low to high principal types.
Rent shifting generates inefficiency. For the principal to receive the right with
larger probability than in the efficient pooling equilibrium, the agent has to be ex-
cluded relatively more often from receiving the right. This reduces the joint collu-
sive profits. Then, a high-type principal faces a trade-off. We show that the princi-
pal’s decision to deviate from the efficient pooling equilibrium ultimately depends
on the distribution of bidders’ types.
If valuations are drawn from asymmetric distributions, with the principal having
sufficiently large probability mass on low valuations, the signaling motive prevails
and efficient collusion cannot be supported in equilibrium. Conversely, if the agent
and the principal are close to being symmetric, or the principal is the stronger bid-
der, then the ex-ante optimal allocation is achievable under a pooling equilibrium.
However, we show that only inefficient equilibria survive the Intuitive Criterion
(Cho and Kreps, 1987).
The property that the agent’s outside option decreases in the type of the princi-
pal also arises in the FPA. However, the non-cooperative play of the FPA depends
on the commonly-known belief that the agent holds about the principal, and vice
versa. The stronger a bidder thinks his opponent is, the less he will shade his bid
below his valuation. As a consequence, the play of the side mechanism that repli-
cates the non-cooperative play of the auction leads to different collusive allocations
for different beliefs that the agent holds about the principal. If the agent thinks
he faces a high-type principal, he is willing to pay the principal a high price for
the right. Conversely, if the agent thinks the principal is a low type, then he will
submit a low bid and thus expects to lose the auction. This allows those high-type
principals to receive the right at no cost.
As a consequence, the high-type principals receive significantly larger payoff
than low types by implementing the mechanism that replicates the non-cooperative
play of the FPA. Since low-type principals will mimic high types, the collusive repli-
cation of the non-cooperative FPA allocation arises in equilibrium.
Yet, this does not imply that collusion is efficient. Indeed, if the agent rejects
the collusive side mechanism proposed by the principal under this pooling equi-
librium, the principal forms beliefs about the agent.
Being a strategic player, the principal maximizes his payoffs by proposing a side
mechanism that leaves the highest agent type indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the mechanism. Since rejecting the proposal would lead to an aggressive
bidding behavior by the principal, the agent is willing to agree to collusive alloca-
tions that leave him with a rather low payoff.
Hence, in equilibrium, the collusive side mechanism replicates the non-cooperative
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play of an asymmetric FPA and thereby induces a fairly inefficient allocation. Col-
lusion in the FPA is therefore always inefficient. Moreover, we show that it is more
inefficient than the least inefficient equilibrium of the SPA. However, if one is only
willing to select equilibria that survive the Intuitive Criterion, there is no general
welfare ranking between the considered auction formats.
Our paper highlights that collusion is in general inefficient and the auction for-
mat has an impact on the cartels’ interaction. Both findings stand in contrast to the
common thought that cartels collude efficiently both in the FPA and the SPA.
Relation to the Bidding-Ring Literature Important contributions of the theo-
retical bidder-collusion literature model the cartel’s interaction as being organized
by an uninformed third party (see Graham and Marshall, 1987, McAfee and McMil-
lan, 1992, Mailath and Zemsky, 1991 and Marshall and Marx, 2007). By this the car-
tel, often termed bidding ring, can achieve its joint profit-maximizing benchmark
of efficient collusion. While this assumption is a realistic description of collusion
in some cases, there is plenty of evidence that cartels are organized by insiders.7
Rather, this assumption is typically employed to derive an upper bound of what a
cartel can achieve despite the information asymmetry among its members (see e.g.,
Mailath and Zemsky, 1991). In our point of view, this approach overly abstracts
from the interaction inside of the cartel. It does not take into account that the cartel
members have to coordinate on a mechanism, given the information asymmetry.8
The way we introduce the resulting strategic interaction inside the cartel allows
us to relate our findings to those of the literature on bidding rings. Indeed, we
show that if the cartel operates in a SPA, the upper bound of efficient collusion is
robust to a minimal form of signaling. However, for a cartel operating in the FPA,
we find that the upper bound of efficient collusion is never achievable.
Although all our results are proven for two-bidder cartels, we argue in section
2.6 that the channels identified in the two-bidder case survive when increasing the
number of cartel members.
7For example, in the antitrust case US v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 728 F.2d 444 (1984) (US v.
Metropolitan); prior to a procurement auction held by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation,
a manager of a highway paving construction firm proactively contacted potential competitors to
arrange a meeting. The purpose of this meeting was to bargain over the right to become the cartel’s
only serious bidder in the procurement auction. More antitrust cases can be found at: http://www.
justice.gov/atr/antitrust-case-filings-alpha. Most of them involve bid rigging. In many of them, the
cartel members bargained over the terms of collusion without the help of an outsider.
8Asker, 2010 documents the case of a ring that repeatedly operated at English auctions for stamps.
Throughout its existence, the ring used a pre-knockout auction as a revelation game to organize col-
lusion. That is, prior to the target auction, each member submitted a sealed bid to a center, which
then stayed active at the actual target auction until the bid reached the highest pre-knockout bid. Al-
though allowing for side transfers between the ring members, such a knockout auction is not ex-post
incentive-compatible. As the members’ valuations and the beliefs about these valuations naturally
changed over time, the ring members submitted too high knockout-bids. As a consequence, the ring
frequently bought stamps at a price larger than the valuation of any ring member. The point we ad-
dress is the following: even a ring that repeatedly colludes faces the necessity to organize collusion
for each auction anew. That is, for each new auction, the members of the ring have to coordinate on
a new revelation game. Clearly, we assume that the cartel in our model does so (see footnote 5 on
page 6).
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Relation to the Insider-Organized Bidder-Collusion Literature Eso˝ and Schum-
mer, 2004 introduce the signaling motive to the bidder-collusion literature. The car-
tel’s side mechanism is a so-called take-it-or-leave-it bribing scheme. One of two
bidders, say bidder P , both privately informed about their types, is able to sub-
mit a bribe to the other potential participant in a SPA, bidder A. By accepting the
bribe, bidder A commits himself to stay out of the SPA.9 In equilibrium, bidder A
sometimes accepts bidder P ’s bribe offer, although the former has larger valuation
than the latter, and thus collusion is inefficient. Rachmilevitch, 2013 analyzes the
take-it-or-leave-it bribing scheme in the FPA. He finds that collusion does not occur
at all - i.e., bidder P never bribes bidder A.
These models do not only introduce the signaling motive, but, in comparison to
the literature on bidding rings, impose also harsh restrictions on the cartel’s collu-
sion technology. By bribing bidder A, bidder P can only buy the right to be the
sole bidder in the auction. However, he cannot sell the right to bidderA or propose
a mechanism that allots the right. Even if there was no information asymmetry
between the bidders, bidder P would buy the right from bidder A types having
larger valuation than himself, implying inefficient collusion. Indeed, restricting the
cartel’s side mechanism to the take-it-or-leave-it bribing scheme implies that the
cartel’s joint profit-maximizing benchmark of efficient collusion is excluded as pos-
sible outcome of the collusive interaction. Collusion can only be efficient, if it does
not occur at all, that is, if the auction is played non-cooperatively for any realized
type profile.
We build on Eso˝ and Schummer, 2004 and Rachmilevitch, 2013 by allowing for
a richer set of side mechanisms. In the model, we allow bidder P to propose one
side mechanism. In particular, he can propose the take-it-or-leave-it bribing scheme
side mechanism. However, we find that bidder P proposes a side mechanism that
resolves the information asymmetry inside the cartel without relying on the non-
cooperative play of the auction. Collusion therefore never breaks down, i.e., the
auction is always played collusively. This implies that the equilibria of Eso˝ and
Schummer, 2004 and Rachmilevitch, 2013 do not survive beyond the case of the
take-it-or-leave-it bribing scheme. Qualitatively, our findings stand in contrast to
the papers mentioned above. Collusion in the SPA might be efficient, whereas col-
lusion in the FPA always leads to inefficiencies.
Relation to the Informed-Principal Literature We build upon the methodolo-
gies developed by Myerson, 1983, Maskin and Tirole, 1992, and Mylovanov and
Tröger, 2015 to solve an informed-principal problem. Our paper is one of only a
few instances that solves an informed-principal problem with two-sided private
information under common values that emerge because the agent’s outside option
is determined by the play of a default game.10 Moreover, to the best of our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first one that solves an informed-principal problem in which
9Francetich and Troyan, 2012 extend this setup to a common value environment. In their model,
an informed principal not only designs the collusive side mechanism but also runs it. This lack of
principal commitment reduces the set side mechanisms to the take-it-or-leave-it bribing scheme.
10To the best of our knowledge, Quesada, 2004 and Che and Kim, 2006 are the only papers that
solve a similar problem. However, in their collusion setups, the collusion-proof principle applies
and in turn implies that the RSW (Rothschild-Stieglitz-Wilson) allocation is the unique equilibrium
allocation. This allocation is degenerate in the sense that it is a replication of the non-cooperative play
of the default game.
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the agent’s outside option is determined by a non-trivial, belief-dependent game,
the FPA.
Myerson, 1983 formulates the inscrutability principle, which states that it is with-
out loss of generality to focus on pooling equilibria of the mechanism-selection
game.11 Moreover, he introduces the concept of safe allocations. An allocation is
safe if it is incentive-compatible and individually rational for any belief about the
principal having point mass. Maskin and Tirole, 1992 introduce the RSW (Rothschild-
Stieglitz-Wilson) allocation. This allocation is defined as the best safe allocation
from every principal type’s perspective. The following result is established: Sup-
pose there exists some full-support belief about the principal such that the RSW
allocation is undominated from the principal’s perspective. Then every allocation
which leaves all principal types with a weakly larger payoff than the RSW alloca-
tion is an equilibrium allocation.
Mylovanov and Tröger, 2015 consider a general framework which applies to sig-
naling games where the sender’s message space is sufficiently rich. In particular,
they introduce the secured-payoff vector. Intuitively, this vector consists of the
max-min payoff, where the max is with respect to the principal’s mechanism pro-
posal and the min with respect to the belief about the principal, each principal type
receives in any (continuation) equilibrium starting after his mechanism proposal.
They establish the following result: If there exists some belief about the principal
such that the secured-payoff vector is undominated from the principal’s point of
view, every allocation that leaves all principal types with a weakly larger payoff
than their secured payoff is an equilibrium allocation.
Focusing on the SPA, we show the secured-payoff vector is implemented by the
RSW allocation. This is an intuitive result, given the technical similarity between a
problem in which the agent’s outside option is determined by a game in dominant
strategies and a problem where the outside option is fixed but type-dependent, as
in Maskin and Tirole, 1992. In addition, we make use of an insight from the latter
paper while characterizing the RSW allocation; instead of solving for the principal
types’ most preferred safe allocation jointly, one can equivalently find the RSW
allocation by solving a sequence of linked maximization problems, one for each
principal type. Having characterized the optimal solution of these problems, we
verify the existence of a belief about the principal such that the RSW allocation is
undominated. Because this belief does not in general have full support, we build
the existence of equilibrium by drawing upon Mylovanov and Tröger, 2015.
Focusing on the FPA, we show that the secured-payoff vector is not implemented
by the RSW allocation, and the latter allocation cannot be supported in equilibrium.
We establish the existence of a certain side mechanism, say m˜, that is accepted for
any belief the agent holds about the principal. Depending on this belief, the play
of m˜ implements different allocations. That is, m˜ is not a direct revelation mecha-
nism and does not implement a safe allocation. We show that the secured payoff
is implemented by the play of m˜ for some belief about the principal. Moreover,
we verify that the allocation being implemented by the play of m˜, with the agent
having prior beliefs about the principal, is the unique equilibrium allocation.
11By the revelation principle, the play of a separating equilibrium of the mechanism-selection
game induces some incentive-compatible allocation. Because the principal is a player of the game he
proposes, this allocation can directly be implemented in a pooling equilibrium. The principal offers
a direct revelation mechanism that implements the corresponding allocation.
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Our analysis provides useful insights to advance our knowledge of the solution
to mechanism-design problems with an informed principal in quasilinear, independent-
private-values environments under the following context (i) in case outside options
are non-trivial, (ii) in case the types of the principal can be screened - that is, the
principal’s incentive constraints are non-trivial, and (iii) to characterize allocations
that survive the Intuitive Criterion.
Concerning (i), the result that the RSW allocation is not an equilibrium allocation
if collusion is in the FPA is both surprising and important, as it indicates that this
is a general feature in informed-principal problems in settings where outside op-
tions are determined by the play of a non-trivial game. Concerning (ii), the ideas
employed to provide conditions assuring that the principal’s ex-ante optimal allo-
cation can be supported in equilibrium of the game might be useful for literature
interested in the question of the irrelevance of the principal’s private information
(see Koessler and Skreta, 2014 and the references therein).12 Concerning (iii), we
characterize the set of equilibrium allocations that survive the Intuitive Criterion.
Maskin and Tirole, 1992 provide a characterization for the case of one-sided private
information under a sorting assumption. They find that only the RSW allocation
survives the refinement. If the sorting assumption holds in our two-sided private
information setting, we arrive at the same result. However, if the sorting assump-
tion fails, the RSW allocation is not the unique allocation that survives the Intuitive
Criterion.
Other related Literature We contribute to a strand of the literature initiated by
Robinson, 1985 that argues that the FPA is less suspicious to collusion than the SPA.
In order to gain from the right to be a cartel’s only bidder in the FPA, a member has
to submit a low winning bid at the auction. This creates incentives for other cartel
members to deviate from the collusive agreement and to enter the auction unex-
pectedly. The results of Marshall and Marx, 2007 and Lopomo, Marx, and Sun,
2011 suggest that collusion in a one-shot FPA can hardly be rationalized without
assuming that the cartel can enforce the collusive agreement. However, collusion
in FPAs is documented, and enforcement does not seem to be impossible in gen-
eral. Indeed, there is a large literature modeling collusion explicitly as repeated
interaction between the cartel members. For example, Aoyagi, 2003 and Aoyagi,
2007 show that due to grim trigger strategies, the cartel can enforce the terms of
collusion independently of the auction format.
Our results highlight that the strategic interaction inside of a cartel operating
at a FPA prevents it from reaching an efficient and profit-maximizing agreement,
although the cartel is powerful enough to exchange side transfers and to enforce the
agreement.
This paper is related to a small literature arguing for inefficient collusion in En-
glish auctions or in SPAs. In Lopomo, Marshall, and Marx, 2005, the members of
a non-all-inclusive cartel are not able to communicate before an English auction
12If collusion is in the SPA, the principal’s common-knowledge payoff (i.e., the payoff he would
receive in case the agent knew his type) cannot be implemented in equilibrium. Yet, the principal’s ex-
ante optimal payoff might be implemented. Conversely, in the FPA, the principal’s ex-ante optimal
payoff cannot be implemented; however, he receives a larger payoff than his common-knowledge
payoff. That is, in the SPA the principal weakly prefers the agent to know his type (from an ex-ante
point of view), whereas in the FPA the principal strictly prefers the agent not to know his type, both
ex-ante and ex-interim.
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in order to decide on the maximal cartel bid, submitted by one of the members
to purchase the good for a post-knockout auction among them. Instead, the cartel
members must communicate via their bidding behavior. This bidding behavior im-
plies an inefficient allocation of the good. In Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng, 2009, the
possibility of resale leads to collusive bidding behavior in a second-price or English
auction, implying inefficiencies in the final allocation of the good.
In our model the inefficiency results from the signaling channel for which pre-
auction communication between the cartel members is crucial.
Finally, for the sake of clarity, we do not relate to the large literature on collusion-
proof mechanisms, to which the (weak) collusion-proof principle - see Laffont and
Martimort, 1997, Laffont and Martimort, 2000 - applies: The designer of the grand
game can restrict attention to game forms, or mechanisms, that leave no cartel
member better off by colluding. We depart from this literature by restricting the
seller’s mechanism to a SPA or FPA.
Outline We proceed by giving an illustrative example of some of our results.
Afterwards, we introduce the model (section 2.2) and continue in section 2.3 by
presenting our main results for collusion in the SPA. We proceed in section 2.4 by
focusing on the case of collusion in the FPA. In section 2.5, we consider extensions
for the case of collusion in the SPA. In particular, we refine the set of equilibria by
the Intuitive Criterion in section 2.5.1 and consider the case of a cartel that can-
not enforce the right to be the only bidder in the auction 2.5.3. In section 2.7, we
conclude and discuss our results.
2.1.1 Illustrative Example
We begin with an example that illustrates the channels behind the main results
of the paper. Suppose there are two bidders, indexed by i ∈ {A,P}. Both are
interested in winning an indivisible good, which is auctioned off at a SPA with
zero reserve price. Bidder A’s type, j, is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1]
with distribution F (·). Assume for simplicity that bidder P ’s type, θk, can be low
(k = 0) or high (k = 1). Independently of bidder A’s valuation draw, each event
occurs with probability βk. Assume that θ0 = 1/4 < θ1 = 5/8. These primitives are
common knowledge.
Before the auction begins, and after each bidder has privately learned the real-
ization of his valuation, bidder P - the principal - proposes bidder A - the agent - a
collusive side mechanism. If the agent accepts the mechanism, its play determines
the collusive allocation that consists of a policy allotting the right to be the only
bidder in the auction and transfer payments between both bidders. If the agent
rejects the mechanism, both the agent and the principal bid their valuation in the
auction. Because there is no reserve price, a sole bidder in the auction receives the
good at price zero. Hence, each player’s valuation of the right is equal to his valu-
ation of the good. We want to examine whether or not efficient collusion can arise
in equilibrium. That is, consider a hypothetical equilibrium in which the princi-
pal, independently of his type, proposes a direct revelation mechanism that allots
the right for any realized type profile to the player with the highest valuation. If
qi(·) stands for bidder i’s interim expected allotment probability, efficient collusion
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implies
qP (k) = F (θk), qA(j) =
1∑
k=0
1[j > θk]βk.
These allotment probabilities can be implemented by means of a linear-separable
transfer scheme. If hi(·) denotes bidder i’s type-dependent payment, the following
specification assures incentive compatibility:
hP (0) = 0, hP (1) = θ0[F (θ1)− F (θ0)], hA(j) =
1∑
k=0
1[j > θk]θkβk.
In any undominated equilibrium, these type-dependent payments stay inside of
the cartel. Bidder i pays hi(·) to bidder −i, and in addition the principal asks the
agent to pay a lump-sum transfer equal to Ek[hP (k)]. Since the allotment of the
right equals the allotment of the good induced by the non-cooperative play of the
auction, hA(·) is optimally set - from the principal’s perspective - equal to the ex-
pected payment the agent would have to pay if the auction were to be played non-
cooperatively. If we denote the resulting allocation by φe, the principal’s payoff,
UPφe(·), takes the form:
UPφe(0) = F (θ0)θ0 +Ej,k[hP (k) + hA(j)], UPφe(1) = F (θ1)(θ1 − θ0) + UPφe(0).
The above presented allocation maximizes the bidders’ joint collusive profits and
leaves every type of the agent with exactly his outside option. Thus, the principal
can extract the entire profits, and efficient collusion is ex-ante optimal from the
principal’s point of view. This is true in general. Every ex-ante optimal allocation
induces efficient collusion.13
However, the extracted profits, UPφe(0), are shared equally between both types of
the principal. Because it is the high type that contributes the most to those profits,
he might have an incentive to use the side mechanism as a signaling device.
For example, he can propose a mechanism that corresponds to the following
game form, which is accepted by the agent for any off-path belief about the prin-
cipal’s type: The game begins with the principal’s choice of one, out of a total of
two, specified menus. Afterwards, the agent determines the allocation by picking
an element of the offered menu. One might think of each of these menus as speci-
fying a price, pk, at which the agent can buy the right. If the latter player does not
want to pay the price, he receives a compensation, ck, for the duty to stay out of the
auction. For the latter specified parameter j˜, with j˜ > θ1, let these two menus take
13Since the principal has finitely many types, the allotment policy does not uniquely determine
the payoff of the principal’s types. Thus, in general, there are infinitely many ex-ante optimal al-
locations. Each such allocation features efficient collusion but differs concerning the distribution of
the payoff between the principal’s types due to the freedom concerning the principal’s adjacent in-
centive constraints. In the subsequent analysis, we focus on the ex-ante optimal allocation in which
every principal type’s upward adjacent incentive constraint is satisfied with equality. This is the most
preferred ex-ante optimal allocation of the largest principal type. Since efficient collusion can be sup-
ported in equilibrium if and only if the largest principal type prefers the ex-ante optimal allocation to
the RSW allocation, this approach is without loss of generality.
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the following form:
{p0 = θ0, c0 = 0}, {p1 = θ1, c1 = j˜ − θ1}.
Suppose the agent accepts the game form and menu 0 is offered. In this instance,
agent types below θ0 pick the compensation, as the price for the right is weakly
higher than their valuation (j − p0 = j − θ0 ≤ 0 = c0). Agent types above θ0
buy the right at price θ0 and thus receive payoff j − θ0 ≥ 0 = c0. Because menu 0
induces an efficient allocation, every type of the agent receives the same payoff as
from playing the SPA non-cooperatively against principal type 0.
If menu 1 is offered, agent types below j˜ pick the compensation as j − p1 =
j − θ1 ≤ j˜ − θ1 = c1. By this, they receive payoff larger than from playing the
auction non-cooperatively against principal type 1. Agent types above j˜ buy the
right and are left with payoff j − θ1 ≥ j˜ − θ1 = c1, equals the payoff from playing
the auction non-cooperatively against principal type 1.
Since the above described behavior of the agent is independent of his belief about
the principal, the agent accepts the game form if principal type k optimally pro-
poses menu k.
If this is the case, the following allocation is induced (where tP (k) denotes the
expected transfer payment of principal type k):
qP (0) = F (θ0), qP (1) = F (j˜)
tP (0) = −F (θ0)θ0, tP (1) = −[1− F (j˜)]θ1 + F (j˜)[j˜ − θ1].
Indeed, principal type 0 is indifferent between proposing menu 0 and 1. If type 0
offers menu 0, he receives payoff qP (0)θ0−tP (0) = θ0. Thereby he attains the upper
bound of any payoff he could receive if the agent knew his type. Given menu 0,
menu 1 is constructed by introducing the smallest inefficiencies necessary to assure
that principal type 0 does not want to offer menu 1. That is, j˜ solves
qP (1)θ0 − tP (1) = θ0 ⇐⇒ F (j˜)θ0 − [1− F (j˜)]θ1 + F (j˜)[j˜ − θ1] = θ0.
The solution is such that j˜ = 3/4 > θ1, and thus the allocation is inefficient in favor
of the principal. Principal types differ in their valuation for the good. Hence, the
screening parameter is the probability with which they receive the right. In order
to credibly signal his type, principal type 1 has to offer an inefficient allocation in
favor of him. In turn, agent types with higher valuation than θ1 are necessarily
excluded from receiving the right.
The described allocation is called RSW allocation. Let us denote by UPRSW (1) the
high principal type’s payoff from this allocation. Given the specified valuations, he
prefers to deviate from the hypothetical equilibrium by offering the RSW allocation
if:
UPRSW (1) > UPφe(1)
⇐⇒ F (j˜)(θ1 − θ0) + θ0 = 17/32 > F (θ1)(θ1 − θ0) + UPφe(0) = 27/64 + β1(9/64).
Hence, if β1 < 79 , efficient collusion cannot be supported in equilibrium. We verify
in section 2.3 that an allocation can be supported in equilibrium if and only if every
type of the principal receives a weakly larger payoff than his RSW payoff. As a
consequence, if β1 ≥ 7/9, efficient collusion can be supported in equilibrium.
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This example illustrates a general feature of collusion in the SPA. The high princi-
pal type faces a trade-off. On the one hand, efficient collusion is desirable because
it allows the principal to entirely extract the cartel’s maximized joint profits. On
the other hand, using the mechanism as a signaling device and proposing the RSW
allocation allows the principal to shift rents from type 0 to type 1. Yet, this rent
shift necessarily induces inefficiencies, which decrease the rent to be shifted. In
which direction the trade-off is resolved depends on β1. The larger β1, the larger
the negative impact of the inefficiencies on the rent to be shifted. This feature holds
in general. The stronger the principal is in stochastic terms, the less desirable it is
to introduce inefficiencies.
Now suppose the auction format is a FPA. The non-cooperative play of the auc-
tion depends on the belief the agent holds about the principal, and vice versa. Sup-
pose for the moment the FPA is played non-cooperatively with degenerate off-path
belief concentrated on the highest agent type, j = 1, and some arbitrary belief about
the principal. Let β˜k denote an arbitrary belief about principal type k.
Then there are, in particular, the following two possible types of equilibria. In
any such, principal type 0 submits a bid equal to his type:
If the agent thinks the principal is fairly strong, that is, (θ1−θ0)/(1−θ0) < β˜1, then
both principal type 1 and the highest agent type, j = 1, submit bids equal to θ1. In
this instance, we assume that agent type j = 1 receives the right with certainty and
is left with payoff 1− θ1. Any agent type below 1 either submits bid θ1, θ0, or 0.
If the agent thinks the principal is fairly weak, that is, (θ1 − θ0)/(1 − θ0) ≥ β˜1,
principal type 1 mixes against agent type j = 1 on the interval [θ0, 1β˜1 + β˜0θ0] and
the latter is left with payoff β˜0(1− θ0). Any agent type below 1 either submits a bid
equal to θ0 or 0.
Hence, the agent’s ex-post outside option, given principal type k, not only de-
pends on k but also on the belief the agent held about the principal at the point in
time where he submitted his bid.
The principal can exploit this feature of the FPA by proposing the mechanism m˜,
corresponding to the following game form.
There is a pool consisting of three menus:
{p∅ = 0, c∅ = 0}, {p0 = 0, c0 = θ0}, {p1 = 0, c1 = θ1}.
The game begins with the agent selecting one menu. Afterwards, the principal
picks an element from the chosen menu and thereby determines the allocation.
Each menu in the constructed pool consists of a price, p, at which the principal
can buy the right, and a compensation, c. If the principal picks the compensa-
tion, he commits to stay out of the auction and the agent receives the right. If the
agent proposes menu kˇ, with kˇ ∈ {0, 1}, principal type k picks the compensation
if and only if k ≤ kˇ (as ckˇ = θkˇ ≤ θk − pkˇ = θk). If the agent proposes menu ∅,
every principal type picks the right and the agent is left with payoff 0. Thus, for
any β˜, selecting the optimal menu is from the agent’s perspective exactly the same
problem as deciding upon the optimal bid in the non-cooperative play of the FPA.
Hence, independently of his belief about the principal, every agent type accepts m˜
and receives payoff equal to his expected outside option.
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Now note that according to the play of m˜ principal type 0 receives, depending
on β˜, at least payoff θ0, whereas for any β˜, type 1 receives payoff θ1. This is a
fairly large payoff for principal type 1. In fact, it is equal to the largest payoff he
could receive if his type were commonly known. By this, principal type 1 has no
incentive to deviate from a hypothetical equilibrium in which m˜ is proposed in
order to signal his true type to the agent.
Moreover, other equilibria do not exist. We show in section 2.4 that any collusive
allocation that differs from the one implemented by the play of m˜with prior beliefs
about the principal, leaves principal type 1 with strictly lower payoff than θ1. Given
this, consider a hypothetical equilibrium that gives rise to a different allocation.
Principal type 1 would propose m˜ and thereby secure himself the payoff θ1.
As for intuition, by replicating the FPA, m˜ heavily exploits the bid-shading prop-
erty of the FPA. If the agent thinks he faces the high principal type with large prob-
ability, the former submits a high bid and expects to win the auction for sure. In
such a situation, the agent is willing to pay the principal a high price for the right. If
the agent thinks he will face a low principal type, the former submits a low bid and
expects to win the auction only against the low type of the latter. Thus, the agent
is willing to let the high principal type win the auction. Hence, when proposing m˜,
there essentially does not exist a worst (off-path) belief about the principal, from
the high principal type’s perspective, with which different equilibria could be sup-
ported.
In general, for any prior belief β about the principal, the allocation implemented
by the play of m˜ is the unique (in terms of payoffs) equilibrium allocation and more
inefficient than the least inefficient equilibrium allocation if collusion is in the SPA.
2.2 The Model
Primitives
We consider an independent-private-values setting with two risk-neutral bidders
who are interested in consuming an indivisible good. The good is initially pos-
sessed by a seller who has no value for it.
The valuation of bidder A, the agent, is denoted by j, with j ∈ [0, J ] := ΘA. j
is distributed according to the distribution F (·), with continuous density f(·) on
the interval (0, J ]. F (·) may have a point mass at zero. We impose a regularity
condition on F (·):
Assumption 1. j + F (j)f(j) is non-decreasing in j, ∀j > 0.
Bidder P , the principal, has finitely many possible valuations, indexed by k, with
k ∈ {0, 1, 2...,K} =: ΘP .14 The valuations are drawn from the ordered set {θ0, ..., θK},
where we assume without loss of generality that θ0 = 0 and θ1 > 0.15 Valuation
θk realizes with probability βk, where the cumulative probability function is given
14Since we employ recursive methods in the analysis, it is frequently the case that k = −1. In this
instance, we understand terms which involve a quantity being indexed with -1 as zero. Similarly,
whenever a term consists of a quantity being indexed by k = K + 1, this term is zero.
15The finite type space of the principal is assumed to avoid the technical difficulties of signaling
games in which the sender has a continuous type space. However, our model allows arbitrarily close
approximations of a continuous type space.
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by B(k) = ∑kv=0 βv. Let β := {β0, ..., βK} denote the (true) prior probabilities, and
indicate by β˜ ∈ B0 := {b ∈ RK+ |
∑K
k=0 bk = 1, bk ≥ 0} an arbitrary belief of the
agent about the principal’s type. Furthermore, we define by B˜(k) := ∑kv=0 β˜v the
resulting cumulative probability function.
The type space is denoted by Θ, with Θ := ΘA × ΘP . We impose the following
non-triviality assumption on Θ:
Assumption 2. θ1 < J .
That is, there is at least one type of the principal having strictly positive, and strictly
lower valuation than the highest agent type.
Throughout most of the paper, we model the seller as passive. We assume that
he holds either an English auction, second-price auction (hereafter SPA), or a first-
price auction (hereafter FPA). Since the English auction is strategically equivalent
to the SPA, we analyze the following format:
Second-Price Auction. The seller announces a reserve price r, with r < θ1. Both bidders
submit a sealed bid. The highest bid above the reserve price wins the single indivisible object.
The winner pays the maximum between the second highest bid and the reserve price. If both
bids are equal, the auctioneer assigns the good to bidder P .16
The rules of the FPA are given by:
First-Price Auction. The auctioneer announces a reserve price r, with r < θ1. Both bid-
ders submit a sealed bid. The highest bid above the reserve price wins the single indivisible
object. The winner pays his bid. If both bids are equal, the auctioneer assigns the good to
the player with the highest valuation.17
The bidders are able to collude in the auction. We model collusion as a three-period
interaction, which begins after each bidder has privately learned his valuation. The
collusive interaction, which we frequently denote as grand game, features the fol-
lowing sequence of events:
Timing.
• t=0: Each bidder privately learns his valuation.
• t=1: The principal proposes to the agent a collusive side mechanism.
• t=2: The agent accepts or declines the mechanism. In the former instance, stage t=2’
applies. If he rejects the mechanism, go directly to t=3.
• t=2’: The proposed side mechanism is played and determines the enforceable terms of
collusion.
• t=3: The auction is played, possibly under collusion. Whenever the terms of collu-
sion allow a bidder to bid in the auction, or if the agent rejected the collusive side
mechanism, the bidders play the auction non-cooperatively.
16This tie-breaking rule is innocuous. We assume it to economize on notation.
17The efficient tie breaking rule is a standard trick in the literature to simplify the analysis of the
FPA (e.g., see Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2013)).
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We are interested in perfect Bayesian equilibria.
In period t = 1, bidder P proposes bidderA a collusive side mechanism, or game
form (we use these terms interchangeably). Similar to Maskin and Tirole, 1992
we allow the principal to offer any simultaneous-move game form with finitely
many actions for the principal and assume the existence of a public randomization
device.18 If the agent accepts the mechanism, both bidders simultaneously choose
an action or message. The resulting collusive outcome is then determined by m.
A collusive outcome allows the bidders to (i) decide which of them is allowed to
bid in the auction, and to (ii) exchange side payments in a budget-balanced way.
Thus, by assumption, no bidder can be committed to other actions in the auction
than staying out.19 Therefore, if a player receives the right to participate as the only
bidder in the auction, he uses it if and only if his valuation is above the reserve
price. In most of the paper, we formally set the reserve price to zero and capture its
effects by allowing for a point mass in the bidders’ type distributions at zero.
A (collusive) allocation is a complete type-dependent description of the outcome
that results from the bidders’ interaction. A (collusive) allocation is defined as a
mapping from the bidders’ type space into the set of (collusive) outcomes:
φ(·) = (qφ(·), qA,Pφ (·), tφ(·)) : Θ→ [0, 1]2 × [0, 1]× R2.
The allocation consists of a policy that allots the right to be the only bidder in the
auction (henceforth the right), qφ(·) = (qAφ (·), qPφ (·)) : Θ → [0, 1]2. The probability
with which bidder i, i ∈ {A,P}, receives the right is denoted by qiφ(·). Moreover,
qA,Pφ (·) : Θ → [0, 1] stands for the probability that both bidders are allowed to
participate in the auction. Lastly, tφ(·) = (tAφ (·), tPφ (·)) : Θ→ R2 denotes the transfer
scheme, with tiφ(·) being the payment made by bidder i. An allocation satisfies
resource feasibility, that is, for any type profile (j, k) ∈ Θ it is the case that
qAφ (j, k) + qPφ (j, k) + q
A,P
φ (j, k) ≤ 1.
A collusive allocation is budget balanced; that is, ∀(j, k) ∈ Θ it holds that:
tAφ (j, k) + tPφ (j, k) ≥ 0.
We refer to this property with the symbol (BB)j,k. Moreover, we impose the re-
striction that transfers are uniformly bounded.
18To be more precise, Maskin and Tirole, 1992 assume that the principal can only offer finite game
forms. This is a sufficient condition to ensure the existence of an equilibrium of the continuation
game starting after t = 1 with the agent’s decision whether to accept or to reject the proposed game
form. Because the principal has finitely many types, every relevant equilibrium allocation in our
model can also be implemented by a game form with only finitely many actions for the agent. But,
for convenience, we analyze the situation in which the game form can specify infinitely many actions
for the agent and assume that a continuation equilibrium always exists. Given the above justification,
this is a very mild assumption.
19This assumption implies that a bidder with valuation below the reserve price cannot be forced
to submit a positive bid in the auction. If we dropped this assumption and analyzed collusion in the
SPA, then, whenever there is a non-trivial reserve price, the RSW allocation would be dominated for
all beliefs about the principal. By this, the analysis would largely be complicated. On the other hand,
if there is no reserve price, then this assumption is without loss of generality.
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Note, the definition of φ is general enough to incorporate cases in which the col-
lusive interaction results in the non-cooperative play of the auction. That is, if agent
type j rejects the side mechanism, then qA,Pφ (j, ·) = 1 and tAφ (j, ·) = tPφ (j, ·) = 0.
A collusive mechanismm is in the set of feasible game formsM if and only if any
play of m results in a collusive allocation that satisfies the above conditions.
Given the general setting introduced above, we first consider collusion in the
SPA.
2.3 Collusion in the SPA
Continuation Game after period 1 With the beginning of period t = 2, the
agent decides whether to accept or to reject the mechanism proposed by the princi-
pal, m. At the start of this continuation game, the agent’s belief about the principal
can differ from the prior belief β. Suppose in the following that the agent holds
some arbitrary belief β˜.
If the agent rejects m, the SPA is played non-cooperatively. We restrict our atten-
tion to the equilibrium in weakly-dominant strategies.
We denote by UAD(j, k) the ex-post utility of agent type j when playing the SPA
non-cooperatively against principal type k. That is, UAD(j, k) := max{0, j − θk}.
UAD(j, β˜) denotes agent type j’s interim expected default utility when holding the
belief β˜ about the principal’s type. That is, UAD(j, β˜) :=
∑K
k=0 β˜kU
A
D(j, k). Let
tAD(j, β˜) denote agent type j’s expected transfer payment submitted to the seller.
Let qAD(j, β˜) be agent type j’s expected probability of winning the good via the
non-cooperative play of the SPA. Similarly, we denote the respective objects for the
principal holding prior beliefs about the agent as UPD (j, k), UPD (k), tPD(k) and qPD(k).
If the agent accepts the game form m, the play of the side game determines the
collusive allocation φ. Given a type profile (j, k) ∈ Θ, agent type j’s ex-post payoff
takes the form:
uA(φ(j, k), j, k) := jqAφ (j, k)− tAφ (j, k) + qA,Pφ (j, k)UAD(j, k).
Principal type k’s ex-post payoff reads:
uP (φ(j, k), j, k) := θkqPφ (j, k)− tPφ (j, k) + qA,Pφ (j, k)UPD (j, k).
In any continuation equilibrium, the agent accepts the proposed mechanism at
the beginning of stage t = 2 if and only if the continuation value from accept-
ing the mechanism is larger than the expected utility from playing the SPA non-
cooperatively. Because this latter payoff depends on the type of the principal, the
analyzed game is an informed-principal problem under common values.
Take any allocation induced by m, that is, through some equilibrium play of the
continuation game starting after the proposal of m. Note, a collusive side mecha-
nism can replicate any outcome that results from the bidders’ interaction. In partic-
ular, it can replicate the outcome that results if the agent rejects the mechanism m
by specifying transfers of zero and allowing both bidders to bid non-cooperatively
in the SPA. Therefore, the revelation principle for Bayesian games implies that it is
without loss of generality to focus attention on (continuation) equilibria, which are
such that the principal proposes a collusive side mechanism that is unanimously
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accepted by all agent types. Thus, a collusive allocation can be induced through
some (continuation) equilibrium play if and only if it can be implemented by a
direct revelation mechanism. Fix a (collusive) allocation φ and suppose the agent
submits report jˆ and the principal reports his type truthfully. qAφ (jˆ, β˜) denotes the
agent’s expected likelihood of receiving the right. tAφ (jˆ, β˜) stands for the agent’s
expected transfer. Whenever β˜ = β - i.e., the agent has the prior belief about the
principal - we suppress the argument β. We denote the respective objects for the
principal holding prior beliefs about the agent as qPφ (kˆ) and tPφ (kˆ).
Agent type j’s interim utility, given report jˆ, takes the form:
UAφ (jˆ, j, β˜) :=
K∑
k=0
β˜ku
A(φ(jˆ, k), j, k).
Whenever we refer to utility evaluated at prior belief about the principal, we sup-
press the argument β˜. The principal’s interim utility with respect to the prior belief
about the agent, given report kˆ, takes the form:
UPφ (kˆ, k) :=
∫ J
0
uPφ (φ(j, kˆ), j, k)dF (j).
We say an allocation φ is β˜-feasible if and only if it is β˜-incentive-compatible and
β˜-individually rational; that is, it holds that ∀k ∈ supp(β˜) and ∀j ∈ ΘA:
(PIC)k k ∈ arg max
kˆ∈ΘP
UPφ (kˆ, k),
(AIC)j
β˜
j ∈ arg max
jˆ∈ΘA
UAφ (jˆ, j, β˜),
(AIR)j
β˜
UAφ (j, j, β˜) ≥ UAD(j, β˜).
Whenever it is clear from the context that we consider the concept of β-incentive
compatibility and β-individual rationality, we use the terms incentive compatibility
and individual rationality. Note, β˜ might be a point belief about a certain principal
type. If φ is β˜-feasible, where β˜ is a point belief about principal type k, we say that
φ is (β˜k = 1)-feasible. We say that an allocation is safe if and only if it is feasible for
any possible point belief about the principal’s type. That is, ∀(j, k) ∈ Θ:
(PIC)k k ∈ arg max
kˆ∈ΘP
UPφ (kˆ, k),
(AIC)jk j ∈ arg max
jˆ∈ΘA
UAφ (jˆ, j, k),
(AIR)jk U
A
φ (j, j, k) ≥ UAD(j, k).
Whenever it is clear from the context that incentive compatibility is satisfied, we
suppress the argument kˆ and jˆ in the utility functions. Moreover, whenever it
follows from the context that a certain constraint is imposed for all types of a
given player, we suppress the script in the definition. For example, the constraints
(AIC)j
β˜
∀j ∈ ΘA are denoted by (AIC)β˜ .
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As a special instance, we denote the allocation given principal type k, as principal
type k’s menu:
φ(·, k) = (qφ(·,k)(·, k), qA,Pφ(·,k)(·, k), tφ(·,k)(·, k)) : ΘA → [0, 1]2 × [0, 1]× R2
The side mechanism that corresponds to φ(·, k) specifies no action for the principal
and is denoted as principal type k’s menu (offer). If it is clear from the context that
the we focus on a menu, we denote principal type k’s outcomes by tPφ(·,k) and q
P
φ(·,k).
Because the collusive play of the auction can payoff-equivalently replicate the
non-cooperative play, it is without loss of generality to focus attention on those β˜-
feasible allocations which do not induce the non-cooperative play of the auction:
Take any β˜-feasible allocation φ′ such that for at least one type profile the SPA is
played non-cooperatively, i.e., qA,Pφ′ (·) > 0. Then there exists some β˜-feasible allo-
cation that does not induce the non-cooperative play of the SPA and implies the
same utility for all types of both players.
Lemma 2.1. It is without loss of generality to focus attention on allocations that are such
that the SPA is never played non-cooperatively.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the grand game specifies (i) for each type of the
principal an optimal mechanism proposal, (ii) for each side mechanism a belief β˜
about the principal’s type, which is computed by Bayes’ rule whenever possible,
and (iii) for the continuation game starting with the proposal of any m ∈ M , a
β˜-feasible allocation implemented by m.
The principle of inscrutability (see Myerson, 1983) applies: By the revelation prin-
ciple, any allocation φ being induced by the perfect Bayesian equilibrium play of
the grand game is β-incentive-compatible. Because the agent’s payoff from the
non-cooperative play of the SPA is linear in the belief about the principal, φ is β-
feasible. Therefore φ can be induced through a pooling equilibrium, in which every
principal type proposes a mechanism directly implementing φ.
A β-feasible allocation φ thus can be supported in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
if and only if for anym′ ∈M there exists a belief β˜, such thatm′ induces a β˜-feasible
allocation, φ′, and UPφ (k) ≥ UPφ′(k) for all k ∈ ΘP .
Analysis
The considered three-stage collusive interaction falls into the class of informed-
principal problems under common values. The common values feature emerges
because the agent’s outside option depends on the principal’s type. This depen-
dency makes the problem interesting. Different types of the principal prefer differ-
ent allocations, and via the outside option, this information is payoff relevant for
the agent. These two main features of our model are best illustrated by considering
the principal’s common-knowledge payoff. Type k’s common-knowledge payoff is
induced by his most preferred β˜k = 1-feasible menu φc(·, k).
Definition 2.1. The common-knowledge allocation, φc, is the solution to the following
class of maximization problems. For each k ∈ ΘP , φc(·, k) is defined as solution to the
problem
max
φ(·,k)
UPφ (k) (P c)k
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such that ∀j ∈ ΘA :
(AIR)jk, (AIC)
j
k, (BB)j,k.
That is, φc(·, k) induces for principal type k the largest feasible payoff in the hypo-
thetical situation in which his type was commonly known.
Definition 2.2. We say that allocation φ is efficient if, for any realized type profile, the
bidder with the higher valuation receives the right. Else the allocation is inefficient.
Remark 2.1. φc is an efficient allocation, that is, ∀(j, k) ∈ Θ:
qPφc(j, k) = 1[θk ≥ j], qAφc(j, k) = 1− qPφc(j, k),
tPφc(j, k) = −1[θk < j]θk, tAφc(j, k) = −tPφc(j, k).
According to φc and given type k, the agent receives the right at transfer payment θk
if and only if his valuation is above θk. Otherwise both the agent and the principal
pay transfer zero and the principal receives the right. By this, principal type k
can extract the entire collusive surplus - i.e., the bidders’ payoff difference between
playing the auction collusively and non-cooperatively. That is, (AIR)jk is satisfied
with equality for any j ∈ ΘA. Because φc(·, k) is an efficient menu, the surplus is
also maximized.
Because different types of the principal prefer different allocations, qPφc(·,k) <
qPφc(·,k+1). Moreover, φ
c does not satisfy the omitted (PIC) constraint. Precisely
because of the common values feature of the considered collusive interaction, the
agent’s individual rationality constraints are eased in the type of the principal. As
a consequence, a given principal type k prefers the allocation φc(·, k + 1) to the
allocation φc(·, k). Therefore, φc is not a β-feasible allocation20 and cannot be im-
plemented in equilibrium.
A safe allocation is feasible for any belief about the principal. The principal’s best
safe allocation is termed RSW (Rothschild-Stigliz-Wilson) allocation, introduced by
Maskin and Tirole, 1992. By offering a mechanism which implements the best safe
allocation from his perspective, a given principal type, say kˇ, can secure himself a
minimal payoff.
Definition 2.3. The RSW allocation, φRSW , is the solution to the following class of maxi-
mization problems. For each kˇ ∈ ΘP we define the problem:
max
φ
UPφ (kˇ) (P1)kˇ
such that ∀j, k ∈ Θ :
(AIR)jk, (AIC)
j
k, (PIC)k, (BB)j,k.
That is, each principal type maximizes his utility subject to the constraint that
the resulting allocation is (β˜k = 1)-feasible for all k ∈ ΘP . φRSW is the so-
lution to any of these problems. Denote the objects being induced by φRSW as
{U iRSW (·), qiRSW (·), tiRSW (·)}i∈{A,P}.
The RSW allocation is inefficient in favor of the principal.
20Pathological cases in which φc is β-feasible are ruled out by assumption 2.
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Lemma 2.2. Whenever F (θk) < 1 and k > 0, then qPRSW (k) > F (θk).
If there are at least two principal types that receive the right with certainty, we say
that there exists a pool at the top.
Definition 2.4. Consider the set {k ∈ ΘP |qPRSW (k) = 1}. If it includes at least two types,
we call it the pool at the top. We denote its lowest element by K.
In the appendix (section A.2), we provide a detailed derivation of the RSW al-
location. Lemma 2.2 implies that the RSW allocation is inefficient in favor of the
principal. The RSW allocation satisfies the same constraints as φc, and in addition,
(PIC) (i.e., any type k prefers φRSW (·, k) to φRSW (·, k + 1)). Thus, principal types
separate. Types differ in their valuation for the good. Hence, the screening param-
eter is qPRSW (·). Because φc is efficient and does not satisfy (PIC), φRSW is such
that principal type k receives the right with probability larger than F (θk). Thereby,
some agent types with valuation above θk do not receive the right, given type k.
That is, separation introduces inefficiencies.
By construction, φRSW is β˜-feasible for any β˜. Therefore, a β-feasible allocation
can only be supported in equilibrium if every principal type receives weakly larger
payoff than UPRSW (·). Otherwise at least one type deviates by proposing a mecha-
nism which implements the RSW allocation.
To argue that the converse is also true - i.e., every β-feasible allocation that in-
duces every type of the principal weakly larger payoff than φRSW is an equilibrium
allocation - we build upon a theorem of Mylovanov and Tröger (2015).
Lemma 2.3. The methodology of Mylovanov and Tröger (2015) applies to our setting.
Mylovanov and Tröger (2015) define a secured payoff for each type of the princi-
pal. In our setup, the secured payoff is implemented by the RSW allocation.
Lemma 2.4. In the SPA, the secured payoff defined in Mylovanov and Tröger (2015) is
implemented by the RSW allocation.
If the vector consisting of each type’s secured payoff, the secured-payoff vector, is
undominated (from the principal’s perspective) for some belief about the principal,
then an allocation can be supported in equilibrium if and only if it is β-feasible and
leaves every type of the principal with weakly larger utility than his secured payoff.
Definition 2.5. Fix a belief β˜. An allocation φ is β˜-undominated if there exist positive
welfare weights {zk}Kk=0, with
∑K
k=0 zk = 1, zk > 0 if k /∈ supp(β˜) and
∑
k∈supp(β˜)
zk > 0,21
such that φ solves:
max
φ
K∑
k=0
zkU
P
φ (k) (P2)
subject to:
φ is β˜−feasible
21Because we are in a quasilinear utility environment, welfare weights may equal zero for a type
in the support of the belief.
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We prove that there exists a belief, β∗, such that the RSW allocation is undominated.
Note, this belief is not required to have full support, and in our setting β∗ does not
in general have full support.22
Lemma 2.5. There exists β∗ such that the RSW allocation is undominated.
For fixed belief β˜ and fixed welfare weights, problems like (P2) can be solved by
carefully relaxing the constraints and rewriting the problem. Eventually the objec-
tive consists of (generalized) virtual valuations. The allotment policy of the optimal
allocation can be identified as the point-wise maximizer of the objective (e.g., see
Ledyard and Palfrey, 2007). We take the reverse approach. For a given claimed
optimal allotment policy, qRSW (·), we construct a belief β∗ and welfare weights
such that the resulting virtual valuations imply that qRSW (·) is indeed a point-wise
maximizer of the (constructed) objective, and the associated allocation, φRSW , is
the optimal solution of the original problem (P2), given β˜ = β∗ and some welfare
weights.
Given lemma 2.5, the next proposition follows by applying Mylovanov and Tröger,
2015.
Proposition 2.1. An allocation can be supported in equilibrium if and only if it is β-feasible
and leaves every type of the principal with weakly larger payoff than UPRSW (·).
A direct consequence of proposition 2.1 is that the RSW allocation is always an
equilibrium allocation.
We are interested in whether efficient collusion is included in the large class
of equilibria allocations. The concept of β-undominated (equilibrium) allocations
turns out to be useful for our analysis. Because supp(β) = ΘP , the definition 2.5
becomes:
Definition 2.6. An allocation φ is β-undominated, or undominated, if there exist weakly
positive welfare weights {zk}Kk=0 (with zk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP and
∑K
k=0 zk = 1) such that φ
solves
max
φ
K∑
k=0
zkU
P
φ (k) (P˜3)z
subject to:
φ is β−feasible
Whenever φ is a solution of (P3)z , which is defined similarly to problem (P˜3)z but aug-
mented by the constraint
(PIR)k UPφ (k) ≥ UPRSW (k) ∀k ∈ ΘP
we say that φ is an undominated equilibrium allocation.
22Given their setting, Maskin and Tirole (1992) prove (theorem 1∗) that whenever the RSW al-
location is undominated (from the principal’s perspective) for some belief with full support, any
β-feasible allocation which leaves every principal type with weakly larger payoff than the RSW al-
location can be supported in equilibrium. Moreover, they state conditions under which the RSW
allocation is indeed undominated for full support beliefs (proposition 14). Not all of their conditions
are satisfied in our setup. Most importantly, their sorting assumption does not in general apply in
our setting. Consequently, we cannot directly apply their methodology. Indeed, whenever the sort-
ing assumption fails in our setting (which happens if there is a pool at the top), the RSW allocation is
dominated for all beliefs with full support.
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Problems (P˜3)z and (P3)z are instances of characterizing interim incentive-efficient
allocations in a quasilinear, independent-private-values environment. Because the
bidders’ outside options are convex in their types - (PIR) can be treated as the prin-
cipal’s individual rationality constraint - individual rationality constraints might
bind for multiple types of a given player.23
An important benchmark is ex-ante optimal allocations. An ex-ante optimal allo-
cation would result if the principal were able to propose the side mechanism before
learning his type. For given prior β, he solves the problem of maximizing his ex-
pected utility among all allocations that are β-feasible.
Definition 2.7. An ex-ante optimal allocation is a β-undominated allocation with zk = βk
for all k ∈ ΘP . That is, it is a solution to (P˜3)z .
An ex-ante optimal allocation corresponds to the hypothetical situation in which an
uninformed third party proposes the side mechanism in order to maximize bidder
P ’s (expected) payoff.
Proposition 2.2. Every ex-ante optimal allocation implies efficient collusion.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: The non-cooperative play of the
SPA allots the good efficiently. If collusion is efficient, the collusive play leads
to the same allotment of the good. By incentive compatibility, the difference be-
tween the agent’s collusive payoff and non-cooperative payoff is necessarily a type-
independent constant. By setting this constant to zero, the principal can extract the
entire collusive surplus. Because collusion is efficient, the surplus is also maxi-
mized.
The form of the resulting ex-ante optimal allocation, φe, is known to the literature.
Mailath and Zemsky, 1991 consider the case of a third party organizing collusion in
a SPA. A characterization of the class of efficient allocations for any division of the
collusive surplus between the cartel members is given. For the boundary case in
which one member receives all surplus, φe results. However, Mailath and Zemsky,
1991 analyze a different problem and therefore do not show that φe is the ex-ante
optimal allocation of this certain cartel member.24
Although φe allows the principal to absorb the entire collusive surplus, it can-
not always be supported in equilibrium. Fix any undominated allocation φ. By
standard mechanism design arguments (see, e.g, Ledyard and Palfrey, 2007), it fol-
lows that the principal’s payoff can be represented in a compact form. The next
lemma states this form for the case that the principal’s upward adjacent incentive
constraints hold with equality.25 The most preferred allocation of the largest prin-
cipal type falls into this class. As can be seen in the subsequent analysis, this is the
most relevant undominated allocation for the purpose of this paper.
23To characterize the set of allocations to the degree necessary for the purpose of our paper, we
employ some ideas of Ledyard and Palfrey, 2007. However, in contrast to the latter paper, we allow
for cases in which the bidders’ individual rationality constraints bind for more than one type of a
given player.
24As minor technical (but in our opinion, interesting) detail: When proving that φe is a solution to
(P˜3)z , every agent type (AIR)j constraint is binding.
25If the upward adjacent incentive constraints do not hold with equality, the payoffs look similar
as in lemma 2.6, but the form of vPφ (k) is cumbersome. For readability, we omit these cases in the
statement of the lemma.
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Lemma 2.6. Any undominated allocation φ, according to which the principal’s upward
adjacent incentive constraints hold with equality, induces the following payoffs:
UPφ (k) = vPφ (k) + UPφ (0) ∀k ∈ ΘP ,
with
vPφ (k) := UPφ (k)− UPφ (0) =
k∑
v=1
qPφ (v)(θv − θv−1) ∀k ∈ ΘP ,
vAφ (j) := UAφ (j)− UAφ (0) =
∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv ∀j ∈ ΘA,
and
UPφ (0) = Ej [qAφ (j)j − vAφ (j)] + Ek[qPφ (k)θk − vPφ (k)]− max
j∈ΘA
[UAD(j)− vAφ (j)].
Given the above necessary condition, we provide in section A.9 sufficient condi-
tions assuring that an allocation is indeed undominated. We term vPφ (k) the infor-
mation rent of principal type k and UPφ (0) the absorbed collusive surplus.
The principal is a player of the game he proposes. Therefore, any β-incentive-
compatible allocation yields him an information rent. Because the screening pa-
rameter is the probability of receiving the right, vPφ (k) is larger the larger qPφ (v) is
for any v ≤ k. In this sense, the principal prefers inefficient allocations in favor
of him. In addition, the principal designs the mechanism. By this he can extract
part of the collusive surplus and receives a constant payment, UPφ (0). If collusion
is efficient, this surplus is maximized and fully extracted. If collusion is inefficient
the surplus is not maximized. Moreover, the agent receives a collusive rent equal
to maxj∈ΘA [UAD(j)− vAφ (j)], which assures his participation.
The RSW allocation is inefficient in favor of the principal, given any type of the
principal. If collusion is efficient, then qPφe(k) ≤ qPφRSW (k), and thus UPRSW (k) −
UPφe(k) is increasing in k. Therefore, efficient collusion can be supported in equilib-
rium if and only if the highest type of the principal K prefers φe to φRSW .
Lemma 2.7. Efficient collusion can be supported in equilibrium if and only if UPφe(K) ≥
UPRSW (K).
We first verify that if types are close to being symmetric, even the highest type
prefers efficient collusion to any other β-feasible allocation.
Definition 2.8. Suppose θK + ∆ = J , with ∆ := θk − θk−1 = θKK . Suppose that f(·)
is differentiable and βk = F (∆ + θk) − F (θk) for any k > 0. For any k > 0, define
f˜(k) := F (∆ + θk)− F (θk)−∆f(θk).
If f˜(k) is non-negative, maxk>0 f˜(k) ≤ δ and such that f˜(k)f(k) is non-decreasing in k, we
say that F (·) and B(·) are δ-close distributions.
We show that φe is a solution to problem (P˜3)z with zK = 1 whenever F (·) andB(·)
are δ-close distributions, with δ and/or ∆ being sufficiently close to zero. That is,
the principal’s type distribution is a sufficiently good discrete approximation of the
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agent’s type distribution; the remaining conditions in definition 2.8 are of technical
nature.26
Lemma 2.8. Assume that F (·) and B(·) are δ-close distributions. If δ is sufficiently close
to zero, then φe is an equilibrium allocation.
Suppose the highest principal type, K, were able to decide upon the collusive al-
location φ. That is, he maximizes vPφ (K) + UPφ (0) − maxj∈ΘA [UAD(j) − vAφ (j)]. Let
him start at an efficient allocation φe. Suppose he introduces inefficiencies on the
allotment policy in favor of the principal such that his information rent increases.
In turn, the information rent of the highest agent type, J , immediately decreases
to a value below the information rent the latter receives from the non-cooperative
play of the SPA. To assure that the agent is still willing to participate in the collu-
sive agreement, the latter, independently of his type, receives a lump-sum payment
equal to the loss of J ’s information rent. Hence, type K optimally maximizes the
sum of his and J ’s information rent. Since both bidders are close to being symmet-
ric, a symmetric allotment policy is desired.
Having established this feature, we interpret UPφe(0) as the seller’s forgone rev-
enue being extracted by the principal. This revenue increases, the stronger bidder
P is in stochastic terms. Because UPRSW (K) is independent of β, the difference be-
tween UPφe(K) and UPRSW (K) increases if bidder P becomes stronger. Hence, if
φe can be supported in equilibrium for some β with associated distribution B(·),
it can also be supported for any β˜ whose associated distribution, B˜(·), first-order
stochastically dominates B(·).
However, efficient collusion cannot always be supported in equilibrium. If bid-
der P is much weaker than bidder A, and the former has large probability mass
on low types, then the collusive surplus is rather low. In such an instance, from
type K’s perspective, maximizing and extracting the collusive surplus is less desir-
able than maximizing the information rent. As a consequence, K prefers inefficient
allocations, such as φRSW , to φe.
Proposition 2.3. For any given distribution of the agent’s type, there exists a distribution
of the principal’s type, Bˆ(·),27 such that the highest principal type is indifferent between
UPRSW (K) and UPφe(K).
Moreover, principal type K’s payoff induced by efficient collusion increases if the dis-
tribution of the principal’s type increases in the sense of first-order stochastic domination.
Hence, if B(·) first-order stochastically dominates Bˆ(·), then efficient collusion can arise in
equilibrium. If B(·) is first order stochastically-dominated by Bˆ(·), then efficient collusion
cannot be supported in equilibrium.
An immediate consequence of lemma 2.8 and proposition 2.3 is that if both bidders
can be ordered according to first-order stochastic dominance and the stronger of
26If the technical conditions are violated, then we would suspect that efficient collusion still can
be supported as equilibrium of the game. Let φzK denote the solution to problem (P˜3)z with zK = 1.
For any φ, UPφ (K) is continuous in B(·) and F (·). Thus, though φzK 6= φe, if B(·) is sufficiently close
to F (·) then maxk∈{1,...,K} |UPφe(K) − UPφzK (K)| is sufficiently small. Hence, the principal’s utility
induced by φe also dominates the RSW payoff, implying φe to be an equilibrium allocation.
27Bˆ(·) is not unique. In the proof of lemma 2.3 we construct Bˆ(·) as a convex combination between
a distribution that has sufficiently large probability mass on type 0, and arbitrary little on all other
types, say B0(·), and one that has sufficiently large probability mass on type K. However, one also
can construct Bˆ(·) by taking a convex combination between B0 and a distribution that is close to the
agent’s type distribution, in the sense of definition 2.8.
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them is the principal,28 efficient collusion can be supported in equilibrium. That is,
if both bidders are not too asymmetric or can be ordered according to first-order
stochastic dominance, then one can always find a distribution of bargaining power
such that the cartel can achieve its joint profit-maximizing benchmark of efficient
collusion.
These are our main results concerning collusion in the SPA. In section 2.5.1 we
apply the Intuitive Criterion to refine the set of equilibria.
2.4 Collusion in the FPA
We stick to the notation introduced above. In particular, the set of the principal’s
side mechanismsM is the same as in the case of collusion in the SPA. What changes
are the payoffs induced by the non-cooperative play of the auction, UPD (·) and
UAD(·).29 The non-cooperative equilibrium play of the FPA depends on the bid-
ders’ beliefs at the beginning of stage t = 3, and so do UPD (·) and UAD(·). Hence,
in the FPA, the bidders’ payoffs induced by any (collusive) allocation φ that results
from their interaction differs from the case of collusion in the SPA. However, this
difference exclusively affects the non-cooperative outcome qA,Pφ (·). Without loss of
generality, we assume that in case the non-cooperative outcome results, this event
is commonly known by both bidders.30
Preliminary Observations Let us start our analysis by defining a feasible allo-
cation in the FPA.
Definition 2.9. Suppose collusion is in the FPA and the agent holds belief β˜ about the
principal. We say that an allocation φ is β˜-feasible if there exists an off-path belief about the
agent’s type such that the allocation can be implemented by a mechanism that is accepted
by all types of the agent. We say that this certain off-path belief about the agent enforces φ.
Continuation Game after period 1 Consider the continuation game starting
with the beginning of period t = 2 where the agent decides whether to accept or
to reject m, the proposed collusive side mechanism. The agent’s belief about the
principal, β˜, might differ from the prior. If a continuation equilibrium exists (more
on this below), the revelation principle implies that the bidders’ interaction results
in a (collusive) allocation, φ, which is β˜-incentive-compatible. Moreover, φ can be
implemented by a mechanism, mˆ, that is accepted by every agent type. Either, the
considered continuation equilibrium play that induces φ is such that every agent
type accepts m. In this case, mˆ can be chosen equals m, and φ is enforced by the
off-path belief that would result if m were rejected. Or, the continuation equilib-
rium play that induces φ is such that m is rejected by some agent types, that is,
qA,Pφ (·) > 0 for some type profiles. In this case, mˆ can, for example, be chosen as
28Of course, the principal’s type space is required to be a discrete approximation of a continuous
type space as in definition 2.8.
29We slightly abuse notation by redefining in this section UAD(·) as the agent’s payoff induced by
the non-cooperative play of the FPA.
30This assumption is equivalent to not enlarging M by those mechanisms that allow for recom-
mended actions in the play of the FPA. Because of the side transfers, the bidders’ types can be directly
screened without relying on the play of some communication equilibrium of the FPA. Indeed, the ar-
guments presented in the subsequent analysis do survive an enlargement, in the above sense, of M .
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a revelation mechanism that directly implements φ. The commonly known belief
the principal holds about the agent after observing the outcome qA,Pφ (·), is equal
to the on-path belief the former holds about the latter after observing the rejection
of m. Moreover, because φ is β˜-incentive-compatible, the considered belief about
the agent necessarily enforces φ. As a consequence, any allocation that is induced
through some (continuation) equilibrium play is β˜-feasible.
Non-cooperative play of the FPA We focus attention on equilibria of the FPA
that feature non-dominated bidding. That is, no type of a bidder submits a bid
above his type. Given this, we show that any β˜-feasible allocation can be enforced
by a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on the highest agent type.
Suppose the agent holds arbitrary belief β˜ about the principal and rejects the pro-
posed mechanismm that implements a β˜-feasible allocation. Assume this behavior
results in a degenerate (off-path) belief concentrated on the highest agent type.
Lemma 2.9. The non-cooperative play of the FPA, given belief β˜ about the principal and a
degenerate belief concentrated on the highest agent type J ,31 induces agent type j the payoff
UAD(j, β˜) = max
kˇ∈ΘP
B˜(kˇ)(j − θkˇ).
By lemma 2.9, the play of the FPA is from the agent’s point of view as if every type
of the principal submits a bid equal to his type. That is, principal types’ bids are
maximized. Hence, a degenerate belief concentrated on agent type J is the worst
off-path belief from every agent types’ perspective. Thus, any β˜-feasible allocation
can be enforced by a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on agent type J .
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the grand game specifies (i) an optimal mech-
anism proposal for each type of the principal, (ii) for each mechanism m a belief β˜
about the principal type, which is computed by Bayes’ rule whenever possible; and
(iii) for the continuation game starting with the proposal ofm a β˜-feasible allocation
implemented by m.
Note that Myerson (1983)’s principle of inscrutability applies to the FPA. Any
β˜-feasible allocation can be enforced by a degenerate off-path belief concentrated
on agent type J . By the revelation principle, any allocation φ being induced by the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium play of the grand game is β-incentive-compatible. Be-
cause the agent’s payoff from the non-cooperative play of the FPA with degenerate
belief concentrated on agent type J is convex in the belief about the principal, φ is
β-feasible.32 Therefore φ can be induced through a pooling equilibrium in which
every principal type proposes a mechanism directly implementing φ.
31In case there are multiple continuation equilibria, we choose the following: Every principal type
weakly below arg maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(J − θkˇ) submits a bid equal to his type. This approach assures that
any β˜-feasible allocation can be enforced by an off-path belief about agent type J . We show in the
subsequent analysis that the chosen continuation equilibrium is part of the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the grand game.
32This means, concerning the non-cooperative play of the FPA, the agent can only be harmed from
being less informed about the principal’s type. Or, let Me be the set of those game forms that occur
with positive probability in some hypothetical separating equilibrium. Denote the probability that
me with me ∈Me occurs in equilibrium by Pr(me) > 0 and by βme the resulting posterior about the
principal. Let Bme(·) be the associated distribution. Then,
∑
me∈Me Pr(m
e) maxkˇ∈ΘP Bme(kˇ)(j −
θkˇ) ≥ maxkˇ∈ΘP B(kˆ)(j − θkˇ). That is, the channel identified by Dequiedt, 2006 and Celik and Peters,
2011 does not apply.
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A β-feasible allocation φ thus can be supported in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
if and only if for any m′ ∈ M there exist β˜ such that m′ induces a β˜-feasible alloca-
tion, φ′, and UPφ (k) ≥ UPφ′(k) for all k ∈ ΘP .
Outline of the approach To apply the informed-principal methodology used
to analyze collusion in the SPA, one must verify the existence of equilibrium of
the non-cooperative play of the FPA for arbitrary beliefs, both about the principal
and the agent.33 To avoid this, we take a different approach to solve the consid-
ered three-stage collusive interaction. For the special cases in which β˜ is a point
belief or the belief about the agent is a point belief, the non-cooperative play of the
FPA can be analyzed without complications. We employ this feature and directly
characterize an equilibrium of the grand game. Afterwards, we verify that it is
unique (in terms of payoffs). To be more precise, we verify that the following play
can be supported in equilibrium: Every type of the principal proposes the same
mechanism, m˜, and the agent accepts the proposal. If the agent deviates and re-
jects the mechanism, the FPA is played non-cooperatively with degenerate off-path
belief concentrated on the highest agent type. If the principal deviates and pro-
poses m different from m˜, the continuation game is played with the agent holding
a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on the lowest principal type. That is, any
principal’s deviation induces some (β˜0 = 1)-feasible allocation.
Throughout the subsequent analysis, we remark relations to the informed-principal
methodology in footnotes.
What makes the analyzed problem interesting is the interplay between (i) the
principal’s large set of side mechanisms and (ii) the dependence of the agent’s bid
in the non-cooperative play of the FPA on β˜.
Let us abuse notation a bit and indicate by φβ˜m the allocation that is implemented
by the side mechanismmwith the agent holding arbitrary belief β˜ about the princi-
pal. This abuse of notation is justified, because, as a consequence of point (ii) above,
side mechanisms that implement different allocations for different beliefs about the
principal are relevant. One such side mechanism is m˜. It plays a prominent role in
our analysis.
Mechanism m˜. Denote the agent’s action or report by d ∈ ΘP . Let the principal’s action
or report be kˆ ∈ ΘP . Given the report profile (d, kˆ) = (kˇ, k), m˜ specifies the collusive
outcome (qim˜(·), tim˜(·))i∈{A,P} according to:
(qAm˜(d = kˇ, k), tAm˜(d = kˇ, k)) =
{
(0, 0) if k > kˇ ,
(1, θkˇ) if k ≤ kˇ .
(qPm˜(d = kˇ, k), tPm˜(d = kˇ, k)) =
{
(1, 0) if k > kˇ ,
(0,−θkˇ) if k ≤ kˇ .
33With the beginning of period 2 the agent decides whether to accept or to reject the mechanism
proposed by the principal. At the start of this continuation game, the agent might hold some arbitrary
belief, β˜, about the principal. If the agent rejects the mechanism, the FPA is played non-cooperatively,
possibly with the principal holding belief about the agent which differs from the prior. Arguing for
existence of the equilibrium of the non-cooperative play of the FPA in such a setting is a difficult task.
Given the literature, e.g., Krishna, 2002, we strongly believe that it is impossible without imposing
more structure on the FPA (e.g., allow only for discrete bid increments). However, this comes at
notational and computational-costs.
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Note that m˜ is a simultaneous-move mechanism but not a direct revelation mecha-
nism.
Lemma 2.10. For any β˜, the play of m˜ is such that principal type k reports kˆ = k, every
agent type receives payoff equal to his outside option, UAD(j, β˜), and any principal type k is
left with weakly larger payoff than θk.
As a consequence, for any β˜ the mechanism m˜ directly implements a β˜-feasible
allocation, φβ˜m˜, with U
P
φβ˜m˜
(k) ≥ θk.
As for intuition, the non-cooperative play of the FPA depends on β˜. For example,
if this belief has high mass on low principal types, then bidder A submits a fairly
low bid and wins the auction only against low types of bidder P , but at a low price.
Conversely, if β˜ has high mass on high bidder P types, bidder A submits a rather
high bid and wins the auction against high types of bidder P , but at a large price.
That is, if kˇ(j, β˜) stands for arg maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(j − θkˇ), then the non-cooperative
play of the FPA is from the agent’s point of view as if the following allocation were
induced:
qAD(j, k) = 1[kˇ(j, β˜) ≥ k], tAD(j, k) = 1[kˇ(j, β˜) ≥ k]θkˇ(j,β˜)
The mechanism m˜ exploits this famous bid-shading property of the FPA. m˜ corre-
sponds to the following hypothetical situation: The principal constructs a pool of
K+1 menus, with a generic menu indexed by kˇ. Afterwards, it’s the agent’s turn to
propose a menu out of the pool. Finally, the principal determines the allocation by
picking an element from the proposed menu.
Each menu in the constructed pool consists of a price at which the principal can
buy the right and a compensation. If the principal picks the compensation, he com-
mits to stay out of the auction and the agent receives the right. In menu kˇ the price
is equal to zero whereas the compensation is equal to θkˇ.
If principal type k chooses from menu kˇ, he picks the compensation if and only if
k ≤ kˇ. Thus, for any β˜, selecting the optimal menu is from the agent’s perspective
exactly the same problem as deciding upon the optimal bid in the non-cooperative
play of the FPA. Hence, every agent type accepts m˜ and receives payoff equal to his
outside option.
As a direct consequence of lemma 2.10, in any equilibrium of the grand game
in which the continuation game that starts after the rejection of m˜ is played with
degenerate off-path belief concentrated on agent type J , no type of the principal
receives lower payoff than θk. This is the payoff principal type k receives from
proposing m˜, when m˜ is played with the worst (off-path) belief, β˜0 = 1, from any
principal’s type perspective, given the mechanism m˜.34
Note, by proposing m˜, large principal types secure themselves a huge payoff. As
for comparison, let us consider the principal’s common-knowledge payoff in the
FPA.
34In the SPA, the principal’s best safe payoff is UPRSW (·). Here, the best safe payoff, or the RSW al-
location, yields all but the lowest principal type a lower payoff than θk and thus cannot be supported
in equilibrium. In fact, one can show that θk is the principal’s secured payoff, defined by Mylovanov
and Tröger, 2015. Thus, the secured payoff is different from the best safe payoff.
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Definition 2.10. In the FPA, the common-knowledge allocation, φ˜c, is the solution to the
following class of maximization problems. For each k ∈ ΘP , φ˜c(·, k) is defined as solution
to the problem
max
φ(·,k)
UPφ (k) (P˜ c)k
such that ∀j ∈ ΘA :
(AIC)jk, (BB)j,k,
(AIR)jk U
A
φ(·,k)(j, k) ≥ UAD(j, β˜k = 1) = 1[j ≥ k](j − θk)
The difference to definition 2.1, which defines the common-knowledge payoff in
the SPA, is that the (AIR)β˜k=1 constraints are evaluated at a different default game.
However, the play of the FPA with point belief about principal type k and degener-
ate off-path belief concentrated on agent type J is such that principal type k submits
a bid equal to his type. Hence, the agent’s (AIR)β˜k=1 constraints are the same as in
definition 2.1. By this, the common-knowledge allocation takes the same form as
in the SPA.
Remark 2.2. φ˜c = φc. Hence, φ˜c is an efficient allocation, and UP
φ˜c(·,k)(k) = θk for all
k ∈ ΘP .
Hence, m˜ leaves especially large principal types with weakly larger payoff than
their common-knowledge payoff. As a consequence, the proposal can be supported
as equilibrium, which takes the following form:
Every type of the principal proposes m˜. If the principal proposes a different
mechanism, a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on the lowest principal type
results. If the agent rejects m˜, a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on the high-
est agent type results.
Proposition 2.4. There exists an equilibrium such that every principal type proposes m˜ or
a mechanism that implements φβm˜.
Any deviation, say m′, of the principal results in a degenerate off-path belief con-
centrated on the lowest principal type, β˜0 = 1. Given this, the non-cooperative
play of the FPA, for any belief about the agent, is such that the agent submits a
bid equal to θ0 and wins the auction with certainty against principal type 0. Con-
sequently the considered (off-path) continuation game has an equilibrium and we
know about its properties. This knowledge is sufficient to verify that any (β˜0 = 1)-
feasible allocation leaves every type of the principal with payoff no larger than θk.
As for intuition, even if all agent types reject the side mechanismm′ and every prin-
cipal type k, with k > 0, wins the auction at price θ0 = 0, no type receives payoff
larger than his common-knowledge payoff, θk.35
The equilibrium is unique:
Theorem 2.1. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the grand game, the allocation im-
plemented by the play of m˜ is the unique β-feasible equilibrium allocation.
To establish the theorem, we build upon the next two lemmatas: We first restrict
our attention to those equilibria in which the continuation game that starts after the
35To relate to the informed-principal methodology: We essentially show that the secured-payoff
vector is undominated for the belief β˜0 = 1.
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agent rejected m˜ is played with a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on agent
type J . We show that, for any prior β there exists only one allocation in terms of
payoffs, which yields the largest principal type payoff no lower than θK . This is
the allocation that is implemented by the play of m˜ under β. Every other β-feasible
allocation leaves the largest principal type with strictly lower payoff than θK and
therefore cannot be supported in equilibrium.
Lemma 2.11. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the grand game, being such that the
rejection of m˜ is followed by a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on agent type J , the
allocation implemented by the play of m˜ is the unique β-feasible equilibrium allocation.
Given this, the following observation establishes uniqueness: Suppose there ex-
ists some hypothetical equilibrium which induces an allocation different from φβm˜.
We know from the proof of lemma 2.11 that principal type K receives strictly
lower payoff than θK in this equilibrium. Suppose principal type K deviates from
such a hypothetical equilibrium by proposing m˜. This mechanism is a slightly
perturbed version of m˜, such that every agent type receives -larger payoff than
maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(j−θkˇ), with  positive, but arbitrarily small. In any perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the grand game, the continuation equilibrium that begins after the
principal’s proposal of m˜ is such that every agent type accepts m˜: Suppose to the
contrary that some agent types, holding arbitrary off-path belief β˜ on the principal,
reject m˜. Denote by j the lowest such agent type and by ΠA(j) the agent’s ex-
pected payoff from playing the FPA non-cooperatively against the principal, with
the agent holding arbitrary belief about the principal, and the principal holding be-
lief about the agent that only has positive mass on those types for which ΠA(j) ≥
maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(j−θkˇ)+. We show that, in any such equilibrium of the FPA in non-
dominated bidding strategies36 type j receives payoff ΠA(j) = maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(j −
θkˇ). Thus, j strictly prefers to accept m˜, leaving him with  larger payoff. Hence,
the continuation game that starts after the proposal of m˜ features a unique per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium: Every agent type accepts m˜. Therefore, an allocation
that induces the highest principal type payoff strictly lower than θK cannot be sup-
ported in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. K deviates by proposing m˜ and receives
payoff arbitrarily close to m˜.
Lemma 2.12. In any equilibrium of the grand game, the rejection of m˜ is followed by a
degenerate off-path belief concentrated on agent type J .
By this, the unique equilibrium in the FPA is inefficient, making it impossible for
the cartel to achieve its joint profit-maximizing benchmark of efficient collusion.
Note that this equilibrium is robust in the sense that it survives refinement con-
cepts. Concerning a deviation of the agent, it satisfies the concept of ratifiability
introduced by Cramton and Palfrey, 1995 and also the Intuitive Criterion. Concern-
ing a deviation of the principal, the equilibrium necessarily survives the Intuitive
Criterion, because every type of the principal receives weakly larger payoff than
his common-knowledge payoff.
Remark 2.3. φβm˜ is ratifiable. Moreover, the equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
36If there does not exist an equilibrium of the FPA, the unique continuation equilibrium is the one
which every agent type accepts m˜.
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The allocation being implemented by m˜, φβm˜, leaves every principal type with at
least his common-knowledge payoff. Compared to collusion in the SPA ,this is an
extremely large payoff for high principal types. Low types receive from φβm˜ larger
payoff than from the RSW allocation, the best safe allocation in the SPA. However,
compared to less inefficient equilibria allocations, low types are better off in the
SPA.
As an implication, in the FPA, the distribution of the principal’s utilities is fairly
unequal. As a consequence, φβm˜ gives rise to large principal information rents and
thus to large inefficiencies of the allotment policy in favor of the principal.
Hence, the least inefficient equilibrium of the SPA is less inefficient than the
unique equilibrium of the FPA.
Definition 2.11. The least inefficient equilibrium allocation in the SPA is defined as solu-
tion to:
max
φ
Ej,k[UPφ (k) + UAφ (j)]
subject to:
φ is β−feasible,
UPφ (k) ≥ UPRSW (k) ∀k ∈ ΘP
We show that if the cartel can achieve its least inefficient equilibrium, then collusive
profits are larger in the SPA than in the FPA.
Proposition 2.5. The least inefficient equilibrium if collusion is in the SPA is less ineffi-
cient than the unique equilibrium in case collusion is in a FPA.
Both the allotment policy resulting from collusion in the FPA and the RSW allot-
ment policy, defined for the case of collusion in the SPA, can be described by a
weakly increasing sequence of threshold agent types. Principal type k receives the
right if and only if the agent’s type is below the threshold associated with type k.
Now consider the allotment policy that corresponds to the element-wise minimum
of these two sequences. Because both sequences induce an inefficient allotment
policy - i.e., the threshold agent type associated with principal type k is larger than
θk - we know that the allotment policy described by the element-wise minimum
sequence is less inefficient than any of the original policies. Suppose that at least
one element of the latter sequence is equal to the FPA threshold. Then, we show
that the policy corresponding to the element-wise minimum sequence gives rise
to an allocation that every principal type prefers to the RSW allocation. Hence,
the element-wise minimum sequence can be implemented in an equilibrium of the
SPA. By this we establish that the least inefficient equilibrium is necessarily less
inefficient than the unique FPA equilibrium.
2.5 Extensions for Collusion in the SPA
In the next sections we give a characterization allocations that survive the Intuitive
Criterion.
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2.5.1 The Intuitive Criterion
In this section we characterize the set of equilibria surviving Cho and Kreps, 1987’s
Intuitive Criterion (henceforth CK criterion). We show that efficient collusion is
never contained in this set. Since the CK criterion is a rather mild refinement con-
cept, this implies that efficient collusion is only robust to a minimal form of signal-
ing. Let us start by introducing some additional notation.
CK criterion
Consider some given equilibrium allocation which induces {Up(k), qp(k), tp(k)}Kk=0.
Consider an off-path collusive side mechanismm′. We define byM(k, β˜,m′) the set
of continuation payoffs of principal type k, induced by the play of the continuation
game starting with the beginning of period t = 2. The continuation game begins
with the agent’s decision whether to accept m′ while holding some (arbitrary) be-
lief β˜ about the principal. Whenever the mechanism is rejected, we still hold fix
the weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of the SPA. Note that M(k, β˜,m′) is a
set, since it might be the case that the play of the collusive side mechanism m′ has
multiple equilibria.
We indicate by β˜1 ∈ B1(m′) := {b ∈ RK+ |
∑K
k=0 bk = 1, supp(b) = Ξ1(m′)} a
belief about the principal that is restricted to have support only in the set Ξ1, being
defined by
Ξ1(m′) := {k ∈ Θp|∃β˜ ∈ B0 : maxM(k, β˜,m′) ≥ Up(k)}.
We also define the following set:
Ξ2(m′) := {k ∈ Ξ1(m′)|minM(k, β˜1,m′) > Up(k) ∀β˜1 ∈ B1(m′)}.
An equilibrium allocation fails to satisfy the CK criterion if and only if there exists
an m′ such that Ξ2(m′) is nonempty.
We show that an equilibrium allocation satisfies the CK criterion if and only if
there does not exist a separation menu for any principal type k ∈ Θp.
Definition 2.12. Fix principal types k and k − 1 with equilibrium payoffs Up(k) and
Up(k − 1). A menu φ(·, k) is called separation menu for type k if it satisfies:
(AIR)jk, (AIC)
j
k, (BB)j,k ∀j ∈ ΘA,
Upφ(·,k)(k − 1) < Up(k − 1),
Upφ(·,k)(k) > U
p(k).
Denote the menu by φSk and let t
p
φS
k
, qp
φS
k
stand for the principal’s expected transfer payment
and allotment probability, conditional that the menu is unanimously accepted by all agent
types.
A separation menu for principal type k satisfies the agent’s individual rationality
and incentive constraints given a point belief about the principal type k. Moreover,
in contrast to the principal type k, k − 1 does not prefer φSk to the equilibrium
allocation.
The concept of a separation menu is useful to determine whether an equilibrium
allocation satisfies the CK criterion. However, it should be noted that we do not
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prove that a separation menu is an off-path side mechanism making the equilib-
rium fail the CK criterion. We do prove, however, that the failure of the CK criterion
implies the existence of a separating menu. Moreover, we show that the existence
of a separation menu implies the existence of some side mechanism, which in turn
implies the failure of the CK criterion.
We sketch the only if part of the proof as follows: Suppose the equilibrium al-
location fails the CK criterion. Fix the corresponding off-path mechanism m′. We
know by hypothesis that the sets Ξ1(m′) and Ξ2(m′) are non-empty. Consider a
hypothetical world in which the agent’s belief about the principal, say β˜, has only
support in Ξ1(m′), i.e., β˜ ∈ B1(m′). Suppose furthermore that the set of collusive
side mechanisms from which the principal is allowed to propose one, say Mˆ(m′),
consists of those mechanisms which induce any k˜ /∈ Ξ1(m′) for any β˜ ∈ B1(m′) a
payoff weakly lower than equilibrium utility, i.e., Up(k˜) ≥ maxM(k˜, β˜,m′). The as-
sumption that the equilibrium allocation fails the CK criterion implies that Mˆ(m′) is
non-empty, since at least m′ is included. We continue by constructing the secured-
payoff vector37 in the hypothetical world, which is characterized by the above
stated constraints. The failure of the CK criterion implies that any principal type k
with k ∈ Ξ2(m′) receives secured payoff strictly larger than equilibrium utility. By
offering m′, k can secure himself for any β˜ ∈ B1(m′) utility strictly larger than his
equilibrium utility.
Having established this feature of the secured payoff, we proceed by showing
its equivalence to the value of a tractable maximization problem. The solution to
this latter problem yields something that can be thought of as RSW allocation in
the introduced hypothetical world. In contrast to (P1)kˇ, which defines the origi-
nal RSW allocation, the latter program is subject to a weakened (PIC) constraint
for those types of the principal not in Ξ1(m′). Instead of leaving them with their
RSW utility when reporting truthfully, they can garner equilibrium payoff. As final
step, we use the constraints of the maximization problem defining the hypothetical
RSW allocation to verify that a separation menu exists, if and only if at least one
type of the principal strictly prefers the hypothetical RSW allocation to the equilib-
rium allocation. Thus, the non-existence of a separation menu is sufficient that an
equilibrium allocation satisfies the CK criterion.
In order to argue for necessity, let k′ be the lowest principal type for which there
exists a separation menu. We construct an off-path mechanism, mCK , such that
in any continuation equilibria, given any belief about the principal, no type of the
principal below k′ profits in comparison to equilibrium. To construct mCK we first
solve a class of maximization problems, similar to (P1)kˇ. However, the principal’s
upward adjacent incentive constraints are eased; the menu associated with princi-
pal type k, say φCK(·, k), satisfies the requirement that principal type k − 1 prefers
either his equilibrium payoff or φCK(·, k − 1) to φCK(·, k). mCK then consists of
these K+1 menus. Moreover, the assumption of the existence of a separation menu
37The term secured-payoff vector refers to the definition in Mylovanov and Tröger (2015). Inspired
by this definition, we define the secured payoff of principal type k the following way:
UPm′(k) := sup
m∈Mˆ(m′)
min
β˜∈B1(m′),UPm∈M(k,β˜,m)
UPm(k)
where Mˆ(m′) is a set that consists of those side mechanisms, being such that any type k˜ not in Ξ1(m′)
receives in any continuation game after the offer of m ∈ Mˆ(m′) payoff lower than equilibrium utility
(for any belief in B1(m′)).
2.5. Extensions for Collusion in the SPA 37
implies that at least principal type k′ prefers the allocation implemented by mCK
to the equilibrium allocation.
To assure that mCK is unanimously accepted by any agent type for any β˜, we
introduce a lottery that the agent triggers if it is likely, from his perspective, that
the mechanism is offered by a principal type below k′. That is, we augment the
message space of the agent by a binary report d ∈ {0, 1} that he submits together
with his type report. If he reports d = 0 and the principal submits a report weakly
above k′, the agent is required to make a small payment. However, he might receive
a large payment, −DA, in case the principal reports to have a type below k′. This
payment is chosen, such that the agent prefers the collusive side mechanism to the
play of the default game for any belief about the principal’s types. If the agent
reports d = 1, then the lottery is degenerate and pays off zero independently of the
principal’s report.
To assure that the lottery payment is budget feasible and that it does not alter the
principal’s incentives to report his type truthfully, we make use of money burning,
i.e., the mechanism might create a budget surplus. That is, if the agent reports
d = 0, then the principal has to pay DA independently of his report. If his report
is above k′, then this money is burned. Because no type of the principal prefers the
agent to report d = 0, the above construction assures that an equilibrium does not
survive the Intuitive Criterion if there exists a separation menu for at least one type
of the principal.
Lemma 2.13. An allocation fails the CK criterion if and only if for at least one type of the
principal there exists a separating menu.
In order to make use of the condition on the existence of separation menus, the
concept of cross subsidizing turns out to be helpful.
Definition 2.13. Fix principal type k, and a probability x ∈ [0, 1]. Define the menu
φx(·, k) as the solution to the following problem:
φx(·, k) := arg max
φ(·,k)
Upφ(·,k)(k)
subject to:
(AIR)jk, (AIC)
j
k, (BB)j,k ∀j ∈ ΘA,
qpφ(·,k) = x.
Whenever x is equal to principal type k’s equilibrium allotment probability, that is, x =
qp(k), we denote φqp(k)(·, k) by φEk and refer to it as principal k’s equilibrium menu. When-
ever tp
φE
k
≤ (≥)tp(k) we say that principal type k pays a subsidy (receives a subsidy) in
equilibrium.
In words, we fix the probability according to which principal type k receives the
right in equilibrium. From his point of view we construct an optimal menu, which
implements the same allotment probability under the minimal expected payment
to the agent. The menu is subject to the agent’s incentive-compatibility and individ-
ual rationality constraints, given type k. We say that principal type k is subsidized
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if the expected transfer payment from the constructed menu is larger than the ex-
pected transfer payment in equilibrium.
We employ the above concept to identify sufficient and necessary conditions for
the existence of a separation menu for principal type k. To begin with, we show
in the appendix that it is without loss of generality to assume that the principal’s
upward adjacent incentive constraints are satisfied with equality.
Given this, a necessary condition for the non-existence of a separation menu for
type k is that he receives a weakly positive subsidy whenever he does not receive
the right in equilibrium with certainty. To see this, suppose that k pays a strictly
positive subsidy. We construct a separation menu the following way: Starting from
k’s equilibrium allocation, we marginally increase the allotment probability and
the transfer payment such that principal type k − 1 does not profit from the allo-
cation induced by the constructed menu, in contrast to k. The agent’s individual
rationality constraints are still satisfied, since k is a subsidizer.
Conversely, one can show that type k has no separating menu if he receives the
right with certainty or is cross-subsidized by other types.
As a consequence, any equilibrium that supports efficient collusion fails the CK
criterion. Given any such equilibrium allocation, the resulting equilibrium menu
of any type of the principal, say k, is common-knowledge menu φc(·, k). This menu
can be described the following way: the agent is left with the decision either to
buy the right at price θk or to select the duty to stay out of the auction at zero
compensation. This menu generates the same allotment policy than the equilibrium
allocation, and implies payoff for any principal type equal to θk. To see that there
is at least one type of the principal receiving lower payoff than in equilibrium,
i.e., there exists kˇ such that Upφe(kˇ) < θkˇ, observe that otherwise every type of the
principal would receive larger utility than his type. However, such an allocation is
not consistent with both the balanced budget condition and the agent’s individual
rationality constraints.
Finally, observe that both the RSW allocation and the RSW allocation with entry
fee38 survive the Intuitive Criterion, since any type of the principal who does not
receive the right with certainty is (weakly) subsidized.
Proposition 2.6. An equilibrium allocation survives the CK criterion only if the allotment
policy is inefficient in favor of the principal. In particular, the RSW allocation survives the
CK criterion. If there does not exist a pool at the top, i.e., K > K, then the RSW allocation
is the only allocation surviving the CK criterion.
As a consequence of proposition 2.6 the RSW allocation is the unique equilibrium
allocation surviving the CK criterion if and only if there does not exists a pool of
principal types at the top. This observation is in line with Maskin and Tirole, 1992.
The non-existence of the pool at the top implies that their sorting assumption is
satisfied. One of their results states that, whenever there is only private informa-
tion on the principal’s side and the sorting assumption is satisfied, then the RSW
allocation is the unique equilibrium surviving the CK criterion.
38In the case that K < K the RSW allocation is such that those principal types in the pool at the
top, i.e., in {K, ...,K}, pay a lump-sum transfer to the agent. By the term "RSW allocation with entry
fee" we mean the RSW allocation augmented by a lump-sum payment from the agent to the principal,
equal to the expected transfer payment the agent receives from those principal types in the pool at
the top.
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2.5.2 Welfare Implications of the Reserve Price
In the preceding analysis, we focused on equilibrium allocations that survive the
Intuitive Criterion. It turned out that if there is no pool at the top, that is,K = K+1,
the RSW allocation is the unique such allocation. If we select the RSW allocation
as equilibrium, then a non-trivial reserve price, i.e., a reserve price which excludes
a set of types that has strictly positive probability mass from receiving the good,
dominates a trivial reserve price in terms of welfare.
Deviating from the approach taken in the preceding analysis, we introduce a re-
serve price r explicitly and do not allow for positive probability mass on the lowest
types of bidders, j = θ0 ≥ 0. These lowest types now may be strictly positive, but
F (j) = F (θ0) = 0 and B(0) = β0 → 0.
If Πφ(j, k) is the seller’s revenue, given type profile (j, k), the allocation φ implies
the welfare W (φ, r), defined by:
W (φ, r) := Ej,k[UAφ (j, k) + UPφ (j, k) + Πφ(j, k)]
UAφ (j, k), UPφ (j, k), Πφ(j, k), and φ depend on r.
Proposition 2.7. Suppose both bidders’ valuation distributions have no point mass at the
lowest types, j and θ0, with j = θ0 ≥ 0. That is, F (j) = 0 and B(0) = β0 → 0. If
we select the RSW allocation as equilibrium, then a welfare-maximizing seller chooses a
non-trivial reserve price, i.e., r > θ0.
To see why proposition 2.7 is true, recall that the RSW allocation has the flavor of a
least-cost separating equilibrium. That is, it induces the smallest inefficiencies nec-
essary for the principal’s types to separate. If the reserve price increases, inefficien-
cies which result from separation become more costly. Hence, fewer inefficiencies
are necessary for separation.
This positive effect of a non-trivial reserve price on welfare must be compared
to the well-known welfare decreasing effect of a non-trivial reserve price. In this
light, the assumption that both β0 and F (j) are arbitrarily close to zero assures that
the first effect dominates the latter, and thus a reserve price is desired in terms of
welfare.
2.5.3 Bid-Coordination Mechanism
We assume a rather strong kind of collusion technology that commits each player
to the outcome of the collusive mechanism. If the mechanism implies inefficient
collusion, a player being committed to stay out of the SPA has incentives break the
commitment.
We will show that when giving up this assumption, that is, restricting the cartel’s
collusion technology, the principal can always implement his ex-ante optimal al-
location of efficient collusion. Moreover, this allocation also survives the Intuitive
Criterion.
In the following we analyze a collusion technology that can only recommend,
but not enforce, a cartel member to stay out of the auction. However, we still allow
the cartel to exchange side transfers in a budget-balanced manner, and assume that
the recommendation mechanism is proposed by bidder P , after having learned the
realization of his valuation. Hence, we analyze a setup that is very similar to the
40 Chapter 2. Signaling and Inefficient Collusion in Auctions
so-called bid-coordination mechanism examined in Marshall and Marx, 2007, with
the exception that the coordination mechanism is proposed by one of the bidders.
Moreover, in order not to rely too much on the all-inclusive cartel assumption, we
impose the restriction that no cartel member bids above his valuation.39 Let us first
characterize the (unique) undominated equilibrium allocation and then verify that
it can be implemented without enforcement.
We now argue that there exists an undominated equilibrium of the described
game, which is consistent with efficient collusion: By the revelation principle, we
can focus attention on direct mechanisms, which are such that the bidders behave
obediently with respect to the private recommendation. Such a mechanism can
induce efficient collusion. For any realized type profile, the highest type of both
players is recommended to bid in the auction. As a consequence, a bidder which is
recommended to stay out of the auction has no incentive not to behave obediently
with respect to this recommendation. Moreover, there cannot exist any other obe-
dient non-trivial recommendation. If the recommendation would imply inefficient
collusion, for at least one reported type profile, every bidder has an incentive not
to behave obediently when being recommended to stay out of the auction. When
breaking the recommendation, there is a strictly positive probability on the event
of winning the auction and receiving an additional rent.40
Observe that the principal can implement the ex-ante optimal allocation, derived
under the enforcement assumption, since he is still able to absorb the entire collu-
sive surplus. That is, to implement the ex-ante optimal allocation no enforcement
of the right is necessary. Moreover, because enforcement is not possible, the prin-
cipal is restricted in his off-path deviations. As a consequence, φe, satisfies the CK
criterion: Recall that an allocation satisfies the CK criterion if there does not exist
a separation menu for any type of the principal. Since the equilibrium allocation
induces efficient collusion, the existence of a separating menu for principal type k
necessarily implies an inefficient high allotment of the right to the principal. Oth-
erwise type k could not separate himself from k − 1. However, by the arguments
above, inefficient collusion cannot be implemented. The agent would not behave
39Given the assumption of the all-inclusive cartel, one can implement any equilibrium allocation
under the strong collusion technology, i.e., under enforcement, also under the weak technology, i.e.,
no enforcement, by employing the following recommendation mechanism: After having submitted
the transfers, the bidder who is supposed to receive the right to be the only bidder in the auction
is advised to submit a very high bid, whereas the other potential bidder is advised to bid 0. See
Ungern-Sternberg (1988). Behaving obedient to this recommendation is a weakly dominated action
for the bidder that is supposed to submit the high bid.
40In this game, the characterization of equilibrium is straightforward: Every feasible mechanism
that induces each principal type a payoff weakly larger than the one generated by the non-cooperative
play of the SPA can be supported as equilibrium. To see this, consider the following off-path belief
of the agent on the principal: The principal is the lowest type 0. Given this belief, the agent always
plays the SPA non-cooperatively, independent of the recommendation. Given this continuation strat-
egy, budget balance implies that the mechanism turns into a zero-sum game with type-independent
strategies. Since the off-path belief is common knowledge, the principal can assert that all agent types
bid their valuation in the SPA. As a consequence, every principal type only cares about the transfer
payment and not about the recommendation generated by the mechanism. The agent is therefore
only willing to participate in the game if the expected payment is weakly positive. In this instance,
every principal type receives weakly less than his non-cooperative outside option. Yet, by offering a
degenerate mechanism that specifies zero transfers, the principal can always secure himself the non-
cooperative SPA payoff. Thus, any efficient allocation that leaves every type of both bidders with
weakly larger payoff than the non-cooperative play of the SPA can be supported in equilibrium.
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obediently with respect to a recommendation inducing inefficient collusion and
thus such inefficient allotment is not feasible.
The self-enforcing collusive agreement can be implemented by means of a linear-
separable transfer scheme. That is, first the agent pays a participation fee to the
principal equal to the height of the expected type-dependent transfer the principal
has to pay, conditional that collusion is efficient. Afterwards, both the principal and
the agent simultaneously submit to each other the type-dependent part of the trans-
fer scheme, where the lowest types pay a transfer of zero. These transfers perfectly
reveal the type of the player submitting it, and thus, staying out of the auction is
a best response for the player with the lower valuation draw.41 At no stage does a
bidder have an incentive to break the collusive agreement. If, for example, the prin-
cipal collects the agent’s entry fee but does not submit a transfer payment himself,
this is equivalent to submitting the transfer payment of the lowest principal type,
which is not desired by incentive compatibility.
2.5.4 Non-All-Inclusive Cartel
Suppose we generalize our set-up slightly by introducing a third bidder, not a
member of the cartel that bids according to his weakly dominant strategy. We sug-
gest that all of the analysis is still valid under minor changes of notation. That is,
we replace the type of a cartel member by his interim expected net utility of playing
the SPA non-cooperatively against the outside bidder.42 Given this modification, in
an equilibrium that survives the Intuitive Criterion inefficiencies with respect to the
cartel members due to collusion are still present. In what follows we focus entirely
on the inefficient RSW allocation.
If the cartel is not all-inclusive, the characteristics of collusion have implications
on the seller’s revenue. Since the member that receives the right to be the cartel’s
only bidder in the auction submits a bid equal to his valuation, the seller prefers
collusion to be efficient. This is the case because efficient collusion is the form of
collusion that maximizes the cartel’s expected bid submitted in the SPA.
If the cartel is not all-inclusive and collusion is efficient, it is well-known from
the literature that a revenue maximizing seller can subsume those bidders inside
of the cartel under a single bidder, the cartel bidder, with valuation equal to the
maximum valuation of the cartel’s members. The seller then sets the reserve price
41One might wonder how decent it is to assume the play of such a weakly-dominated actions.
However, note, if one assumes that both the agent and the principal have discrete types and there are
small bidding costs, smaller than the distance between any two adjacent types, all of the presented
arguments are still valid, under minor changes. Still, submitting a bid of zero is not a dominated
action.
42To be more specific, we transform the type of a cartel member, say j, into the valuation of the
right v(j). If the outside bidder’s type is distributed continuously according to F o(·), with support
equal to the one of the agent’s distribution, then e.g., agent type j’s valuation of the right is given by
v(j) =
∫ j
r
F o(v)dv. Moreover, to calculate, for example, the RSW allocation one first must determine
the utility the agent receives when rejecting the mechanism, given the principal is type k, with j >
θk ≥ r (otherwise agent j receives utility zero). This object takes the form UAD(j, k) =
∫ j
θk
F o(v)dv.
With this, one still can think of the RSW allocation as being induced by price and compensation pairs
the principal offers to the agent. Suppose the principal’s type is k, and the threshold agent type, being
indifferent between paying the price and picking the compensation, is j(k). Then the compensation,
c, takes the form c = UAD(j(k), k) and the price, p˜, is p˜ = v(j(k))−UAD(j(k), k). One can then find the
RSW allocation by solving a sequence of problems, similar to {(P1)k}Kk=0 but modified in the manner
described above.
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as if the cartel bidder, with distribution as described above, plays the auction non-
cooperatively against the outside bidders.
In contrast, if we focus on an inefficient equilibrium, the seller’s problem differs
in two respects. First, the distribution of the cartel player changes, since collusion
is not efficient. Second, the distribution of the cartel bidder might depend on the
reserve price.
Concerning the implications on the seller’s optimal reserve price, note that both
effects work in favor of a larger reserve price, in comparison to the situation in
which collusion is organized by a third party and therefore is efficient. First, if
collusion is inefficient, then the distribution of the second-highest bid that is sub-
mitted in the SPA, being played by the cartel bidder against the outside bidder,
is first-order stochastically dominated by the respective distribution if collusion is
efficient. However, given any reserve price, the probability of the event that the
highest bid being submitted in the SPA is above the reserve price is not affected by
the characteristics of collusion, as according to the RSW allocation, the right to bid
is either allotted to the agent or to the principal if at least one of both players has
a valuation above the reserve price. Employing the reasoning of Krishna (2002),
section 11.1.2 on bidding rings, this effect in isolation already implies a larger re-
serve price when collusion is inefficient compared to the case of efficient collusion.
Second, as an increase of the reserve price decreases the inefficiencies inside of the
cartel, and in turn increases the expected bid of the cartel bidder, there is a second
channel that increases the optimal reserve price.
2.6 Discussion of the Number of Cartel Members
An undeniable limitation of our model is the number of bidders. In the SPA, the
all-inclusive cartel assumption is without loss of generality (see section 2.5.4). How-
ever, in the FPA, a non-all-inclusive cartel implies that the agents’ outside options
are determined by an asymmetric FPA not featuring analytic solutions in general.
Admittedly, this is very unsatisfying. Yet, the entire bidder collusion literature suf-
fers from this annoyance.43
In the following, we state sophisticated conjectures concerning the implications
of increasing the number of cartel members from 2 to N+1. In the FPA, we strongly
believe that the following happens: As strategic player, the principal implements a
no-veto constraint mechanism. That is, if an agent rejects the collusive side mecha-
nism the remaining cartel members collude according to some predefined protocol.
To punish the deviating agent the most, - recall, the collusive side mechanism can
only allot the right to bid -, the remaining cartel members collude efficiently. As
a consequence, an agent’s outside option is determined by the asymmetric FPA
being played between him and the cartel member with the highest valuation, with
degenerate belief concentrated on the largest type of the former. Given this, one can
adjust the mechanism m˜ to m˜a such that the latter replicates the non-cooperative
43Papers that deal with this problem have to rely on particular examples, often featuring only
numerical solutions (see McAfee and McMillan, 1992, Marshall et al., 1994 and Marshall and Marx,
2007).
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play of the described setting.44 A similar reasoning as in the one-agent case should
show that m˜a implements the principal’s secured payoff and the proposal of m˜a can
be supported as equilibrium of the mechanism-selection game. However, establish-
ing uniqueness is a more elaborate task. This involves to show that m˜a implements
the highest principal type the largest feasible payoff given the prior beliefs about
the principal. This is essentially a mechanism design problem, involving the care-
ful specification of measures that trade off any agent’s type-depending individual
rationality constraints. If there is more than one agent, the construction used in
the proof of theorem 2.11 does not directly go through. Instead, a more elaborate
construction of measures as in the flavor of the proof of lemma 2.8 is needed. We
are not entirely certain whether this is feasible, that is, whether there is indeed a
unique equilibrium.
One might wonder why there are no equilibria in which the agents implicitly
collude against the principal and coordinately reject certain mechanisms that leave
them with too low payoffs. That is, why doesn’t there arise a veto-constraint mech-
anism ? The reason is that the principal can prevent the above-described collusive
behavior of the agents. He can specify large payments for those agents that ac-
cepted the mechanism, conditional on the event of at least one agent rejecting the
mechanism. By this, the event that all agents reject the mechanism becomes an
off-path event, and the relevant individual rationality constraints are those being
described in the previous paragraph. Because of this, veto-constraint mechanisms
only arise if one restricts the principal’s set of side mechanisms to those. It is actu-
ally not at all an interesting question to explore to what extent the agents can make
use of the above collusive behavior to influence the principal’s proposal to their
advantage. Restricting the principal’s set of mechanisms to those that are veto-
constrained implies that basically every proposal can be supported as equilibrium
of the mechanism-selection game. Given that the agents have decided to support
mechanism m′, they coordinate on the following strategy: Accept mechanism m′,
and if the principal proposes a different mechanism ,reject it. Given this strategy,
at most mechanism m′ can be supported in equilibrium. It can be supported if
there exist certain off-path beliefs about the agent and the principal such that ev-
ery bidder receives in the non-cooperative FPA, played with this certain off-path
belief about himself and prior belief about the other bidders, less payoff than from
the play of m′. Hence, if the set of side mechanisms were restricted too much, the
model would fail to capture the strategic interaction inside of the cartel.
The above remark about veto-constraint side mechanisms also applies to the SPA.
Focusing on no-veto-constraint mechanisms, there are no additional insights from
increasing the cartel’s size. The cartel members’ interaction is governed by the prin-
cipal’s signaling motive, which does not rely on the number of agents. However,
with more than one agent, the principal receives a rent from organizing collusion
between the agents. As a consequence, if the number of agents increases, the inef-
ficiencies induced by the principal’s signaling motive quantitatively decrease.45
44Suppose there are N agents. Index a generic agent by i. Let H−i(t) be the distribution of the
maximum valuation, t, of the cartel without agent i. Each member reports in m˜a a number ti(j) :=
argmaxtH−i(t)(j − t). The allocation is then such that principal type k receives the right if θk >
maxi∈{0,...,N} ti(j), and else the agent i that reported the largest t·(j).
45Indeed, concerning the SPA ,let us focus on the characterization of the RSW allocation. With
more than one agent, all being ex-ante symmetric, this allocation takes the following form: Depend-
ing on the principal’s type, there is a threshold. An agent receives the right if and only if he has the
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2.7 Conclusion and Discussion
The aim of this paper was to analyze the implications of the auction format on
the characteristics of bidder collusion. To suppress competition, bidders form a
cartel and organize their joint bidding behavior. The key premise in our analysis
is that it is the cartel members themselves who resolve the information asymmetry
among them. This necessity gives rise to strategic interactions.46 We model this
interaction by giving one cartel member the right to act as principal and to propose
the other member, the agent, a collusive side mechanism, whose play determines
the enforceable collusive allocation.
One contribution of this paper is to find that collusion leads in general to inef-
ficiencies, both in the SPA and in the FPA. This novel result stands in contrast to
the literature on bidding rings, which abstracts from the signaling motive and pre-
dicts the cartel to collude efficiently in both auction formats. By this, the cartel can
achieve its joint profits-maximizing benchmark.
Focusing on the SPA, we find that the cartel’s interaction is entirely driven by
the principal’s signaling motive. It is shown that high principal types face a trade-
off between maximizing and extracting the cartel’s expected collusive profits and
proposing inefficient allocations in order to signal their strength in exchange for a
better bargaining position inside of the cartel. Loosely speaking, if both bidders are
not too asymmetric or the stronger of them becomes the principal, efficient collu-
sion can be supported in equilibrium. With this result, we establish that the cartel’s
joint profit-maximizing benchmark of efficient collusion is robust to a mild form of
signaling.
In contrast, we find that the cartel cannot achieve this benchmark in the FPA
where collusion is always inefficient. Importantly, the non-cooperative play of the
FPA depends on the belief the bidders hold about each other. By this, his belief
about the principal affects the agent’s inference that he is supposed to draw from
the principal’s mechanism proposal. Making use of his large mechanism space, the
principal exploits this bid-shading property of the FPA by proposing a mechanism
that replicates the non-cooperative play of the auction for any belief the agent may
hold about him. Given this mechanism, the cartel’s interaction is driven by the
agent’s fear that the breakdown of collusion signals his strength, which results in a
distorted play of the FPA to the agent’s disfavor.47
highest valuation above the threshold. Otherwise the principal receives the right. Note that even if
the agents are ex-ante asymmetric, introducing further inefficiencies is costly in terms of their binding
individual rationality constraints. As a consequence, we suspect that the principal treats all of them
equally in case they have valuation above the threshold. Technically, because the agents’ outside
options are increasing in their types, the respective individual rationality constraints are allowed to
bind at the optimum for all types above the threshold. Given this, one should be able to construct
measures such that the agents’ virtual valuations are equated. That is, everything the principal saves
on one agent’s (AIR) constraint by introducing inefficiencies w.r.t. the agents implies costs of at least
the same amount on some other agent’s (AIR) constraint.
46This is a reasonable premise. E.g., Cave and Salant, 1987 document cases of legal cartels in
agricultural markets. The interaction between the members resulting from their need to agree on
quotas was driven by non-cooperative, strategic forces.
47In an experiment Llorente-Saguer and Zultan, 2014 tested Eso˝ and Schummer, 2004 / Rachmile-
vitch, 2013’s take-it-or-leave-it bribing scheme both in the FPA and SPA. They find that collusion in
the FPA does not break down and leads to inefficiencies. These inefficiencies are due to unsuccess-
ful collusive attempts, which distort the non-cooperative play of the FPA. This is in line with our
results. We find a close connection between the collusive allocation and the allocation induced by
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Our paper highlights that the channels that govern the cartel’s interaction de-
pend on the auction format. Nonetheless, we are still able to draw some quantita-
tive comparisons between collusion in the SPA and the FPA. We find that the least
inefficient equilibrium in the SPA is less inefficient than the unique equilibrium of
the FPA.
Naturally, our results depend on the assumed bargaining protocol inside of the
cartel. We faced the following modeling challenge: Our aim was to capture the
strategic interaction between the cartel members without predetermining the col-
lusive side mechanism resulting from this interaction. This latter point allows us
to meaningfully relate our results to well-established findings on bidding rings.
Similar to this literature, we took a mechanism-design approach with the impor-
tant difference that a member inside the cartel proposes the mechanism. We thus
assumed an extreme distribution of bargaining power and solved a non-standard
informed-principal problem.
In our point of view, the assumption of the extreme distribution of bargaining
power is rather innocuous, as any distribution can be restored by accordingly ran-
domizing which of the bidders becomes the principal. However, our conclusions
concerning the FPA might appear to depend on the large set of side mechanisms
available to the principal. The unique equilibrium heavily relies on the fact that
the principal can propose a mechanism that is not a direct revelation mechanism,
replicating the non-cooperative play of the auction for any belief about him.
Be that as it may, this unexpected result, - in fact, this is the very first result for an
informed-principal problem in a setting where outside options are determined by
the play of a belief-dependent game - , highlights an economically relevant chan-
nel; by influencing each cartel member’s inference, drawn from interacting with
the other members, the FPA makes it impossible for the cartel to achieve efficient
collusion.
This insight draws attention to a direction for future research. Anti-collusive auc-
tion design typically takes the cartel’s interaction as given and focuses on design
elements, making it hard for the cartel to enforce the collusive agreement (e.g., see
Marshall and Marx, 2009). Importantly, such design elements (for example allow-
ing for shill bidders and not revealing the identity of the auction’s winning bidder)
are redundant if the auction is played non-cooperatively, but imply anti-collusive
gains if a bidder cartel is present. However, there are environments where the iden-
tity of the winner cannot be kept secret, like procurement auctions of construction
services. Deterring the cartel from enforcing its agreement is hard, if not impossi-
ble. Exploring whether there are auction-design elements that influence the cartel’s
interaction in an anti-collusive way seems to be relevant.
the non-cooperative play that would result if the agent were to reject the collusive side mechanism.
We differ from the experiment in that the principal is not restricted to bribes and therefore proposes
a mechanism that replicates the allocation being induced after an hypothetical unsuccessful collusive
attempt.
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Chapter 3
Managing a Conflict: Alternative
Dispute Resolutions in Contests
with Johannes Schneider
3.1 Introduction
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a tool introduced into the legal system
of many countries to increase the system’s efficiency by settling as many cases
as possible outside court. ADR itself can take many forms and describes a third-
party mechanism other than formal litigation to solve the conflict. However, ADR
typically cannot overturn the rule of law, such that parties return to the litigation
track once ADR fails. Given that ADR and litigation remain thus connected, sev-
eral questions arise. How does the information exchanged during ADR influence
the behavior in litigation post ADR-breakdown? How does the threat of ADR-
breakdown influence the litigants’ willingness to release information during ADR?
How should we design ADR “in the shadow of the court”?
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal third-party ADR-mechanism that
uses litigation as the fall-back option in case no agreement is reached. We provide
a model identifying the two-way channel that links an optimal mechanism (ADR)
and an underlying contest (litigation). We show that optimal ADR and litigation
cannot be considered as independent problems: the information revealed in the
ADR-stage influences the choice of action in both ADR and litigation. Litigants’
investment into evidence provision after breakdown depends on the beliefs about
their opponent’s action. The ADR-designer needs to be concerned about managing
the players’ beliefs in case ADR breaks down. Moreover, ADR cannot fully elim-
inate litigation as parties differ in their marginal cost of evidence provision. ADR
breaks down sometimes to screen parties and to ensure truth-telling during ADR.
Most modern societies accept the concept of the “rule of law” despite an over-
burdened legal system: in 2014 each judge in the U.S. district courts received 658
new cases. At the same time the number of pending cases is even larger with 694
per judge. The large caseload leads to a median time from filing to trial of around
2 years. As litigation requires a lot of time and resources from courts, each case
that forgoes litigation also has a positive externality on the functioning of the legal
system as a whole.
Thus, most jurisdictions encourage parties to engage in some form of ADR be-
fore starting the formal litigation process. The U.S. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1998 states that courts should provide litigants with ADR-options in all civil
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cases. ADR is defined as “any process or procedure, other than an adjudication by
a presiding judge, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolu-
tion of issues in controversy” (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 1998). However,
ADR supplements the “rule of law” rather than replacing it. Ultimately, each party
has the right to return to formal litigation.1 Hence, ADR indeed happens “in the
shadow of the court:” whenever no settlement is achieved via ADR, litigants return
to the traditional litigation path.
Nonetheless, ADR is a very effective tool to settle conflicts and has success rates
substantially above 50% across time, jurisdictions, and case characteristics. Further-
more, litigants report that ADR has an impact on the continuation of the trial even if
unsuccessful (Genn, 1998; Anderson and Pi, 2004). The informational spillovers to
post-breakdown litigation influences the design of optimal ADR: if the information
a player receives during ADR depends on the information she provides, parties
have an incentive to strategically extract information within ADR which they can
use in litigation once ADR breaks down.
We follow a large literature dating back to Posner (1973) and consider litigation
as a legal contest (for an overview on the litigation literature see Spier (2007)). The
party providing the most convincing evidence wins the case. In such a contest,
the optimal amount of evidence the plaintiff provides is a function not only of her
own cost of evidence provision, but also of her beliefs about the defendant’s evi-
dence choice and vice versa. Hence, litigation strategies after ADR-breakdown are
a function of the players’ belief system.
Optimal ADR-design should take the belief-channel into account to ensure in-
centive compatibility: suppose a plaintiff who only has access to circumstantial
evidence reports to the mediator instead that she has direct evidence. She then
might gain from misreporting in two dimensions. First, through a direct effect: re-
porting better evidence can lead to a more favorable settlement. Second, there is
an indirect effect: if the plaintiff misreports, she may also benefit if ADR fails to re-
solve the conflict. By misreporting in the ADR stage, the plaintiff may influence her
post-breakdown expectation about the defendant’s type since breakdown is a func-
tion of both players’ reports. Changing the beliefs post-breakdown affects expected
litigation outcomes and provides an additional incentive to misreport. While the
direct effect is present in standard mechanism design models, we seem to be the
first to consider the indirect effect as the outside-option of our mechanism depends
on the belief system.
Our analysis highlights several important features of ADR in the shadow of a
legal contest: we show that if ADR cannot promise full-settlement for all type-
profiles, then ADR cannot promise full-settlement for any type-profile. The reason
is that if the mediator promises settlement for a specific type-profile, it imposes an
externality on the other types by influencing their breakdown beliefs.
We further show that the optimal mechanism is always asymmetric. It favors one
player when ADR breaks down and the other when ADR is successful, even when
players are fully symmetric ex-ante. At the time of participating, players only care
about their expected valuation being the sum of the valuations in case of both set-
tlement and breakdown. To keep the expected valuations constant, the valuation
promised to players in settlement must increase the more competitive and there-
fore wasteful litigation post ADR-breakdown is. Consequently, optimal mediation
1For a detailed discussion on this, see Brown, Cervenak, and Fairman (1998).
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makes the litigation process post-ADR less competitive by inducing asymmetric
beliefs to save on resources needed for settlement.
While the optimal mechanism results in asymmetric beliefs, it ensures that be-
liefs are independent of the player’s type-report. If a player could obtain different
information from different reports, she could induce a situation without common
knowledge of beliefs post-breakdown: the deviating player knows that she misre-
ported, but her opponent does not. Each player’s optimal action depends on both
her own belief about the opponent and what the opponent thinks this belief is.
Learning from reports can thus provide an incentive to misreport in hope of break-
down. If beliefs are independent of the report, however, such a problem does not
arise because deviations do not create an information advantage.
We significantly differ from standard models of conflict resolution in that we
consider a model in which investment into the conflict is made after the resolution
mechanism broke down. Nonetheless, a key result derived by Hörner, Morelli,
and Squintani (2015) carries over to our setting: if the mediator can talk to parties in
private, the players’ level of commitment is not important. Compared to a situation
in which parties commit to the mechanism at an interim stage, the mediator can
achieve (almost) the same result if parties are allowed to unilaterally opt-out of
mediation after the settlement proposal. The reason is that private communication
allows the mediator to conceals some information even at an ex-post stage.
Our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion of optimal ADR-design by
pointing out several important aspects: (1) optimal ADR can settle most of the cases
outside court independent of the cases’ characteristics; (2) the level of commitment
needed by the parties is not important if the mediator can communicate to parties
in private; (3) regulators should be careful when preventing mediators from using
asymmetric protocols as they increase the probability of ADR breaking down; and
(4) to incentivize settlement, optimal ADR should predominantly manage beliefs
in case a breakdown occurs.
We also contribute to the literature on mechanism design. If screening can hap-
pen only through an underlying game, on-path breakdown is informative for play-
ers and necessary for optimality. Our model emphasizes the relevance of belief
management by the mechanism if the underlying game, and thus the outside op-
tion, is belief dependent. Our findings directly apply to other situations in which
a wasteful contest is the last resort such as strikes, political lobbying, patent races,
and standard setting organizations.
Outline. After discussing the literature in Section 3.2, we set up the model in Sec-
tion 3.3 and derive the optimal mechanism in Section 3.4. Subsequently, we discuss
the findings in Section 3.5 and several extensions in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 con-
cludes.
3.2 Related Literature
We contribute to three strands of literature: (1) to the best of our knowledge we
provide the first formal model in the law and economics literature that explicitly
addresses the complementarity of litigation and ADR; (2) we add a new channel
to the literature on mechanism design with endogenous outside option by show-
ing that a mechanism which cannot fully avoid a post-mechanism game should
be concerned about the information release during the process; and (3) we add to
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the existing literature of mechanism design and conflict resolution as we consider
a setup in which parties make their decision on investment into the default game
after the conflict arises.
We connect to the law and economics literature on settlement under asymmetric
information dating back to the seminal paper by Bebchuk (1984). Spier (1994) is
the first in this line to consider a mechanism design approach. She uses a model
that applies to situations in which investment in evidence provision was made prior
to negotiations and is interested in optimal fee-shifting between parties. We differ
in two aspects: we hold the rules of litigation fixed and study a model in which
the choice on how much evidence to present is made after settlement negotiations.
This results in an optimal mechanism that conditions on informational spill-overs
of ADR onto litigation.2
Brown and Ayres (1994) highlight that managing the information flow between
litigants can be a rationale for ADR that goes beyond reducing psychological bar-
riers to negotiation. There is, however, to the best of our knowledge no paper yet,
that links information exchange in pre-litigation ADR with litigation as a strategic
game. We model litigation in the tradition of Posner (1973) as a legal contest.3 Our
findings show that such a link is important as ADR and litigation should not be
treated as two independent problems, but two stages of the same game.
The second strand of literature we relate to is that of mechanism design with
endogenous outside options, i.e. mechanisms which cannot fully replace an un-
derlying strategic game. Similar to Cramton and Palfrey (1995), the optimal ADR
mechanism is ratified by both parties. Without mutual consent, parties play the
litigation game. However, in our model, mediation sometimes breaks down after
participation and parties are referred to the underlying game. Celik and Peters
(2011) show that for some games it is optimal to design a mechanism without full
participation. In our model, this channel is not present and full participation is op-
timal. Instead, we explore an additional channel: we ask how on-path references
to the default game by the mechanism interact with the belief structure of the players
after breakdown.
We also connect to the literature on conflict resolution as the two closest papers
to ours are Bester and Wärneryd (2006) and Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015).
Bester and Wärneryd (2006) were the first to study conflict resolution in a mech-
anism design environment. Similar to us, they look for the conflict minimizing
mechanism and find that it is typically stochastic. Hörner, Morelli, and Squin-
tani (2015), building on Bester and Wärneryd (2006), study optimal mediation in
the context of international relations. They show that limited commitment of the
disputants does not change the outcome of the optimal mechanism as long as the
mediator can talk to parties in private.
The main difference between our model and those of Hörner, Morelli, and Squin-
tani (2015) and Bester and Wärneryd (2006) is the timing of events: through their
fixed, type-dependent outside option, Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015) im-
plicitly assume that investment decisions take place before the conflict arises. While
2Another recent paper discussing third-party mediation is Doornik (2014) who studies the opti-
mal use of a fixed mediation mechanism. Different from us, she is interested in when to use a certain
ADR mechanism,while we focus on the optimal design of ADR.
3Examples include Baye, Kovenock, and Vries (2005), Prescott, Spier, and Yoon (2014), Spier and
Rosenberg (2011), and Katz (1988). In addition, see Spier (2007) for a general discussion on litigation
in the law and economics literature.
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this assumption may apply to mediation attempts in international relations, it ap-
plies less to ADR negotiations as the collection of evidence typically happens after
the conflict arises. Our results are thus a complement to Meirowitz et al. (2015)
who study the relationship between dispute resolution and pre-conflict investment.
Contrary to that, we study the relationship between dispute resolution and post-
mediation investment. An important result of Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015),
however, carries over to our setting: limited commitment changes the result of the
optimal mechanism arbitrarily little.
Although the result on limited commitment is similar, the optimal mechanism
itself is qualitatively different: in Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015), the result is
always symmetric and involves full-settlement between weak types. In our setup
neither occurs: the optimal mechanism is never symmetric and mediation has a
positive breakdown probability for all type profiles as weak types are needed in
the post-mediation contests to ensure full participation which is always optimal.
Our concept of mediation is based on Bester and Wärneryd (2006) and lies be-
tween pure communication devices as in Mitusch and Strausz (2005) and a media-
tor with independent sources of information (Fey and Ramsay, 2010). Pavlov (2013)
shows that the former has no effect on the outcome in contests but, different to Fey
and Ramsay (2010), the mediator can resolve the majority of conflicts without the
need of an exogenous information source.
3.3 Model
Litigation Game. The underlying litigation game Γ of our model is an all-pay
contest with asymmetric information as in Szech (2011) and Siegel (2014).4 There
are two risk-neutral players i = 1, 2 who compete for a good of a commonly known
value of 1. Both players simultaneously decide on a score si and the player with
the highest score wins the good. Ties are broken in favor of player 1.5 Obtaining a
score is costly. Players are ex-ante symmetric and have low marginal cost, cl, with
probability p, or high marginal cost, ch ≡ κ cl; κ > 1, with probability (1 − p). All
but the realization of the cost, which is privately learned by each player, is common
knowledge. To simplify notation, we denote the low-cost type “l” and the high-
cost type “h”. In line with this simplification, we are going to use the expressions
“player i, type k” and “player ik” interchangeably.
Mediator. We model the mediator as a neutral third-party possessing no private
information who announces a protocol X and has the ability to commit to it. The
protocol is a mapping from a message profile, M , to triple (G,X1, X2) where G de-
notes the matrix of breakdown probabilities andXi the matrix of settlement shares.
Mediation is voluntary. If a player refuses to participate in the mechanism, this
event becomes commonly-known and litigation is played. A result of (Celik and
Peters, 2011) implies that we can focus without loss of generality on mechanisms
4We follow the terminology of Siegel (2009), indicating that players have heterogeneous cost of
effort but a common perception of the prize.
5This technical assumption allows us to circumvent openness problems off-path. However, any
other tie-breaking rule would work at cost of additional notation.
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that induce full participation.6 Suppose for the moment that the mediator proposes
a direct-revelation mechanisms. Thus, let
G =
(
γ(l, l) γ(l, h)
γ(h, l) γ(h, h)
)
,
and
Xi =
(
xi(l, l) xi(l, h)
xi(h, l) xi(h, h)
)
,
where γ(M) denotes the probability of mediation breakdown after message pro-
file M = (m1,m2), that is the probability that players are sent back to the litigation
game Γ after message M . Further, xi(M) denotes the share of the good assigned to
player i after M .7
We assume budget balance and non-negative shares: the designer can only divide
the good in question and allocate shares to players. These shares sum up to not
more than one, that is x1(k1, k2) + x2(k1, k2) ≤ 1.8
The revelation principle implies that the outcome of any equilibrium being in-
duced by some ADR mechanism, can be replicated by a direct ADR mechanism in
which the mediator sends action recommendations to the players, conditional on
breakdown. We restrict our attention to the following class of ADR games: Take
any continuation game that begins after the breakdown of ADR with the players
choice about their score in the litigation game. If this continuation game is part of
the equilibrium path of the grand game (i.e., the game that begins with the player’s
decision whether to participate in the ADR game), then players’ (type-dependent)
beliefs about payoff types are commonly known.9,10 Observe, this class of games
includes, in particular, any ADR process in which the mediator publicly speaks to
the players and also any decentralized form of ADR, in which the players directly
communicate with each other. In principle, we could allow the mediator to send
recommendations to the players that are obedient and are such that the players’
inference, drawn from the received recommendations given a commonly-known
recommendation protocol, are consistent with common-knowledge of beliefs with
respect to payoff-types.11 Yet, to characterize the optimal solution, we can abstract
6If one player rejects the mechanism, his opponent may update his belief. Since the priors are
type-independent, the posteriors are, too. We verify in the preceding analysis that the payoffs in-
duced by the litigation game are weakly convex in beliefs, if beliefs are type-independent. By (Ce-
lik and Peters, 2011) this feature assures that full-participation is without loss of generality. See
lemma B.1.
7For the ease of notation, we assume without loss of generality that the message k is assigned to
the meaning “I am type k”.
8If the good itself was indivisible, a lottery could implement the same result.
9Without this restriction, the mediator could in principle induce a communication equilibrium
in the litigation game. Pavlov (2013) shows that all communication equilibria in all-pay contests are
payoff equivalent to the unique Nash equilibrium. Yet, Pavlov (2013)’s setting is not identical to ours
and his proof does not directly apply. Although we strongly conjecture that the imposed restriction
is without loss of generality, a formal proof is still required.
10A more natural restriction is to require common-knowledge about payoff-types beliefs to hold
also off the equilibrium path. The solution we derive also satisfies this more demanding restriction.
11I.e. recommendations which can be implemented by the play of a Bayes Nash equilibrium,
possibly augmented by a randomization device, given some commonly-known beliefs about payoff-
types.
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from such recommendations or signals.12
We are looking for a mechanism that minimizes the ex-ante probability of medi-
ation breakdown, Pr(Γ). The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Timing. For most of the analysis, we consider an interim individually rational
mechanism.13 Hence, the timing is as follows: first, the mediator commits to the
mediation protocol X and players learn their type privately. Second, players simul-
taneously decide whether to participate in the mediation mechanism. If any player
rejects, players update beliefs and play the litigation game. If both accept, players
privately send a message mi to the mediator.
Following her protocol X , the mediator either implements an allocation (x1, x2)
or initiates breakdown. In the latter case players update beliefs and go to litigation.
Discussion of the Assumptions. We follow a large strand of the literature in as-
suming that litigation is a legal contest. The all-pay contest, a limiting case of a
general Tullock (1980) contest, is only assumed to ensure closed form solutions.
As expected, contest utilities are continuous for every action pair, hence adding
noise would not change our results qualitatively.14 The same is true for the constant
marginal cost of evidence production. Results maintain if we assume a more so-
phisticated (monotonic) evidence provision function as used e.g. in Baye, Kovenock,
and Vries (2005). Ex-ante symmetry is chosen for simplicity, too, and can be relaxed
without changing the results.
The assumption that mediation is designed by a neutral third-party follows the
U.S. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998. In practice, ADR is typically con-
ducted by (retired) judges, law professors or private mediation companies all re-
peating the mediation services on a regular basis. Clearly, trust is a relevant issue
for those mediators and provides a rationale for commitment.
Interim individual rationality of the players is assumed for the ease of notation,
only. In Section 3.6 we show in line with the argument by Hörner, Morelli, and
Squintani (2015) that assuming ex-post individual rationality changes results only
arbitrarily little.
Finally, the assumption that the mediator aims to minimize breakdown is in line
with the theoretical literature on conflict resolution. Courts have an enormous
backlog in pending cases. Mainly because of the backlog, the time from filing to
trial takes typically more than two years. Decreasing the number of court cases
therefore has a positive effect on caseloads as well as on possible future conflicting
parties and their ability to use the legal system effectively. Related to that, reducing
the backlog is the main goal of ADR in practice: the success of dispute resolution
programs is typically measured in the share of cases settled (see, e.g., Anderson
and Pi (2004) and Genn (1998)). Moreover, the assumption that ADR minimizes
the number of court cases adds to the tractability of the model: contest utilities are
12To see this, suppose the mediator releases public signals in the litigation game, where each public
signal gives rise to a different system of first-order beliefs, i.e. beliefs over payoff-types. Each such
signal induces a different equilibrium play of the litigation game. Hence, the mediator optimally
implements the signal that induces his most preferred litigation play with probability 1. The proof
can be found in appendix (lemma B.5).
13In Section 3.6 we show in an extension that assuming ex-post individual rationally can changes
results arbitrarily little.
14See e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and Vries (1996), Ewerhart (2015), and Che and Gale (2000) for a
detailed discussion.
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not well behaved in the mediator’s choices. A different objective complicates the
analysis substantially by adding non-convexities to the objective function.
3.4 Analysis
We proceed with the analysis in several steps. First, we characterize the equilib-
rium of the continuation game after on-path breakdown for a given information
structure. Next, we characterize the properties of the continuation game following
a misreport during the reporting stage. Breakdown after a false report essentially
produces a situation without common knowledge of beliefs and provides the devi-
ator with an informational advantage. We show that all players and types weakly
prefer the on-path contest to the deviation contest only if beliefs are independent
of their type reports. The third step is to rewrite the problem to overcome non-
convexities and to make it tractable. Litigation is the only source of screening, and
thus, the mediator is concerned about choosing the optimal information structure
post-breakdown. This determines the solution of the problem up to a constant. We
show that this constant is entirely determined by the fact that the optimal mech-
anism is budget balanced. Finally, we characterize the optimal mechanism. We
show that it discriminates even between symmetric players, but involves a type-
independent belief structure.
We organize the remainder of this section as follows: for each step we first state
its result and provide an intuition thereafter. Formal proofs are provided in Ap-
pendix B.3.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Characterization of the Continuation Game
The continuation game after breakdown of mediation is an all-pay contest with
type-dependent probabilities as defined in Section 3.3.
Let pi(ki|m−i) denote the probability that player i is of type ki, given that player -i
is of type m−i. For readability, we drop the player subscript in the arguments and
write pi(k|m). In contests, the literature typically assumes some form of mono-
tonicity condition which guarantees that having a low-cost type is desirable for all
players. We follow Siegel (2014) and call the environment monotone if
pi(k|l)
pi(k|h) >
cl
ch
= 1
κ
∀ i, k. (M )
In what follows, we are going to assume that (M ) holds, i.e. we assume that it
is optimal for the mediator to induce post-breakdown belief structures that satisfy
(M ). In the Appendix we show that this is indeed optimal even if the mediator
could choose non-monotone environments.15 Further, we assume throughout the
paper that the probability that player 1 has low-cost, given player 2 reported low-
cost, is weakly larger than the probability that player 2 has low-cost, given player 1
reported low-cost. Hence, player 1 is the stronger player in the contest or p1(l|l) ≥
p2(l|l). This assumption is without loss of generality.
15Siegel (2014) shows that in principle little can be said if (M ) is violated. In our setting, the me-
diator can only induces Bayes’ plausible belief structures. Thus, it is actually possible to characterize
the non-monotonic equilibria explicitly. We characterize them in the Appendix B.3.12.
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Lemma 3.1. Suppose (M ) holds and p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l). Then, the all-pay contest has a
unique equilibrium which has the following properties:
• the support of equilibrium strategies of each type is disjoint from but connected to the
other type of the same player,
• the highest score played in equilibrium, ∆l,l, is in the strategy support of any l-type,
• the joint support of player 1’s strategies is (0,∆l,l],
• the joint support of player 2’s strategies is the same as that of player 1 plus an addi-
tional mass point at 0, in case p1(l|k) 6= p2(l|k) for some k,
• both players play mixed strategies with piecewise constant densities on at most three
subintervals of (0,∆l,l].
s
b m t
type h type l
type h type l
Player 2
Player 1
0 ∆h,h ∆l,h ∆l,l
FIGURE 3.1: Strategy support of player 1 and 2 with type-dependent pri-
ors.
The Lemma is a direct application of Siegel (2014) to our setting. Figure 3.1 sum-
marizes the equilibrium strategies. The horizontal axis depicts the score s. The
dark-red and the light-blue line denote equilibrium strategy support for both play-
ers if player 1 is more likely to have low-cost. Player 1 (dark-red line at the top),
type h (dashed part), is indifferent for all scores on the bottom interval b from 0 up
to and including ∆h,h. This is the lower bound for the score of 1l (solid part) who
is indifferent on all scores on intervals m and t up to and including ∆l,l given the
strategy of player 2. Player 2h (light-blue dashed line at the bottom) is indifferent
between a score of 0 (indicated by the dot) and on intervals b and m up to and
including ∆l,h. Player 2l is indifferent on interval t. If players become ex-ante sym-
metric, interval m vanishes, the mass point at 0 disappears, and strategies become
fully symmetric.
There are no pure-strategy equilibria: whenever one player scores on a singleton
only, it is either optimal to marginally overscore this value or to score 0 instead.
There are several relevant properties of this mixed-strategy equilibrium. First, the
highest score obtained by both players is the same. If one player was to strictly
overscore her opponent, she could always deviate by reducing her score to the
highest possible score of her opponent. Such a deviation does not reduce the prob-
ability of winning, but reduces the cost of the score.
Second, choices in all-pay contests are similar to strategic complements: when-
ever the likelihood of player 1l increases, player 2l reacts by scoring more aggres-
sively. As l-types share the upper bound in their strategies, 2l has a higher average
score than player 1l.
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Third, for every information structure at least one h-type player receives 0-utility
in expectations. This player is always the ex-ante weakest player-type combination,
here player 2h. If this is not the case, no player would score exactly 0 with positive
probability. But then, whatever the lower bound of the joint support, scoring at this
lower bound yields a negative utility, which can always be avoided by deviating to
a score of 0.
If player 2h has a mass point at 0, player 1h receives strictly positive utility as
every score arbitrarily close to 0 guarantees her to win if player 2h decides to score
0.
Overall, the equilibrium actions in the all-pay contest depend on the belief about
both the opponent’s type, and the opponent’s action, where the latter is a function
of the opponent’s beliefs. Thus, expected utilities depend on the entire belief struc-
ture. The following corollary to Lemma 3.1 defines the expected contest utilities in
closed form.
Corollary 3.1. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, and pi(l|k) > 0, the expected contest
utilities are
U1(l) = U2(l) = 1− cl ∆l,l > 0,
U1(h) = p2(h|h)F2,h(0), (U)
U2(h) = 0.
Moreover, utilities are linear in beliefs, if beliefs are type-independent. If beliefs are sym-
metric, F2,h(0) = 0.
The utility of the low-cost types is a direct consequence of the common highest
score. Both players win with probability 1 if they score at ∆l,l and have cost cl∆l,l.
On all other scores in their support they must be indifferent. The utility of the high-
cost type of player 1 is derived as she always wins against those high-cost types
that score 0 even if she scores arbitrarily close to 0. High-cost types of player 2
score 0 with probability F2,h(0) which gives them utility 0. If beliefs become type-
independent, that is pi(l|l) = pi(l|h), the upper bound, ∆l,l, and the mass on 0,
F2,h(0), is linear in beliefs. If beliefs are symmetric between players, that is p1(l|k) =
p2(l|k), the mass point on 0, F2,h(0) = 0 and U1(h) = 0.
3.4.2 Deviator Payoffs in the Continuation Game
As players in our model differ only with respect to their cost in the contest, it is im-
portant for incentive compatibility to characterize the post-deviation continuation
game. It needs to be assessed how players’ actions and utilities change in case of
breakdown conditional on a false report during the reporting stage. A false report
introduces non-common knowledge of beliefs between the players. The deviating
player knows about her deviation and assigns correct beliefs to her opponent. The
non-deviating player and the mediator, on the other hand, are unaware of the de-
viation and incorrectly predict the deviator’s beliefs. The wrong prediction affects
actions, expected contest utilities, and thus incentive compatibility.16
Lemma 3.2. Assume (M ) and p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l) > 0. All player-type combinations but
player 1h are weakly better off in their respective deviation contest. Player 1h is strictly
16The deviator of course correctly predicts the wrong prediction of the non-deviator, and so on.
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worse off in the deviation contest if and only if the probability of facing a high-cost type in
her deviation contest is strictly smaller than in her on-path contest.
Lemma 3.3. Assume (M ) and p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l) > 0. Then, exactly one type of each player
is strictly better off in the deviation contest than in the on-path contest if and only if the
beliefs the player holds are not type-independent. If beliefs are type-independent, no player
is better off in the deviation contest.
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 state that the only situation in which no player-type prefers
the deviation contest to the on-path contest is when beliefs, pi(l|m), are indepen-
dent of the reported type m. To understand the intuition, let us first define the two
types of contest.
Definition 3.1. On-path contest: the contest is called on-path contest if the belief
structure is such that any player i, type k, holds belief p−i(l|k) about player −i.
Further, the belief that each player and type holds is common knowledge.
Definition 3.2. Deviation contest: the contest is called deviation contest of player i
k if player i, type k holds a belief p−i(l|¬k) that is the same belief that player i,
who is not k, holds on-path. This belief is called the deviator’s belief. Player −i,
however, holds her on-path belief pi(l|k) about player i. Thus, generically, there is
no common knowledge of beliefs in this contest.
A direct consequence of non-common knowledge of beliefs is that the deviating
player is no longer indifferent between several scores. The non-deviating player
chooses her strategy to make an on-path opponent indifferent on some interval. The
deviator, however, has a different belief about the non-deviator than the on-path
opponent and is thus not indifferent. Decisions are similar to strategic complements,
such that a too aggressive choice of the non-deviator leads the deviator to pick an
aggressive response. If the choice is too soft, the deviator picks a soft response. The
best response is generically a singleton.
s
b m t
type h type l
Optimal strategy
of player 2l
after report h
Optimal strategy
of player 2h
after report l
Player 1
0
∆h,h ∆l,h ∆l,l
FIGURE 3.2: Optimal behavior in the deviation contest of player 2 if
p1(l|h) > p1(l|l). Notice that the deviation strategies are conditional on 2l
reporting h and 2h reporting l without player 1 noticing.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the optimal strategies for player 2’s deviation contest in case
it is more likely that l-types appear after an h-report, i.e. p1(l|h) > p1(l|l). The
horizontal axis describes the scores, the dark-red line the strategy of player 1, which
is the same as in equilibrium. The light-blue, dashed arrow points to the unique
best response of player 2h who reported l, the solid arrow to that of player 2l who
reported h.
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If the probability that the opponent has low cost is larger in the deviation con-
test, the deviating l-type decides to score more aggressively. By the common upper
bound in the strategy support, scoring above the highest score, ∆l,l, is never ben-
eficial. Thus, her optimal strategy in the deviation contest is to score at ∆l,l and to
win with probability 1, if she is more likely to meet an l-type. Therefore, her utility
is the same as on path, where she wins with probability 1 at a score ∆l,l which is
part of her equilibrium strategy.
Whenever reporting h increases the likelihood to meet an l-type opponent for
player 2, reporting l must increase the likelihood to meet an h-type, i.e. p1(h|l) >
p1(h|h). Similar to the case of 2l, a deviation by 2h makes her increase the score
against an h-type (interval b in Figure 3.2), but decrease it against an l-type (inter-
val m in Figure 3.2), since those occur less likely. Thus, her optimal response is
∆h,h which leads to a win against all h-types. High-cost types occur with higher
probability as p1(h|l) > p1(h|h), and hence, 2h prefers the deviation contest to the
on-path contest.
Low-cost players are never worse off in the deviation contest, as they can always
score at the top. Moreover, player 2h is not worse off either as she can secure her
on-path utility of 0. The only player that can be worse off in the deviation contest
is player 1h, if she expects to meet less 2h. She then softens her bid to 0 and wins
by the tiebreaker but suffers from the low probability of meeting 2h.
Having discussed both on-path and post-deviation behavior in the continuation
game, we shorten notation and use Ui(k|m) to describe the expected utility that
player i, type k enjoys in the contest stage if she reported to be type m and behaves
optimally thereafter.
3.4.3 Rewriting the Problem
We now turn to the problem of the designer. Note that the problem is highly non-
convex and standard techniques do not apply. To be able to characterize the solu-
tion we need to transform it to a tractable problem. We do so in several steps. As the
transformation is a series of technical issues we proceed as follows. First, we state
the proposition describing the reformulated problem. Second, we state the original
problem. Third, we provide a brief, non-technical comment on each transformation
step in the main text. We refer the interested reader to Appendix B.1 for the cor-
responding detailed description of the transformation including the intermediate
lemmas.
Proposition 3.1. Any ex-post implementable, individually feasible and incentive compat-
ible solution to
min
P
Pr(Γ) = min
P
R(P )γ∗(P ) (P1’)
is also a solution to the mediator’s problem if and only if γ∗(P ) ≤ 1, where R(P ) =
Pr(Γ)/γ(l, l).
The proposition states that an equivalent formulation of the mediator’s problem
exists. In it, she optimizes over the set of breakdown beliefs, P = {p1(l|l), p2(l|l), p1(l|h)},
instead of the set of shares and breakdown probabilities, X = (G,X1, X2). The re-
maining breakdown belief about player 2, p2(l|h), is implicitly defined by P and
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Bayes’ rule. The rewritten problem comes at the cost of two additional, techni-
cal constraints, namely ex-post implementability and individual feasibility. We are
going to discuss these constraints below.
The Original Problem of the Mediator. As the mechanism needs to pass a ratifica-
tion stage it is not necessarily without loss of generality to assume full participation.
Given the payoff structure of the litigation game, however, we can use a result of
Celik and Peters (2011) to conclude that full participation is indeed optimal in our
setting, the corresponding lemma stating this result is included in Appendix B.1.
Given full participation, the mediator’s problem is
min
X
Pr(Γ) = min
X
(
p, (1− p)) ·G · ( p(1− p),
)
(P1)
subject to the following sets of constraints for all i ∈ {1, 2} and k,m ∈ {l, h}
Πi(k|k) ≥ Vi(k), (PCki )
Πi(k|k) ≥ Πi(k|m), (ICki )
x1(k1, k2) + x2(k1, k2) ≤ 1, xi(k1, k2) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ γ(k1, k2) ≤ 1,
where Πi(k|m) describes the expected total payoff of a participating player i, type k
given she reportsm. Vi(k) describes the value of vetoing the mechanism for player i,
type k. The first set of constraints are participation constraints, (PCki ), indicating
that each player and type should prefer to participate in ADR over vetoing. The
second set, the incentive compatibility constraints (ICki ), state that it is optimal for
each agent to announce her true type. The third set of constraints prohibits addi-
tional payments by the agents or the mechanism and ensures a balanced budget.
Finally, the last set of constraints ensures that breakdown probabilities are between
0 and 1.
Value of vetoing. To determine the outside option we need to define the con-
tinuation equilibrium of the litigation game after a veto by either of the parties in
the ratification stage. High-cost types do not receive any payoff after a veto and
are thus always at least indifferent to participate in ADR. Low-cost types’ value of
vetoing depends on the choice of beliefs after vetoing. In our case any choice of
these off-path beliefs after vetoing which satisfy the intuitive criterion leads to the
same value of vetoing: the expected litigation payoff under the prior p.17
Whenever the value of vetoing is smaller than 1/2 for low-cost types, however,
the mediator could offer parties a sharing rule of (1/2, 1/2) for each type-realization
and settle all cases. To make the problem interesting we make the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 1. The low-cost types’ value of vetoing is strictly above 1/2.
Assumption 1 translates into the following condition on parameters: κ > (2− 2p)/(1− 2p).
17This is a direct consequence of the low-cost types’ contest utilities being a function of the weaker
players’ probability to have low-cost in case of type-independent beliefs. Any deviation belief satis-
fying the intuitive criterion, makes the non-deviating player the weaker one. Thus, the relevant belief
remains constant at p.
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Expected payoff. The expected payoff from participation, Π1(k|m), has two com-
ponents: the expected value of successful settlement and the expected value of me-
diation breakdown and subsequent litigation. Thus,
Πi(k|m) = zi(m) + γi(m)Ui(k|m), (3.1)
where message m leads to a value of settlement, zi(m), and a value of breakdown
γi(m)U1(k|m). The expected contest probability, γi(m), is a convex combination of
the breakdown probabilities conditional on the opponents type
γ1(m) = pγ(m, l) + (1− p)γ(m,h),
the value of settlement is a convex combination of realized shares and settlement
probabilities
z1(m) = p(1− γ(m, l))x1(m, l) + (1− p)(1− γ(m,h))x1(m,h),
and analogously for player 2. Equation (3.1) shows how optimal mediation relies
on the litigation game. While the value of settlement, zi, is similar to transfers
in standard mechanism design, the utility of the contest continuation game is the
screening device.
Step 1: Reduced-Form Problem à la Border (2007). In this step we make use of
a procedure introduced by Border (2007) to reduce the problem from realized val-
ues to expected values. The reduced form problem has the advantage that the
exact composition of the settlement shares, Xi, becomes irrelevant and we can use
the settlement values, zi(·), directly as choice variables. To ensure a feasible Xi,
reducing the problem introduces two additional constraints: an individual feasibil-
ity constraint, (IF ), and an ex-post implementability constraint, (EPI). The first
constraint states that each player cannot get more than the whole good in case of
settlement. The second constraint guarantees that the total amount of value dis-
tributed to a given type-profile does not exceed the total probability of any of the
types within that profile occurring.
Step 2: Backing out Expected Settlement Shares. In the second step, we make
use of the fact that we can assume without loss of generality that both the high-
cost types’ incentive compatibility constraints and the low-cost types’ participation
constraints are binding. The latter follows naturally from the values of vetoing, that
is the fact that low-cost types need to be compensated to take part in ADR. Binding
incentive compatibility for high-cost types follows from their low expected payoff
in litigation: it provides an incentive to mimic low-cost types to get their settlement
value. The binding constraints allow us to eliminate all settlement values, as they
can be expressed in terms of breakdown valuations.
Step 3: From Breakdown Probabilities to Breakdown Beliefs. This step uses that
breakdown beliefs are homogeneous of degree 0 with respect to the set of break-
down probabilities, G by Bayes’ rule. Thus, the set of breakdown beliefs defines
the set of breakdown probabilities up to a constant. We choose this constant to be
γ(l, l) such that all other breakdown probabilities are defined relative to γ(l, l). This
allows us to eliminate all breakdown probabilities but γ(l, l), and replace them by
breakdown beliefs.
Step 4: Eliminate γ(l, l) via expected feasibility. The final step is to eliminate
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γ(l, l). We use the fact an ex-ante feasible settlement rule is a necessary condition for
individual feasibility, (IF ). All expected breakdown probabilities increase linearly
in γ(l, l) by Step 3. Therefore, the mediator wants to set γ(l, l) as low as possible,
as long as the problem remains feasible in expectation. This introduces an equality
constraints γ(l, l) = γ∗(P ) by which we replace γ(l, l). The additional constraint
γ∗ ≤ 1 ensures that γ(l, l) remains a probability. This concludes the rewriting of the
problem.
3.4.4 Optimal ADR-Mechanism
Having established the reduced problem (P1’), which is a problem of three choice
variables only, we can now state the main result:
Theorem 3.1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, any optimal mediation protocol has the
following properties:
• on-path breakdown beliefs are type-independent, that is for any i it holds that pi(l|l) =
pi(l|h) =: ρi,
• on-path breakdown beliefs are asymmetric, that is ρi 6= ρ−i,
• both player’s on-path breakdown belief is weakly larger than the prior, that is ρi ≥
p ∀i,
• all type profiles {k1, k2} have a breakdown probability that is strictly positive.
Theorem 3.1 states that, independent of the primitives, any optimal protocol in-
duces an information structure that is report-independent. In addition, although
parties start perfectly symmetric, the mediation protocol should always be set up
asymmetrically. At the same time the ADR protocol ensures that both parties ap-
pear to be at least as strong after mediation breakdown as they appeared before
mediation. Therefore, the fraction of low-cost types is at least as high in a post-
mediation contest as before the start of the game. Finally, the mediator needs to
ensure that in principle any type profile can lead to a breakdown of mediation to
get the above mentioned features.
To build intuition we organize the remainder of the section as follows. We first
discuss the optimal solution to (P1’) ignoring (IC li) and γ∗(P ). We then reintroduce
(IC li) and later γ
∗(P ) ≤ 1. Finally, we verify that the solution is implementable in
the sense of Border (2007).
Recall that the assumption of player 1 appearing weakly stronger in the contest
implies the following expected litigation utilities of the high-types: U2(h|h) = 0
and U1(h|h) ≥ 0 with strict inequality whenever player 1 appears strictly stronger.
Further, litigation utilities, Ui(k|m), depend on breakdown beliefs and all expected
breakdown probabilities, γi(m), are linear in γ(l, l). In addition, the following tech-
nical lemma is useful to keep in mind. It states that whenever it is more likely for
player 2 to meet 1l after a report of l, the same is true for player 1 and vice versa.
Lemma 3.4. p1(l|l) > p1(l|h)⇔ p2(l|l) > p2(l|h) if pi(l|m) ∈ (0, 1).
Part 1: Neglecting (IC li) and γ
∗(P ) ≤ 1. First, we want to argue that beliefs are
type-independent. The basic idea is straight-forward: if the mechanism does not
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allow parties to influence the opponent’s type distribution in case of breakdown,
then there is no incentive for a false report. Similar to a second price auction, where
expected payments are independent of the type report, the mediator ensures that
the type distribution the player faces, and by that her contest utility, is independent
of her type report.
Proposition 3.1 states a problem with the three breakdown beliefs, p1(l|l), p2(l|l), p1(l|h)
as choice variables. Given Lemma 3.4 we can fix p2(l|l) and p1(l|h) for the upcom-
ing argument and concentrate on p1(l|l) without loss of generality.
As the mediator cannot achieve full settlement by the participation constraint
of the low-cost types and the high-cost types’ desire to mimic them, she needs to
strategically fail mediation to screen types. High-cost types need to be present
in the contest to guarantee some utility for the low-cost player and to match her
participation constraint. However, the high-cost players should have an incentive
to avoid the contest to report truthfully. Thus, the probability of a high-cost player
meeting another high-cost player after mediation breakdown, pi(h|h), should be
smaller than the ex-ante probability of a high-cost type, 1 − p. Without a belief
dependent outside option this effect typically drives pi(l|h) to 1 as in e.g. Hörner,
Morelli, and Squintani (2015).
There is, however, a second, non-standard effect, changing utilities after break-
down. If breakdown is informative, i.e. pi(l|l) 6= pi(l|h), the expected utility in the
deviation contest might differ from the expected utility in the on-path contest.
Recall from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 that Ui(h|l) > Ui(h|h) whenever it is more likely
to meet a low-cost type under truth-telling than under deviation, that is whenever
pi(h|h) < pi(h|l)⇔ p1(l|l) < p1(l|h),
due to the information advantage effect in the contest. This advantage vanishes as
p1(l|l) → p1(l|h). If p1(l|l) increases further, player 2 receives no utility in the con-
test and therefore also no marginal breakdown utility from lying. Player 1, on the
other hand, actually starts gaining utility again, as an intimidation effect becomes
dominant. Player 1 appears to be much stronger in expectation than player 2. Thus,
player 2 invests less into the contest which increases player 1’s utility. Therefore,
both deviation utilities have a minimum at type-independent beliefs.
Deviation utilities have a kink at type-independent beliefs by the all-pay contest
assumption. The kink is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.3 as deviating high-cost
players are only indifferent for type-independent beliefs. High-cost types score at
the upper end of their on-path equilibrium strategy set for lower values of p1(l|l)
and at the lower end for higher values of p1(l|l). Hence, for type-independent be-
liefs their utilities are non-differentiable and obtain a minimum. The left panel of
Figure 3.3 plots the deviation utilities as a function of p1(l|l).
If we combine the effects on breakdown probabilities γi(m) and contest utilities,
we find that the minimum at type-independent beliefs prevails. The result can best
be seen if we consider the marginal breakdown-value of lying. This breakdown
value is the right-hand side of the following representation of the high-types incen-
tive constraint,(IChi ),
zi(h)− zi(l) = γi(l)Ui(h|l)− γi(h)Ui(h|h).
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Expected Utility in Deviation Contest
p1(l|l)
U
0
1p2(l|l) p1(l|h)
U1(h|l)
U2(h|l)
U1(h|h)
Marginal Breakdown Value of Lying
p1(l|l)
U
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1p2(l|l) p1(l|h)
γ1(l)U1(h|l)− γ1(h)U1(h|h)
γ2(l)U2(h|l)− γ2(h)U2(h|h)
FIGURE 3.3: The left panel depicts the high-types deviation utilities as a
function of p1(l|l). The right panel depicts the marginal breakdown-value
of lying. Red is for player 1, blue player 3. The gray line in the right panel
is the on-path utility of the high-cost type of player 1.
The left hand side can be interpreted as the marginal settlement value of truth-
telling which matches the right hand side being the marginal breakdown value of
lying. The right panel of Figure 3.3 displays the marginal breakdown value of lying
and illustrates how the minimum property prevails and type-independent beliefs
are optimal. We can thus simplify notation and define ρi to be the probability that
player i is the low-type post-mediation.
Having established that beliefs are type-independent we can simplify the analy-
sis using a corollary to the derivation of the breakdown beliefs.18
Corollary 3.2. If beliefs are type independent, breakdown probabilities can be simplified to
γi(l) =
p
ρ−i
γ(l, l), γi(h) =
(1− ρi)
(1− p)
p
ρi
γi(l), P r(Γ) =
p2
ρ1ρ2
γ(l, l).
Moreover, Corollary 3.1 allows us to write contest utilities with type-independent
beliefs as
Ui(l|m) = (1− ρ2)κ− 1
κ
, U1(h|m) = (ρ1 − ρ2)κ− 1
κ
. (3.2)
These expressions are useful in the argument for asymmetry of the optimal mech-
anism which we turn to next. We discuss the general argument non-formally to
provide a good understanding of the qualitative results. A more detailed and for-
mal analysis is in Appendix B.2.
The main argument for asymmetry lies in the structure of a contest. A symmetric
contest is expected to be tight: parties expect to be matched with an opponent
of similar strength and the marginal value of investment is high. By contrast, an
asymmetric contest appears to be less tight, and the marginal value of investment is
lower for both parties. This imposes an externality, especially for the high-cost type
of the ex-ante stronger player. Her opponent’s high-cost type is going to increase
her investment but remains at a utility of 0 as she is the weakest of all player-
types. Thus, the stronger player’s h-type can reduce the investment and still has
a reasonable chance to win the contest as the opponent believes she likely faces a
low-cost type. This effect can be seen by inspecting equations (3.2). If we start in a
18To be precise, Corollary 3.2 is a corollary to Lemma B.4 which is stated in Appendix B.1.
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symmetric setting and unilaterally increase the belief put on player 1, then l-types
would not benefit in terms of expected utilities and neither would 2h. However,
player 1h actually achieves a positive utility in such a case which she would not
under symmetry.
Although only concerned about the probability of contest, the optimal ADR-
mechanism uses this property of the underlying game to increase the breakdown
utility of one of the high-cost types. This allows the mediator to reduce the settle-
ment value that needs to be paid to this player which in turn increases the available
resource for settlement. There is, however, a second effect that limits the extent to
which the mediator can use this feature: as breakdown probabilities are derived
in their relative relation to γ(l, l) in problem (P1′), an increase in ρ1 is effectively a
decrease of the breakdown probability of high-cost types of player 1, γ(h, l) and
γ(h, h). This implies, in turn, a decrease in the breakdown probability for player 2l,
γ2(l), according to Corollary 3.2. While such a decrease has a positive effect on the
objective, Pr(Γ), it also leads to a decrease in player 2’s breakdown utility. Thus,
the mediator would need to increase player 2’s settlement utility. Making the con-
test less resource intensive is therefore only optimal up to a certain point. This point
balances the additional resources needed to finance the loss for player 2l and the
gain from making the contest less resource-intensive. A similar argument is true
for the other player-types.
To see the aggregate effect consider the expected settlement share paid to player i,
zi. The expected settlement share is a convex combination of the settlement share
paid to the l-type to ensure participation and the settlement share paid to the h-type
to ensure incentive compatibility. The shares are given by
z2 = V (l)− 1− ρ2
ρ1
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)
z1 = V (l)− 1− ρ1
ρ2
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
symmetric part
+ ( p
ρ1
− p
ρ2
)κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)κ.︸ ︷︷ ︸
asymmetric part
The first part in z1 is present in the symmetric case, too, while the second vanishes.
Without the second part z1 would be the anti-symmetric version of z2 which would
lead to endogenous symmetry. However, the second part provides a clear incentive
for asymmetry driven by U1(h|h).19 An increase in ρ2 requires more resources to
compensate the players than an increase in ρ1. Thus, the optimal choice involves
ρ1 > ρ2 , that is player 1 appears relatively stronger in the contest. Finally, notice
that the asymmetric part is always negative and thus, some asymmetry always
saves resources. The next lemma states the findings up to this point.
Lemma 3.5. Ignoring (IC li), (IF ), (EPI) and γ(l, l) ≤ 1, and assuming that ρ1 ≥ ρ2,
the unconstrained optimum of (P1’) is achieved at
ρ∗1 =
1 + p
2 ρ
∗
2 =
1− p
2 .
Moreover, the optimal breakdown belief ρ∗i is independent of the opponents breakdown belief
ρ−i.
19Notice that this part can also be written as −Pr(Γ)U(h|h).
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Part 2: Reintroducing (IC li). Next, we reintroduce the low-cost type’s incentive
compatibility constraint, (IC li). For type-independent beliefs and with (IC
h
i ) satis-
fied this boils down to(
γi(l)− γi(h)
)
Ui(h|h) ≤
(
γi(l)− γi(h)
)
U(l|l). (3.3)
A sufficient condition for this to hold is γi(l) ≥ γi(h), as U(l|l) ≥ Ui(h|h) by con-
struction. For player 2 it is also necessary since U2(h|h) = 0. Using Corollary 3.2,
γi(l) ≥ γi(h) is equivalent to ρ2 ≥ p. Intuitively the reasoning is straightforward:
suppose ρ2 ≤ p. The likelihood of breakdown must be larger when reporting to
be an h type. By (ICh2 ), the value of settlement, z2(l) = z2(h), is independent of
the report and the low-cost type prefers to be sent to contest more often and would
misreport. Thus, incentive compatibility requires ρ2 ≥ p.
Taking into account the results from Lemma 3.5, this means that (IC li) is violated
whenever (1−p)/2 < p which holds if and only if p > 1/3. Note further that ρ∗1 > p
for all p and thus, (IC l1) never binds. As the optimal ρi does not depend on ρ−i, we
get the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Ignoring (EPI) and γ∗(P ) ≤ 1, and assuming that ρ1 ≥ ρ2, (IC li) binds for
player 2 if and only if p ≥ 1/3. In this case the constrained optimum is achieved at
• ρ∗1 = 1+p2
• ρ∗2 = p.
Lemma 3.6 states that the probability of breakdown for low-types is larger than
the probability of breakdown for high-types, i.e. γi(l) ≥ γi(h). In such a case one
individual feasibility, (EPI), which is one of the two constraints coming from the
reduced form, is always satisfied. Appendix B.3.4 provides details on this.
Part 3: Full model. So far we have ignored that the scaling parameter γ∗ is in fact
always equal to the probability of breakdown for two low-cost types, γ(l, l), in the
original problem. Thus, we need to ensure that γ∗ ∈ [0, 1] to guarantee that γ(l, l)
remains a probability.
Whenever the constraint γ∗(P ) binds, (IC li) must hold, too. To see this recall
γi(l) =
p
ρ−i
γ(l, l).
To ensure γi(l) ∈ [0, 1] even if γ(l, l) = 1 we need p ≤ ρ−i. Such a high post-
breakdown belief ensures incentive compatibility by Lemma 3.6. If the ex-ante
probability of low-cost types is high enough for (IC li) to bind, the scaling parame-
ter γ∗(P ) < 1. Thus, γ∗ ≤ 1 does not change the results of Lemma 3.6. Next, recall
that
γ∗(P ) = ν
Q(P )−R(P ) ,
such that γ∗ is increasing in ν for any P . The value of ν, in turn, is large for small
p and large κ. Therefore, the solution computed in Lemma 3.5 violates γ∗ ≤ 1 if
cost difference between low-cost and high-cost types are high, or the probability to
have high-cost is small.
To compensate this, the mediator can decrease either ρi. As in the discussion of
Lemma 3.5 such an operation increases the resources available for distribution in
settlements and allows to reduce γ∗.
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Given small values of the prior, p, the optimal breakdown belief ρi without consid-
ering the γ∗-constraint is strictly larger than p, and thus the mediator reduces both
beliefs, ρ1 and ρ2, simultaneously up to the point at which one equals the prior,
i.e. ρ2 = p. If this does not suffice to make γ(l, l) feasible, the mediator decreases
the belief on player 1, ρ1, further until γ∗(P ) = 1. It turns out that the remain-
ing Border-constraint, (EPI), holds at any such point and ex-post implementation
is thus possible. Combining all results allows us to make a statement about any
set of parameters, κ and p. The characterization is given in the next lemma which
concludes the argument for Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.7. Consider without loss of generality only ρ1 ≥ ρ2. Fix some κ such that
Assumption 1 hold and assume that the mediator cannot release public signals. Then there
are three cutoff values p′, p′′ and p′′′ such that the optimum of the minimization problem is
either 0 or satisfies
• (IC l2) and therefore ρ2 = p with equality only if p /∈ (p′, p′′′),
• γ(l, l) ≤ 1 with equality only if p ≤ p′′,
• 2p < ρ1 ≤ (1 + p)/2 where the last holds with equality only if p ≥ p′′.
The cutoffs are given by:
p′ = 16(κ− 1)
(
κ− 8 +
√
28− 4κ+ κ2
)
,
p′′ = 12 + 3κ
(
2(κ− 1)−
√
8− 4κ+ κ2
)
,
p′′′ = 13 .
The cutoffs describe the main characteristic of the optimum. For low p the mediator
offers low-cost types a litigation utility post breakdown which is smaller than their
value of vetoing, i.e. ρ2 > p. To do this l-types need a high enough settlement
share which the mediator finances by reducing the overall breakdown probability
by increasing γ∗. However, for very low p not even γ∗ = 1 suffices as V (l) is
too high. To account for the constraint, the mediator decreases both breakdown
probabilities, ρ2 and ρ1. However, ρ2 cannot fall below p as this would violate both
(IC l2) and γi(k) ≤ 1. Thus, for very low p, the mediator chooses ρ2 = p and adjusts
ρ1 accordingly.
As the prior p increases, the solution ρ2 increases, too, and ρ2 ≥ p does not bind
anymore. The resource constraint, γ∗ ≤ 1, however, still does. If p is larger than p′′,
the solution of Lemma 3.5 can be implemented directly. For p > 1/3, on the other
hand, low-cost types of player 2 have an incentive to misreport given the protocol
from Lemma 3.5 which means that (IC l2) binds and the belief on player 2 is set to
the prior, ρ2 = p. The left panel of Figure 3.4 illustrates the findings. The dashed
line plots the optimal protocol according to Lemma 3.5 whereas the solid line is the
full model.
3.5 Discussion of the Results
Comparative Statics. Figure 3.4 depicts the probability of litigation under the opti-
mal mechanism both as a function of the prior, p (left panel), and as a function of the
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FIGURE 3.4: Ex-ante probability of the contest as a function of p (left
panel) and κ (right panel). The dashed line describes the situation of
the unconstraint problem (P1′) as in Lemma 3.5. The green solid line
corresponds to Lemma 3.6. All solid lines together display the result of
Lemma 3.7.
distance between low and high cost, κ (right panel). The different colors indicate
the different regimes as discussed in Lemma 3.7. Red and blue (for p < p′′) denote
the areas in which the resource constraint, γ∗ ≤ 1, binds; green (to the right of p′′′)
is the area in which 2l’s incentive constraint binds and black is the area in which
(P1′) is solved “unconditionally” as in Lemma 3.5. p0 indicates the point at which
Assumption 1 starts to fail and the mediator achieves full settlement for p > p0. For
comparison, the dotted line depicts the solution ignoring (IC li) and γ∗ ≤ 1.
As expected, the probability of litigation increases in the distance between high-
costs and low-costs. As the low-cost type’s cost advantage increases, it becomes
more expensive to compensate her for participation and thus the mediator ini-
tiates breakdown more often. The relationship with respect to the prior is non-
monotone. When chances to meet a low-cost type are small, litigation can effec-
tively be avoided. Although low cost types require a large compensation for a
settlement, the mediator can grant this as she needs to pay this compensation sel-
dom. As the ex-ante probability of low-cost types increases the mediator must pay
the compensation more often, but at the same time the amount decreases. The re-
sult is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the prior and the probability of
litigation.
In addition, comparative statics show that ADR is a very effective tool. In our
setup the mediator can settle the majority of the cases for any set of parameters, p
and κ. The next proposition summarizes these findings.
Proposition 3.2. Under the optimal mediation protocol, the ex-ante probability of break-
down is never greater than 1/2. Moreover, the probability of breakdown is increasing and
concave in κ while it takes the form of an inverse U-shape in p.
Next, we want to discuss how the asymmetry translates to the different outcome
variables. A first result is straightforward and a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1:
low cost types experience breakdown more often than high-cost types. Moreover,
player 1l is sent to court more often than player 2l as the belief on player 1 is larger
than on player 2. Since the participation constraint binds, both low-cost type play-
ers experience the same utility in expectations. However, the contest utility is the
same for both low-cost types and smaller than the value of vetoing, V (l), as low-
cost types are more likely after breakdown than in the initial population. Thus,
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(a) Breakdown Probab. by Type (b) Expeceted Share by Type (c) Settlement Valuation by Type
FIGURE 3.5: (a) Expected Contest Probability, (b) Expected Share con-
ditional on settlement taking place, and (c) Valuation of Settlement by
player-type as a function of the ex-ante probability of being a low-cost type.
Solid lines depict low-cost types, dashed lines depict high-cost types. Dark-
red is player 1 and light-blue is player 2. The dotted gray line in (b) is the
value of vetoing for low-cost type players. In (c), player 2h has the same
settlement value as 2l by incentive compatibility.
player 2l, who is sent to court less often, receives a smaller expected share than
player 1l. For high-cost types the intuition is the other way around. Player 2h,
who experiences no utility in contest post-mediation, is compensated with a larger
amount than 1h. The next proposition states that this is the case for all parameter
values. Thus, player 1, who is stronger in the contest, expects a less favorable set-
tlement contract than player 2 who, in turn, faces a more difficult task to win the
litigation process after breakdown.
Proposition 3.3. Both the pre-mediation probability of being sent to court during media-
tion and the expected share conditional on settlement are largest for player 1l and smallest
for player 1h.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the results of Proposition 3.3 as a function of the prior dis-
tribution. The left panel (a) describes breakdown utilities, the middle panel (b) ex-
pected shares conditional on settlement, xi(m) ≡ zi(m)/(1 − γi(m)), and the right
panel (c) the settlement valuation. Dark-red lines are for player 1 and light-blue
lines for player 2. Dashed lines indicate high-cost types, solid lines indicate low-
cost types. The linear, gray, dotted line in panel (b) denotes the value of vetoing for
the l-type, V (l).
If the probability of low-cost types is very small, the mediator sends one of the
two low-cost types to litigation with certainty to ensure that the resource constraint
holds. As the probability of low-cost players increases, the pressure from the re-
source constraint relaxes as compensation for low-cost types declines. The media-
tor thus wishes to implement a less asymmetric solution. As p increases further, the
mediator can in fact reduce the probability of litigation for all types up to the point
where Assumption 1 seizes to hold and the problem therefore becomes trivial.
Another feature of our model is that we are able to evaluate the consequences
of the mediation decision on the litigation process. As litigation in our model is a
strategic game with actions that depend both on first and second order beliefs, we
should not expect players to play the same strategies as in litigation without a pre-
ceding mediation stage. Indeed the mediation attempt changes the belief structure
of the opposing parties in two ways: (1) it increases the likelihood for both play-
ers to meet a low-cost type in court and (2) it introduces an asymmetry that makes
player 1 more likely to be the low-cost type than player 2.
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The first effect clearly makes competition more intense as litigants are afraid that
the opponent can and will produce good evidence. The second effect works in the
other direction, since the high-cost type of player 2 has little chance of winning in
court. She refuses to compete at all from time to time and gives away the good
for free. The second effect exceeds the first, if player 2’s likelihood of being the
low type is the same as the prior, that is if ρ2 = p or p 6= (p′, p′′′). In such a case
the incentive to downsize investment in evidence due to the asymmetry between
players always supersedes the incentive to increase investment in evidence due to
the higher probability of low-cost types and we would see lower legal expenditure
post-mediation.
Proposition 3.4. Assume parameters are such that p < p′ or p > p′′′. Then, the sum of
expected legal expenditures after breakdown never exceeds the sum of expected legal expen-
ditures if mediation did not exist.
Outside this range no clear statement can be made other than that for any κ there
exists a possibly empty interval (pˆ, pˇ), with pˆ ≥ p′ and pˇ ≤ p′′′. Only in this interval,
the expected legal expenditure after breakdown is higher than without mediation.
3.6 Extensions
Pre-trial Bargaining. The traditional law and economics literature focuses mainly
on bilateral settlement negotiations. Typically, these bargains are modeled as a
simple take-it-or-leave it bargaining game (Posner, 1996; Shavell, 1995; Schweizer,
1989). For illustration assume the following bargaining procedure close to Schweizer
(1989): one player (Sender) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player (Re-
ceiver) who decides whether to accept or reject the offer. Upon rejection both play-
ers update their beliefs and proceed to litigation.
To compare our results, notice first that by the revelation principle and Lemma B.1,
the equilibrium rejection channel is absent. Pre-trial negotiations thus cannot out-
perform the result of the mechanism.
As in the mediation mechanism, off-path beliefs play a crucial role in the bargain-
ing game. The actions in the contest are based on the belief structure as discussed
above.
The solution concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium allows to freely choose
beliefs put on the deviator at the first node of deviation, but requires Bayes’ rule
thereafter. Any bargaining equilibrium that performs as well as the mediation
mechanism replicates outcome utilities of the mechanism and is furthermore equipped
with a set of off-path beliefs that deter any deviation by any player. It turns out that
no off-path belief exists such that the bargaining can replicate the mediator’s solu-
tion as long as Assumption 1 holds.
Proposition 3.5. Independent of the off-path belief structure, take-it-or-leave-it bargaining
leads to a strictly higher probability of litigation than the optimal mediation mechanism
provided that Assumption 1 holds.
The intuition behind the result is that a low-cost Sender could always profitably
deviate by proposing an arbitrarily small share  to Receiver. Then, given any belief
Receiver holds after observing this deviation, she either accepts the share which
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gives Sender a higher utility than in the optimal mechanism, or rejects the share
if she thinks Sender is weak. Assuming a weak Sender, however, induces her to
score softer than in the litigation game under priors. By strategic complementarity,
Sender scores softer as well. But then, Sender expects a higher utility as winning is
less costly. Thus, it is not optimal for a low-cost Sender to reproduce the outcome
of the optimal mechanism: the incentive to deviate from the mechanism leads to a
higher breakdown probability in expectations.
This shows the importance of a third-party who manages the information flow.
With direct bargaining, Receiver always interprets Sender’s proposal as a signal
and Sender cannot commit to abstain from signaling via her proposal. A neutral
third-party can overcome this adverse selection problem and thus improves upon
bilateral negotiations.
Asymmetric Players. Asymmetric players do not change any of the results ob-
tained. The reason is that the mediator would always treat the ex-ante stronger
player as “player 2”, i.e. the player that gets the better settlement conditions. The
ex-ante weaker player accepts a small settlement share, since she fears a strong
opponent in litigation. The weaker player, however, is compensated for the small
share with a favorable contest after breakdown. Thus, while the ex-ante weaker
player is strong post-breakdown, she agrees to settlement-contracts that favor her
opponent. With such a protocol the mediator is still able to solve the majority of
the cases. A key result of our analysis is, however, that we get asymmetric results
even with symmetric players.
Different forms of commitment. So far we have assumed that both players can
fully commit to the proposed mediation protocol. In particular, once the mecha-
nism is accepted, parties commit to only go back to litigation if the mediator tells
them. In reality this is not always the case. Many jurisdictions demand that parties
can unilaterally opt-out of ADR at any point to return to litigation. We discuss two
stages at which parties can unilaterally decide to break down ADR. The first is a sit-
uation in which they can leave after the mechanism has told players’ their expected
share conditional on settlement. We call this commitment structure post-ADR in-
dividual rationality (PAIR). The second commitment structure is that parties can
veto the mechanism after they have learned their realized share conditional on set-
tlement. We call this ex-post individual rationality (EPIR).
The mediation protocol developed in Section 3.4 does not directly carry over to
PAIR and EPIR. In fact, given these commitment schemes, the mediator profits from
the ability to communicate to parties even after ADR breaks down. If this is the
case, the mediator can give parties non-binding recommendations for the play of
the contest and by that restore the outcome under full-commitment. The modified
game thus follows a slightly enhanced timeline:
1. the mediator commits to X and recommendation structure Σ; players learn
their types,
2. players send a message mi to the mediator,
3. the mediator privately announces a share xi according to X to each player i,
4. players accept/reject the share,
5. players receive a recommendation σi by the mediator,
6. if either of the players rejected her offer, the contest is played under updated
beliefs.
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Note that since the mediator first observes the behavior of the players with respect
to the announced share she has the ability to detect a deviation in this stage (other
than in the reporting stage). To restore the result of Section 3.4 the mediator uses
the following slightly more sophisticated mechanism(s).
To find the optimal PAIR mechanism, we need to define a convex combination of
the protocol derived in Section 3.4 and its mirror image switching roles of player 1
and 2. Define Xˆλ, a mediation protocol such that Xi applies with probability λ
and X−i with probability (1 − λ). Xi denotes a mediation protocol similar to the
one discussed in Theorem 3.1. When mediation is successful, player i is treated as
“player 1”. To trigger litigation in this protocol, the mediator offers a share of 0 to
at least one of the players. This share is going to be rejected such that parties move
to the litigation game.
To ensure EPIR we need that, in addition, the mediator sends both parties to
contest irrespective of their reports with probability  > 0. Thus, we define Xˆ λ to
be a mediation protocol such that with probability  players are send to court and
with probability (1 − ) the mediator executes Xˆλ. This is sufficient to ensure the
following two results.
Proposition 3.6. There exists a signal Σ, such that an incentive compatible PAIR mech-
anism (Xˆ1/2,Σ) has the same breakdown probability Pr(Γ) as the mechanism X under
interim individual rationality.
Proposition 3.7. For any δ > 0, there exists a signal Σ and an  > 0, such that an in-
centive compatible EPIR mechanism (Xˆ 1/2,Σ) achieves a breakdown probability Pr(Γ) <
Pr(Γ) + δ, where Pr(Γ) is the optimal breakdown probability of the mechanism X under
interim individual rationality.
To gain intuition observe the following. First, with both PAIR and EPIR the medi-
ator can trigger the play of a contest by offering at least one party an unacceptable
share as rejection leads to contest. Second, the mediator achieves the result by ob-
fuscating two issues: the role of the player and the relevance of her decision.
The latter derives from the possibility that the mediator wants to trigger contest
play and has offered the player’s opponent an unacceptable share. As both do not
know which litigant takes the role of player 1, and who is offered the trigger share
0, she cannot learn much from her own offer. As the conditional distribution post-
breakdown is on-path revealed via the signal σ, obfuscation is only payoff relevant
in deviation games. Deviation is, however, only detected by the mediator, not by
the non-deviator. Thus, the mediator can react to deviation by sending the deviator
a signal of a strong non-deviator to punish her. This suffices to get the same result
as under full-commitment.
In the case of EPIR the mediator is more constrained as revealing the ex-post
share xi(k1, k2) to player i allows for more inference by the player. For some pa-
rameter values it might be the case that certain constellations do not settle on-path.
Thus, the mediator might have a degenerate belief after some proposed realized
shares which makes the procedure of PAIR impossible. The mediator can use an-
other option instead, though. She can commit to initiate breakdown for any type-
profile with a small probability  and to send a fully informative signal thereafter. In
such a case both parties can end up with 0 expected utility after breakdown. If the
mediator commits to signal this event to the non-deviator after any deviation, the
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non-deviator will always invest an amount large enough to effectively punish the
deviator. As →0 the mechanism converges to Xˆλ and the resulting probability of
breakdown is arbitrarily close to that of the mechanism described in Theorem 3.1.
Nonetheless, allowing the types to go back to court after all uncertainty has un-
raveled would naturally lead to a different result. Typically however, once a de-
tailed settlement agreement has been signed by both parties, it is hard to imagine a
legal system that allows parties to overturn this contract simply because they have
learned that they might have a good chance to beat the opponent.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we characterize optimal Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the
shadow of the court. We show that optimal ADR is always asymmetric and of-
fers one player an advantage after breakdown and the other one an advantage un-
der settlement. We show that the optimal information structure post-ADR is com-
pletely independent of the players’ report, but conditions only on their identity.
Such a mechanism prevents players from misreporting to achieve an informational
advantage.
We find that a litigation-minimizing ADR-protocol is highly effective and solves
the majority of cases. The effectiveness indicates that mandatory ADR should be
considered by all courts to reduce the prevalent stress on judges and court’s back-
log of cases. In addition, the asymmetry of the optimal mechanism implies that
regulators should act carefully when defining their notion of fairness for mediation
protocols. The same holds true for discretionary policies: mediators should always
have the possibility to talk to the disputants in private as this eliminates commit-
ment problems on the disputants side. Finally, we show that mediators should not
be forced to disclose all their information in the event of breakdown. Trust in the
mediator’s discretion is an important driving force of the success of a mechanism.
More broadly, we show that the most important aspect of the optimal ADR-
protocol is the management of the information structure in litigation post-breakdown.
The optimal protocol imposes type-independent beliefs to minimize the potential
gain a deviator can earn in the litigation game following a misreport. In addition,
the protocol is asymmetric to reduce resource intensity in case of breakdown.
We demonstrate that the standard assumption of fixed, type-dependent outside
options in mechanism design is not innocuous when the following two conditions
are satisfied: (1) the mechanism cannot replace the underlying default game com-
pletely and (2) the actions chosen in the underlying game depend on player’s be-
liefs. We show that the behavior of the players in the mechanism and those in
the underlying game are interconnected. For the case of contests, we show that
players invest less resources post-breakdown for extreme type distributions com-
pared to a situation in which no resolution mechanism is present. For intermediate
type-distributions, however, the post-mediation contest can also be more resource
intensive.
Not claiming that the actual ADR-mechanisms we observe in reality are optimal,
we want to note that our findings are in line with some observations on ADR. Its
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success rates are beyond 50% across cases and jurisdictions and mediation is con-
sidered to be informative when breaking down. In addition, one reason why me-
diation is perceived to be successful is its ability to not rely on publicly observable
actions of the mediator, but allowing for private settlement negotiations.
Our findings provide several interesting directions for future research. First of
all, the assumption that the mechanism designer has full-commitment could be re-
laxed to allow for third-party renegotiation. Especially when mediators compete
for clients this seems reasonable. Further, extending the analysis to a setup of more
than two players and possibly correlated types might add several interesting chan-
nels to the model. In addition, many conflicts evolve around a variety of battlefields
on different subjects or points in time. If types are correlated over time this adds
an additional signaling dimension which is interesting to analyze further. Finally,
although minimizing court appearances is optimal given the public good proper-
ties of the legal system, it is less clear in other contest situations whether this is the
most suitable objective. Although a richer model is needed to address such issues
properly, we are confident that the results of this papers provide a first step towards
analyzing these problems.
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A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Take any β˜-feasible allocation φ that induces the play of the default game (i.e.,
qA,Pφ (jˆ, kˆ) > 0 for some profile of reports). Agent type j’s utility reads: UAφ (jˆ, j, β˜) =∑K
k=0 β˜k(qAφ (jˆ, k)j + q
A,P
φ (jˆ, k)UAD(j, k) − tAφ (jˆ, k)). Principal type k’s utility reads:
UPφ (kˆ, k) =
∫ J
0 (qPφ (j, kˆ)θk + q
A,P
φ (j, kˆ)UPD (j, k) − tPφ (j, kˆ))f(j)dj. We want to show
that there exists φ′ that does not involve the non-cooperative play of the auction, is
β˜-feasible and leaves every bidder with the same payoff as φ.
For any kˆ ∈ supp(β˜) define φ′ by qAφ′(jˆ, kˆ) = qAφ (jˆ, kˆ) + qA,Pφ (jˆ, kˆ)1(jˆ > kˆ) ,
qPφ′(jˆ, kˆ) = qPφ (jˆ, kˆ) + q
A,P
φ (jˆ, kˆ)1(jˆ < kˆ), tAφ′(j, k) = tAφ (jˆ, kˆ) + 1(jˆ > kˆ)q
A,P
φ (jˆ, kˆ)(θkˆ)
, tPφ′(jˆ, kˆ) = tPφ (jˆ, kˆ) + 1(jˆ < kˆ)q
A,P
φ (jˆ, kˆ)(jˆ) and q
A,P
φ′ (jˆ, kˆ) = 0.
Observe, by constructionUAφ (j, j, β˜) = UAφ′(j, j, β˜) ∀j ∈ ΘA,UPφ (k, k) = UPφ′(k, k) ∀k ∈
supp(β˜) and qA,Pφ′ (jˆ, kˆ) = 0 ∀jˆ, kˆ ∈ ΘA × supp(β˜).
Suppose that φ′ is β˜-incentive-compatible for the principal. Then, UAφ′(jˆ, j, β˜) =∑K
k=0 β˜k{qAφ (jˆ, k)j − tAφ (jˆ, k) + 1(jˆ > k)qA,Pφ (jˆ, k)(j − θk)} ≤ UAφ (jˆ, j, β˜) ∀jˆ ∈ ΘA,
and with equality if jˆ = j. Since the right-hand side is maximized when jˆ = j
(by β˜-incentive compatibility of φ), φ′ is β˜-incentive compatibility for the agent. A
similar reasoning applies when reversing the roles of the principal with type in the
support of β˜ and the agent.
Finally, consider a principal type k not in the support of β˜. Denote k’s opti-
mal report given φ by kˆ(k). For any such type, augment φ′ by a menu such that
(qPφ′(jˆ, k), q
A,P
φ′ (j, k), tPφ′(jˆ, k)) = (qPφ (jˆ, kˆ(k)) + q
A,P
φ (jˆ, kˆ(k))1(k > jˆ), 0, tPφ (jˆ, kˆ(k)) +
qA,Pφ (jˆ, kˆ(k))(jˆ)1(k > jˆ)). By construction, UPφ′(k, k) = UPφ (kˆ(k), k). Moreover, the
β˜-incentive constraints of those principal types in the support of β˜ are not altered,
since φ is β˜-incentive-compatible: According to φ, each principal type k′ in the sup-
port of β˜ can secure himself the utility UPφ′(kˆ(k), k′) by reporting to be kˆ(k) and
submitting the bid θk in the SPA, whenever the mechanism allows him to do so.
Since this is a (weakly) dominated strategy, it follows from β˜-incentive compatibil-
ity of φ that UPφ′(kˆ(k), k′) ≤ UPφ (kˆ(k), k′) ≤ UPφ (k′, k′) = UPφ′(k′, k′).
We conclude that there is no loss of generality on focusing on outcome functions
that do not involve the play of the default game, whenever evoking the concept of
β˜-feasibility. Since the argument can easily be generalized to capture the case of
safe allocations, we consider statement (ii) as proven.
76 Appendix A. Appendix Chapter 2
A.2 Characterization of the RSW Allocation and the Proof
of Lemma 2.2
Similar to proposition 2 in Maskin and Tirole, 1992, where the agent has no private
information, the solution φRSW to the class of maximization problems (P1)kˇ for
kˇ ∈ ΘP , can be found and thought of as solving the following sequence of linked
maximization problems:
max
φ(·,0)
Upφ(·,0)(0) (P˜1)0
such that ∀j ∈ Θa:
(AIR)j0, (AIC)
j
0, (BB)j,0,
and for any k = 1, ...,K and given φ(·, 0), ..., φ(·, k − 1),
max
φ(·,k)
Upφ(·,k)(k) (P˜1)k
such that ∀j ∈ Θa :
(AIR)jk, (AIC)
j
k, (BB)j,k,
(PIC)+k−1 U
p
φ(·,k−1)(k − 1) ≥ Upφ(·,k)(k − 1),
where each (P˜1)k defines an optimal - from principal type k’s point of view - menu
offer to the agent, satisfying k−1’s upward adjacent incentive constraint, (PIC)+k−1.
Each (P˜1)k is subject to the agent’s ex-post individual rationality and incentive
constraint, given k.
We start with principal type k = 0. We construct the optimal menu φRSW (·, 0)
from his point of view. We continue with principal type k = 1. We construct the
optimal menu φRSW (·, 1) from his point of view, subject to the additional constraint
that k = 0 does not prefer to offer φRSW (·, 1) instead of φRSW (·, 0), i.e., subject to
(PIC)+0 . Having determined φRSW (·, 1), we proceed in the same fashion with the
next higher principal type, and so on.
RSW Allocation. There exists K ∈ ΘP ∪K + 1 and a sequence of increasing threshold
types {j(k)}K−1k=0 with j(k) ∈ ΘA and j(0) = 0, such that φRSW is as follows:
∀(j, k) ∈ Θ with k < K :
qPRSW (j, k) = 1[j ≤ j(k)], qARSW (j, k) = 1− qPRSW (j, k)
tPRSW (j, k) = 1[j ≤ j(k)](−θk)+(1−1[j ≤ j(k)])(j(k)−θk), tARSW (j, k) = −tPRSW (j, k)
∀(j, k) ∈ Θ with k ≥ K :
qPRSW (j, k) = 1, qARSW (j, k) = 1− qPRSW (j, k)
tPRSW (j, k) = θK−1 − UPRSW (K − 1), tARSW (j, k) = −tPRSW (j, k)
To explain the form of the RSW allocation, let us describe the menus, induced by
the sequence of maximization problems (P˜1)k: Principal type 0 does not value the
right. Since he is constraint by (AIR)j0, φRSW (·, 0) is a degenerate menu that allots
the right to every agent type at zero transfer payment.
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A menu associated with principal type k, such that 0 < k < K, leaves the agent
with a choice set consisting of two elements: The right to be the only bidder in the
SPA and the commitment to stay out of the auction. Augmented to each element is
a transfer. The construction of these transfers assures that every agent type above
a threshold, j(k), chooses the first element and every type below the threshold se-
lects the second element. Imposing in addition that the agent’s ex-post individual
rationality-constraint has no slack, these transfers are uniquely determined as func-
tion of j(k) and k. If the agent type is above the threshold, one might think of the
transfer as price for the right. If the type is below the threshold, the transfer takes
the role of a compensation, paid to the agent for the commitment to stay out of
the auction. Via the binding resource-feasibility and budget-balanced constraint,
the agent’s choice in the menu associated with principal type k determines an ex-
pected allocation for the latter. The parameter j(k) is chosen such that principal
type k− 1 indeed prefers the menu associated with his type and does not imitate k.
That is, j(k) is determined by principal’s type k−1 upward adjacent incentive con-
straint at the interim level. The higher the threshold j(k), the higher the probability
with which the right is allotted to principal type k. Since the principal’s upward ad-
jacent incentive constraints are binding, the probability with which type k receives
the right is inefficiently high.The resulting inefficient binary 0,1 allotment policy
implies that the ex-post individual rationality-constraints of those agent types be-
ing weakly above j(k) are satisfied with equality. Incentive compatibility in turn
implies that the ex-post individual rationality-constraints for lower types than j(k)
is satisfied with strict inequality.
If we can construct menus in the above fashion for all principal types, we set
K = K + 1. If, however, for some sufficiently high principal type k˜ there does not
exist a menu generated in the above manner that separates k˜ from his downward
adjacent neighbor k˜−1, i.e., when choosing j(k˜) = J and constructing the incentive-
compatible transfers such that the agent’s individual rationality-constraints have
no slack -, we set K = k˜. In this instance, we refer to the set of principal types
weakly above K as the pool at the top. All types of the principal weakly above K
offer the same degenerate menu. Upon acceptance, the agent commits to stay out
of the auction in exchange for a transfer payment. This payment from the principal
to the agent is chosen such that principal type K − 1 ’s upward adjacent incentive
constraint is satisfied with equality. As implication, every agent type’s ex-post in-
dividual rationality-constraint with respect to the principal’s types in the pool at
the top holds with strict inequality.1
For completeness, note the optimality of the binary 0,1 allotment policy is implied
by the regularity assumption on the agent’s type distribution, i.e., assumption 1.
Outline of the proof We first state an algorithm that defines the RSW alloca-
tion completely. For later purpose, we continue by stating a different maximiza-
tion problem (P1)′, being subject to the same set of constraints as any (P1)kˇ. We
prove that the solution to (P1)′ solves every (P1)kˇ. We work with (P1)
′ and show
that the claimed solution φRSW solves (P1)′. In order to set up a tractable maxi-
mization problem, we make use of some ideas of Ledyard and Palfrey, 2007. By
1Referring to Maskin and Tirole, 1992, the existence of such a pool at the top corresponds to a
failure of their sorting assumption.
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relaxing the agent’s incentive constraints and restating his individual rationality-
constraints, we transform (P1)′ to a program with finitely many constraints. This
new program is sufficiently well-behaved in that it admits a quasi-concave objec-
tive and a convex constraint-set. Moreover, the problem admits an interior point,
φo, defined in the proof of lemma 2.3 in A.3. Thus, we are able to apply the standard
Lagrangian-methodology. We proceed by constructing multipliers being consistent
with complementary slackness, given the assumed optimality of the RSW alloca-
tion. Given these multipliers, we show that qRSW (·, ·) maximizes the Lagrangian
function (point-wise). By the imposed regularity condition on the agent’s distri-
bution, i.e., assumption 1, the ignored monotonicity condition is satisfied at the
optimum.2
Algorithm.
• Step 0: Start with k = 1. Note that (qPRSW (0), tPRSW (0)) and thus UPRSW (0) are
determined by the RSW allocation stated above. Go to step 2.
• Step 1:
For any k > 1, note that (qPRSW (k−1), tPRSW (k−1)) are determined up to j(k−1),
according to the form of the RSW allocation. Hence, so is UPRSW (k − 1, k − 1) =
qPRSW (k− 1)θk−1 − tPRSW (k− 1). j(k− 1) is determined by the algorithm starting
with k − 1.
• Step 2:
If k > J , set j(k) = J
If k < J ,compute the set Ωk, where
Ωk := {j ∈ ΘA|UPRSW (k− 1, k− 1) ≥ F (j)θk−1 + (1−F (j))θk −F (j) max{j −
θk, 0}}
If Ωk is empty, set K = k and stop. In this instance set j(k) = J ∀k ≥ K.
Otherwise define j(k) := min Ωk.
• Step 3:
Given j(k), UPRSW (k, k) is completely determined by the formula of the RSW alloca-
tion.
• Step 4:
If k < K, go back to step 1 and start with k + 1.
If k = K go to step 5.
• Step 5:
Set K = K + 1.
2The way we solve the K+1 maximization problems that define the RSW allocation seems rather
elaborate. It is taken, since we make use of the characterization of the solution to (P1)′ in terms of the
multipliers when proving that the RSW allocation is undominated for some β˜ and welfare weights.
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Some remarks are in order: First, K takes a value weakly smaller than K iff the
algorithm stops in stage 2 for some k ∈ ΘP . A sufficient condition for this event
is θK ≥ J . In this instance, ΩK is empty and thus K ≤ K . Second, note that j(k)
is a weakly increasing sequence. Third, for all k < K it holds that j(k) > θk. This
follows by construction: Suppose j(k) ≤ θk, then max{j(k)− θk, 0} = 0. Therefore,
the right-hand side of the constraint in Ωk takes a value strictly above θk−1. Since
UPRSW (kˆ = k − 1, k − 1) ≤ θk−1, this is a contradiction to the fact that j(k) ∈ Ωk.
Introducing auxiliary program (P1)′ In order to prove that φRSW solves any
problem (P1)kˇ, we next show that this solution satisfies the optimality conditions
of program (P1)′.
max
φ
K∑
k=0
UPφ (k) (P1)′
such that ∀j, k ∈ Θ:
(AIR)jk, (AIC)
j
k, (PIC)k, (BB)j,k
We start by relaxing the constraints:
Step 0: (PIC)
We replace (PIC) by (PIC)+. That is, we impose the constraint:
(PIC)+k U
P
φ (k, k) ≥ UPφ (k + 1, k) ∀k ∈ {0, 1, ...,K − 1}.
Step 1: (AIC)k
Recall that given any k, agent’s utility takes the form:
UAφ (jˆ, j, k) = qAφ (jˆ, k)j − tAφ (j, k).
Note,
∂UAφ (jˆ,j,k)
∂j ≤ 1, for all qAφ (jˆ, k), tAφ (jˆ, k). By Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal
(2002) we thus know that the incentive-compatible form of the utility is given by:
UAφ (j, k) =
∫ j
0
qAφ (v, k)dv + UAφ (0, k),
where UAφ (0, k) := qAφ (0, k)0 + tAφ (0, k) is the utility of the lowest agent type. More-
over, UAφ (j, k) is absolutely continuous in j.
If in addition qAφ (j, k) is non-decreasing in j, (AIC)k is satisfied.
Step 2: (AIR)k
By the above necessary condition, individual rationality reads (given any k):∫ j
0
qAφ (v, k)dv + UAφ (0, k)− UAD(j, k) ≥ 0.
Define
J˜(k) := arg min
j∈ΘA
{
∫ j
0
(qAφ (v, k))dv − UAD(j, k)},
which might be a set of (possibly infinitely many) types.
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We guess that J ∈ J˜(k), which will later be verified. By this guess and the definition
of J˜(k) it immediately follows that UAφ (J, k) ≥ UAD(J, k) implies (AIR)jk is satisfied
for all j.
We replace (AIR)k by UAφ (J, k) − UAD(J, k) ≥ 0 and denote the relevant multiplier
by ρk.
Step 3: (BB)j,k
We first relax (BB)j,k to
(BB)k EjtAφ (j, k) + tPφ (k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP .
Second, we make use of step 1 to obtain the following representation for the transfer
of any j given any k:
tAφ (j, k) = qAφ (j, k)j − UAφ (j, k)
= qAφ (j, k)j −
∫ j
0
qAφ (v, k)dv − tAφ (0, k).
Hence,
EjtAφ (j, k) =
∫ J
0
qAφ (j, k)jf(j)dj −
∫ J
0
(
∫ j
0
qAφ (v, k)dv)f(j)dj − tAφ (0, k)
=
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, k),
where the last step follows from partial integration.
We thus replace (BB)j,k by:∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, k) + tPφ (k).
We denote the multiplier on this constraint by δk.
Step 4: Lagrangian
We are ready to state the Lagrangian objective:
maxL =
K∑
k=0
UPφ (k) +
K∑
k=0
ρk[
∫ J
0
(qAφ (v, k))dv + tAφ (0, k)− UAD(J, k)]
+
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)−UPφ (k+1, k)]+
K∑
k=0
δk[
∫ J
0
{(j−1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}f(j)dj−tAφ (0, k)+tPφ (k)],
where vk,k+1 and vk−1,k denote the multiplier on the (PIC)+ constraints.
Complementary slackness requires:
ρk[
∫ J
0
(qAφ (v, k))dv + tAφ (0, k)− UAD(J, k)] = 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP ,
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k + 1, k)] = 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP \K,
δk[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, k) + tPφ (k)] = 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP .
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The choice variables are the following:
{tAφ (0, k), tPφ (k), qAφ (·, k), qPφ (·, k)}Kk=0
Step 5: Necessary conditions for an optimum
As first step, we use the first order conditions of the choice variables tAφ (0, k) and
tPφ (k) to construct non-negative multipliers being consistent with complementary
slackness under the hypothesis that φ = φRSW solves the problem.
The derivative with respect to tAφ (0, k) satisfies:
ρk − δk = 0 (A.1)
By the claimed optimality of φRSW it follows that ρk = 0 (and thus δk = 0) when-
ever k ≥ K. If k < K the claimed optimality implies that ρk = δk ≥ 0.
The derivative with respect to tPφ (k) satisfies:
− 1− vk,k+1 + vk−1,k = −δk (A.2)
Summing (A.2) over k yields
K∑
k=0
1 =
K−1∑
k=0
δk := δ.
Iterating backwards on (A.1) motivates the following choice of the multipliers:
vk−1,k :=
K∑
v=k
1 if k ≥ K,
vk−1,k := (
K∑
v=0
1−
k−1∑
v=0
1)− (δ −
k−1∑
v=0
δv) =
k−1∑
v=0
δv −
k−1∑
v=0
1 if k < K.
Note, for k = 1 it follows that v0,1 = δ0 − 1.
Non-negativity implies: vk−1,k =
∑k−1
k=0 δk −
∑k−1
k=0 1 ≥ 0 ∀k > 0.
We thus face the following restrictions on the sequence {δk}Kk=0 with δk = 0 ∀k ≥
K:
(i) δk ≥ 0, (ii) vk−1,k =
k−1∑
v=0
(δv − 1) ≥ 0, (iii)
K∑
k=0
δk =
K∑
k=0
1 (F1)
Step 6: Manipulating the Lagrangian terms: (PIC)+
We aim to manipulate the Lagrangian objective in order to derive an expression that
allows us to solve the maximization problem point-wise. As first step, consider the
following expression:
A :=
K∑
k=0
UPφ (k) +
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k + 1, k)] +
K∑
k=0
δk[tPφ (k)].
Note that
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)−UPφ (k+1, k)] = −vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k+1)−qPφ (k))−(tPφ (k+1)−tPφ (k))].
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Substituting in A and using the first order conditions with respect to tPφ (k), (A.2),
leads:
A =
K∑
k=0
θkq
P
φ (k)−
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k+1)−qPφ (k))−(tPφ (k+1)−tPφ (k))]+
K∑
k=0
(δk−1)[tPφ (k)]
=
K∑
k=0
θkq
P
φ (k)−
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k + 1)− qPφ (k))].
Applying some algebra manipulations we can reformulate A as:
A =
K−1∑
k=1
qPφ (k)[θk(1 + vk,k+1)− vk−1,kθk−1] + qPφ (K)θK + (1 + v0,1)qPφ (0)θ0.
Again, by the first order conditions, (A.2), and the assumed form of the multipliers:
qPφ (k)[θk(1 + vk,k+1)− vk−1,kθk−1] = qPφ (k)[δkθk + (θk − θk−1)vk−1,k]
= qPφ (k)[δkθk + (θk − θk−1)
k−1∑
k=0
(δk − 1)] if 0 < k < K,
and
qPφ (k)[θk(1 + vk,k+1)− vk−1,kθk−1] = qPφ (k)[(θk − θk−1)vk−1,k]
= qPφ (k)(θk − θk−1)
K∑
k=k
1 if K > k ≥ K.
Merging these increments leads:
A =
K−1∑
k=1
qPφ (k)[δkθk+(θk−θk−1)
k−1∑
k=0
(δk−1)]+
K−1∑
k=K
[qPφ (k)(θk−θk−1)
K∑
k=k
1]+qPφ (K)θK+δ0qPφ (0)θ0.
Step 7: Manipulation of the Lagrangian objective, continued
We want to use the previous results to reformulate the Lagrangian. First, observe
that L = A+B, with B being defined as:
B :=
K∑
k=0
ρk[
∫ J
0
(qAφ (v, k))dv + tAφ (0, k)− UAD(J, k)]
+
K∑
k=0
δk[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}f(j)dj − UAφ (0, k)].
We can reformulate B:
B =
K−1∑
k=0
δk[
∫ J
0
{(j + F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}f(j)dj − UAD(J, k)].
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L now reads:
L =
K−1∑
k=1
∫ J
0
{qPφ (j, k)[θk + (θk − θk−1)
∑k−1
k=0(δk − 1)
δk
] + (j + F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}δkf(j)dj
−
K−1∑
k=1
δkU
A
D(J, k) +
K−1∑
k=K
[qPφ (k)(θk − θk−1)
K∑
k=k
1] + qPφ (K)θK
+qPφ (0)θ0 +
∫ J
0
(j + F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, 0)f(j)}dj
+F (0)
K−1∑
k=1
qPφ (k, 0)[δkθk + (θk − θk−1)
k−1∑
k=0
(δk − 1)]
Step 8: Optimal allotment policy
For given {δk}K−1k=0 the claimed optimality of the RSW allocation follows if qRSW
maximizes L point-wise. We thus need to find {δk}K−1k=0 , satisfying the above stated
optimality conditions, such that the claimed allotment policy satisfies the feature
of a point-wise maximizer, say qφ∗ .
For any k ≥ K it is straightforward to observe that qPφ∗(k) = 1. Moreover, since
θ0 = 0 it directly can be seen from the shape of L that qPφ∗(j, 0) = 0 and qAφ∗(j, 0) = 1
and qPφ∗(0, k) = 1 and qAφ∗(0, k) = 0.
Now consider k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}. We want to show that we can find {δk}K−1k=0 such
that φRSW maximizes L point-wise. We are free to choose any {δk}K−1k=0 being con-
sistent with (F1).
For any k, such thatK−1 ≥ k > 0 we must find a sequence of multipliers,∑Kk=0 1 =∑K
k=0 δk satisfying the optimality requirement:
[θk + (θk − θk−1)
∑k−1
v=0(δ∗v − 1)
δk
] = j(k) + F (j(k))
f(j(k)) ,
where we treat j(k) as exogenously given.3
If this sequence is consistent with (F1), it follows that
∑K
k=0 1 =
∑K
k=0 δk. This
allows us to rewrite:
k−1∑
v=0
(δv − 1) =
K∑
v=k
(1− δv).
We apply the following approach: We guess the existence of a solution to the prob-
lem, say {δ∗k}K−1k=0 , that satisfies (F1). Afterwards, we apply backward induction to
first verify that any such δ∗k, with 0 < k ≤ K − 1, satisfies the optimality require-
ment and features 0 < δ∗k < [
∑K
v=k+1(1 − δ∗v)] + 1. Finally, we construct δ∗0 , and
verify that all conditions in (F1) are satisfied.
We now apply the induction procedure.
We argue that, for any k and given {δ∗v}K−1v=k+1, we can find δk such that:
[θk + (θk − θk−1)
∑K
v=k+1(1− δ∗v) + (1− δk)
δk
] = j(k) + F (j(k))
f(j(k)) .
3Recall j(k) := argmin{j ∈ ΘA|qARSW (j, k) = 1}
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Since for fixed {δ∗v}K−1v=k+1 the left-hand side is continuous in δk, the intermediate
value theorem applies. First, when δk is arbitrarily small, the left-hand side goes to
(plus) infinity. This follows from the guess that the requirements are satisfied, i.e.,∑K
v=k+1(1 − δ∗v) > 0. When δk = δ¯k := [
∑K
v=k+1(1 − δ∗v)] + 1 the left-hand side is
strictly smaller than the right-hand side (this follows since θk < j(k)). Moreover,
the left-hand side strictly decreases in δk. We thus conclude that for any k such
that K − 1 ≥ k > 0 the solution to the above equation, δ∗k, features: 0 < δ∗k <
[∑Kv=k+1(1− δ∗v)] + 1.
As last step, consider k = 0. We determine δ∗0 such that
∑K
k=0 δk =
∑K
k=0 1. Let
δ∗0 := 1 +
K−1∑
k=1
(1− δ∗k) +
K∑
k=K−1
1.
Moreover, δ∗0 > 1 because δ∗1 − 1−
∑K−1
k=2 (1− δ∗k) < 0, by the features of δ∗k. We are
now ready to verify the conditions stated in (F1). First, observe that
δ =
K−1∑
k=0
δ∗k =
K∑
k=0
1,
by construction of δ∗0 . This proves (F1) (iii).
Second,
k−1∑
v=0
(δ∗k − 1) ≥ 0 ∀k, ⇐⇒
K∑
k
(1− δ∗k) ≥ 0 ∀k,
where the first step follows from the choice of δ∗0 and the last inequality from the
feature of δ∗k <
∑K
v=k+1(1− δ∗v) + 1. This verifies (F1) (ii).
Third, note that
δ∗k ≥ 0
is obviously satisfied for all k > 0 and therefore F1 (i) follows.
Step 9: Optimality of point-wise maximization
We constructed the multiplier such that the RSW allocation is consistent with point-
wise maximization of L. It is left to argue that point-wise maximization leads the
optimum. This is true because j + F (j)f(j) is non-decreasing in j and j(k) is weakly
increasing in k.
The next Lemma completes the proof of Lemma 2.2.
Lemma A.1. Suppose φ′ is a solution to (P1)′. Then φ′ is a solution to every (P1)kˇ.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that φ′ does not solve every (P1)kˇ. That is, there
exists at least one principal type k′ such that UPRSW (k′) > UPφ′(k′). Recall that both
maximization problems are subject to the same set of constraints. Construct a new
allocation, φ′′, by setting φ′′(·, k) = φ′′′k (·, k) for all k, where φ′′′k := arg maxφ∈{φRSW ,φ′} UPφ (k, k).
I.e., let each type of the principal choose whether he wants his allocation to be de-
termined by the agent’s choice in the menu φRSW (·, k) or in φ′(·, k). Note that φ′′
satisfies the constraints of problem(P1)′: the agent’s constraints are not altered,
since they are satisfied at the ex-post level according to both φRSW and φ′. Suppose
the principal’s incentive constraint is violated for some type k′′. Then, there must
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exists some kˆ 6= k′′ ∈ ΘP such that one of the following cases is true:
max{UPRSW (k′′, k′′), UPφ′(k′′, k′′)} < UPRSW (k′′′, k′′)
max{UPRSW (k′′, k′′), UPφ′(k′′, k′′)} < UPφ′(k′′′, k′′)
This is a contradiction to the fact that both φRSW and φ′ satisfy the principals in-
centive constraints.
We conclude that φ′′ is feasible. By construction, we know that φ′′ implies a weakly
higher value of problem (P1)′ than φ′. By the assumption on the existence of k′,
we know that φ′′ implies a strictly higher value of problem (P1)′ than φ′. Hence, φ′
cannot solve problem (P1)′.
A.3 Proofs of Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4
We verify that corollary 3 of Mylovanov and Tröger, 2015 applies to our setting. For
this, we need to show that every principal type can implement his best safe payoff.
That is, we need to verify that there exists an interior point (Step 1), that is, an al-
location satisfying all defining constraints of a safe allocation with strict inequality.
Given this, it follows that when the principal proposes a direct revelation mech-
anism equal to any convex combination between the allocation implementing his
best safe payoff and the interior point, the agent accepts the mechanism and it fea-
tures a unique equilibrium play. Afterwards, in Step 2 we verify that the secured
payoff is implemented by the RSW allocation. In the course of this step, we also
verify that the assumptions in Mylovanov and Tröger, 2015 are satisfied implying
that there methodology applies.
Step 1
We first verify that there exists an allocation, say φo, that is safe with strict inequal-
ity. Denote by µ, α > 0 two parameters that are specified later. Then, φo takes the
form:
∀j ∈ ΘA:
(qAφo(j, k), tAφo(j, k)) =
{
(αF (j), α(jF (j)− ∫ j0 F (v)dv)− J) ∀k ∈ ΘP .
If k = 0:
(qPφo(j, k), tPφo(j, k)) =
{
(0, 2J) ∀j ∈ ΘA .
∀k > 0 :
(qPφo(j, k), tPφo(j, k)) =
{
(µB(k),−UPφo(k − 1, k) + θk+θk−12 µB(k)) ∀j ∈ ΘA .
We choose µ, α > 0 sufficiently small, such that µ+ α < 1.
Observe that φo is resource feasible and budget balanced since qAφo(j, k)+qPφo(j, k) ≤
α+ µ < 1 and tAφo(j, k) + tPφo(j, k) ≥ −J + 2J > 0 ∀(j, k) ∈ Θ.
Moreover, φo creates an interior point: Firstly, UAφo(j, k)−UAD(j, k) = α(
∫ j
0 F (v)dv)+
J − max{0, j − θk} > 0 for any (j, k) ∈ Θ. Hence, (AIR)jk is satisfied with strict
inequality. Secondly, (PIC)k is satisfied with strict inequality, since by construction
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both the principal’s upward and downward incentive constraints are satisfied with
inequality. Finally, (AIC)jk is satisfied with strict inequality, since UAφo(jˆ, j, k) is
convex in jˆ and has a unique maximum at jˆ = j.
Step 2
In order to apply Mylovanov and Tröger (2015), we introduce some further nota-
tion.
Define H(k, β˜) as the set of payoffs of type k, that is:
H(k, β˜) := {UPφ (k)|∃φ : (AIC)jβ˜, (AIR)
j
β˜
, (PIC)k ∀j ∈ ΘA,∀k ∈ supp(β˜)}.
Because of the quasilinear environment, H(k, β˜) is a convex set. Denote by Upφ
the principal’s payoff vector, with K+1 elements. Element k + 1 corresponds to
principal type k’s payoff UPφ (k). Define the set H(β˜),
H(β˜) := {UPφ |∃φ : (AIC)jβ˜, (AIR)
j
β˜
, (PIC)k ∀j ∈ ΘA, ∀k ∈ supp(β˜)}.
By the revelation principle, the continuation game starting after a proposal of any
m ∈ M together with fixed β˜ induces a β˜-feasible allocation. Let us denote the
induced principal payoff vector by UP . The k+1’th element, UP (k), denotes the
payoff of type k. Hence, UP ∈ H(β˜).
Moreover, let M(β˜,m) denote the set of those payoff vectors being induced by the
play of the continuation game subsequent to the principal’s proposal of game form
mwith belief β˜ about the principal. In addition, define the setK such that (β˜, UP ) ∈
K if and only if β˜ ∈ B0 and UP ∈M(β˜,m) for some m ∈M .
We first verify that K is compact. Take a convergent sequence of beliefs β˜n → β˜∗
and a convergent sequence of payoff vectors such that UPn → UP∗ and UPn ∈ H(β˜n)
for all n. For any element n, there exists a corresponding allocation φn that is β˜n-
feasible. We choose a convergent subsequence such that φn(j, k) → φ∗(j, k) for
all (j, k) ∈ Θ. As H(β˜n) is defined with respect to inequalities, it must be that
UP∗ ∈ H(β˜∗).
Next, we introduced the secured payoff defined by Mylovanov and Tröger (2015).
For all k ∈ ΘP the secured payoff, UP (k), is defined as:
UP (k) := sup
m∈M
min
β˜∈B,UP∈M(β˜,m)
UPm(k).
Denote by UP the secured-payoff vector, with the secured payoffs as elements.
We want to show that UPRSW (k) = UP (k).
First, observe that UPRSW (k) ≤ UP (k): Suppose that UPRSW (k) > UP (k). Consider
the following direct revelation mechanism implementing φRSW with probability
approaching 1 and φo with strictly positive probability approaching zero. By the
features of φo, it follows that this direct revelation mechanism implements an allo-
cation, φ′, that is feasible for all beliefs. φ′ induces principal type k payoff arbitrary
close to UPRSW . This contradicts the definition of U
P (k).
Moreover, note that UPRSW (k) ≥ UP (k) ∀k ∈ ΘP : Suppose UP (k) > UPRSW (k)
for some k. As initial step, observe UP ∈ H(k, β˜) ∀β˜ from the definition of the
secured payoff: UP (k) > UPφ (k) for some β˜′, and all β˜′-feasible allocations implies
a contradiction to the fact that UP (k) is defined as the value of a minimization
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problem with respect to the belief. UP (k) < UPφ (k) for some β˜′, and all β˜′-feasible
allocations cannot be the case since by hypothesis UPRSW (k) < UP (k) and φRSW
is β˜-feasible for all β˜. Since H(k, β˜) is a convex set, the claim follows. We thus
note that there exists a payoff that is feasible for all beliefs. The revelation principle
implies:
UP (k) ∈ ∩β˜∈B0H(k, β˜) = {UPφ (k)|∃φ : (AIC)
j
k, (AIR)
j
k, (PIC)k ∀(j, k) ∈ Θ},
where the last equality follows from the fact that for any j and β˜, UAD(j, β˜) =∑K
k=0 β˜kU
A
D(j, k). The hypothesis U(k) > UPRSW (k) thus implies a contradiction:
There exists a game form that is feasible in (P1)k and leads a higher payoff than
the solution value of this program.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.5
We show that there exist welfare weights ({z∗k}Kk=0 with z∗k > 0) and a belief about
the principal’s types, β∗, such that the RSW allocation solves (P2). We subsume
those principal types not being in the support of β∗ in the set O. I.e., O := {k ∈
ΘP |β∗k = 0}. Whenever the pool at the top exists, we set O = {K, ...,K} and
else O = ∅. We relax problem (P2) by replacing the principal’s global incentive
constraints with local, upward adjacent constraints. The resulting program ,(P2)′,
takes the following form:
max
φ
K∑
k=0
z∗kU
P (k) (P2)′
such that ∀j ∈ ΘA and ∀k ∈ {0, ...,K − 2}:
(AIR)jβ∗ , (AIC)
j
β∗ ,
(PIC)+k U
P
φ (k, k) ≥ UPφ (k + 1, k),
for k = K − 1:
(PIC)OK−1 UPφ (K − 1,K − 1) ≥ UPφ (kˆ,K − 1) ∀kˆ ∈ O,
and
∀(j, k) ∈ Θ (BB)j,k.
(PIC)OK−1 imposes that principal type K − 1 does not prefer the menu being asso-
ciated with a type of the principal in O to φ(·,K − 1). Because O consists of those
types being strictly above K−1, this constraint is the local version of the constraint
that no principal type k′ ∈ ΘP \ O does prefer φ(·, k ∈ O) to φ(·, k′). Whenever
the solution to the relaxed program induces a monotonic allotment policy, the im-
posed local constraints are sufficient for β∗-incentive compatibility at the optimum
and the solution to (P2)′ solves (P2).
We first relax the constraints of (P2)′. Afterwards, we construct the Lagrangian
multipliers. Finally, we argue that there exists β˜ and {z∗k}Kk=0 such that φRSW solves
the relaxed version of (P2)′’. If O is empty, then all of the below still holds true. In
this instance variables and arguments involving a type k ∈ O are void.
Step 1: (AIC)β∗
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We work with the necessary condition and later verify that the sufficient condition
for incentive compatibility is satisfied.
Note,
∂UAφ (jˆ,j,β
∗)
∂j ≤ 1, for all qAφ (jˆ, β∗), tAφ (jˆ, β∗).
By Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal, 2002 we thus know that the incentive-compatible
form of the utility is given by:
UAφ (j, β∗) =
∫ j
0
qAφ (v, β∗)dv + UAφ (0, β∗),
where UAφ (0, β∗) = qAφ (0, β∗)0 + tAφ (0, β∗) is the utility of the lowest agent type.
Moreover, UAφ (j, β∗) is absolutely continuous in j.
Step 2: (AIR)β˜
By the above necessary condition, individual rationality reads (given any k):∫ j
0
(qAφ (v, β∗)dv + tAφ (0, β∗)− UAD(j, β∗) ≥ 0.
Define
J˜β
∗ := arg min
j∈ΘA
{
∫ j
0
(qAφ (v, β∗)dv − UAD(j, β∗)},
which might be a set of (possibly infinitely many) types.
We guess that J˜ p˜ = J , and verify it later. By this guess and the definition of J˜β∗ it
immediately follows that UAφ (J, β∗) ≥ UAD(J, β∗) implies (AIR)β∗ for all j.
We replace (AIR)β∗ byUAφ (J, β∗)−UAD(J, β∗) ≥ 0 and denote the relevant multiplier
by ρ.
Step 3: (BB)j,k
We first relax (BB)j,k to
(BB)k EjtAφ (j, k) + EktPφ (k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP .
Making use of step 1 we obtain the following representation for the transfer of any
j:
tAφ (j, β∗) = qAφ (j, β∗)j − UAφ (j, β∗)
= qAφ (j, β∗)j −
∫ j
0
qAφ (v, β∗)dv − tAφ (0, β∗).
Hence,
EjtAφ (j, β∗) =
∫ J
0
qAφ (j, β∗)jf(j)dj −
∫ J
0
(
∫ j
0
qAφ (j, β∗)dv)f(j)dj − tAφ (0, β∗)
=
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, β∗)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, β∗),
where the last step follows from partial integration.
We thus replace (BB)k by:∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, β∗)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, β∗) + tPφ (k).
A.4. Proof of Lemma 2.5 89
We denote the multiplier by δk.
Step 4: Lagrangian
We are ready to state the Lagrangian objective:
maxL :=
K∑
k=0
z∗kU
P
φ (k) + ρ[
∫ J
0
(qAφ (v, β∗)dv + tAφ (0, β∗)− UAD(J, β∗)]
+
K−2∑
k=0
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k + 1, k)] + vK−1,o[UPφ (K − 1,K − 1)− UPφ (o,K − 1)]
+
K∑
k=0
δk[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, β∗)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, β∗) + tPφ (k)],
where vk,k+1 and vk−1,k denote the multiplier on the upward adjacent (PIC) con-
straints.
Complementary slackness requires:
ρ[
∫ J
0
(qAφ (v, β∗)dv + tAφ (0, β∗)− UAD(J, β∗)] = 0,
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k + 1, k)] = 0 ∀k < K − 1,
δk[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, β∗)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, β∗) + tPφ (k)] = 0 ∀k.
Choice variables are the following:
{tAφ (0, β∗), tPφ (k), qAφ (·, k), qPφ (·, k)}Kk=0.
Step 5: Necessary conditions for an optimum
We want to show that there exist {z∗k}Kk=0 and β∗ such that φ = φRSW solves the
problem. That is, we treat z∗k and β
∗ as choice variables. Throughout the presen-
tation of the proof we assume that K < K. If this condition fails, then O = ∅ and
vK−1,k∈O = vK−1,K = 0. We deal with the latter instance in footnotes.
As first step, we use the first order conditions of the choice variables tAφ (0, β∗) and
tPφ (k) and construct (non-negative) multipliers being consistent with complemen-
tary slackness under the hypothesis that φ = φRSW solves the problem.
The derivative with respect to tAφ (0, β∗) satisfies:
ρ−
K∑
k=0
δk = 0 (A.3)
The derivatives with respect to tPφ (k) satisfy:
− z∗k − vk,k+1 + vk−1,k = −δk ∀k < K − 1, (A.4)
− z∗k −
∑
o∈O
vk,o + vk−1,k = −δk for k = K − 1, (A.5)
− z∗k + vK−1,k = −δk ∀k ∈ O. (A.6)
90 Appendix A. Appendix Chapter 2
At this point it becomes handy to pool the types in O. We choose z∗k := z∗o > 0 and
δk := 0 for any k ∈ O and define
∑K
k=K z
∗
k =: α. Summing (A.3) over k leads:
1 =
K−1∑
k=0
δk.
Iterating on (A.4)-(A.6) motivates the following choice of the multipliers:
vK−1,k := z∗k − δk = z∗o ∀k ∈ O,
v0,1 := β∗0 − z∗0 ,
vk−1,k :=
k−1∑
v=1
(δv − z∗v) + α, ∀k ∈ {2, ...,K − 1},
α = β∗0 − z∗0 .
We choose β∗k = z∗k for all K > k > 0. For all k < K we choose δk = β∗k .4
These choices leave us with the following requirements on α, z∗0 , β∗, which are ver-
ified later:
(i) v0,1 = β∗0−z∗0 ≥ 0, (ii)
K∑
k=0
z∗k = z∗0 +α+
K−1∑
k=1
β∗k = 1, (iii) α = β∗0−z∗0 (F2)
Step 6: Reformulation of the Lagrangian terms: (PIC)+
We aim to manipulate the Lagrangian in order to derive an expression that allows
us to solve the maximization problem point-wise. As first step, consider the fol-
lowing expression:
A :=
K∑
k=0
UPφ (k) +
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k + 1, k)] +
K−1∑
k=0
δk[tPφ (k)].
Note that
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)−UPφ (k+1, k)] = −vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k+1)−qPφ (k))−(tPφ (k+1)−tPφ (k))].
Substituting in A and using the first order conditions with respect to tPφ (k), (A.4),
leads:
A =
K∑
k=0
z∗kθkq
P
φ (k)−
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k+1)−qPφ (k))−(tPφ (k+1)−tPφ (k))]+
K−1∑
k=0
(δk−z∗k)[tPφ (k)]
=
K∑
k=0
z∗kθkq
P
φ (k)−
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k + 1)− qPφ (k))].
4If K > K , we choose β∗k = z∗k for all K > k > 0 and β∗k = δk ∀k ∈ ΘP . Moreover, we
determine z∗K , z
∗
0 and β∗K (or δK ),β
∗
0 later on via 1−(z∗K+z∗0) = 1−
∑K−1
k=1 β
∗
k = 1−(βK+β0). Define
z∗K − δK =: α > 0. Then vK−1,K := z∗K − β∗K = α, vk−1,k = α for any k > 1 and v0,1 = β∗0 − z∗0 ≥ 0.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 2.5 91
Applying some algebra manipulations, we receive:
A =
K−1∑
k=1
qPφ (k)[θk(z∗k + vk,k+1)− vk−1,kθk−1] +
K∑
k=K
qPφ (k)z∗kθk + (z∗0 + v0,1)qPφ (0)θ0.
Again, by the first order conditions (A.4) and the assumed form of the multipliers:
qPφ (k)[θk(z∗k + vk,k+1)− vk−1,kθk−1] = qPφ (k)[δkθk + (θk − θk−1)vk−1,k]
= qPφ (k)[δkθk + (θk − θk−1)(
k−1∑
v=1
(δv − z∗v) + α)] = qPφ (k)[β∗kθk + (θk − θk−1)α)],
whenever 0 < k < K.
A becomes:
A =
K−1∑
k=1
qPφ (k)[β∗kθk + (θk − θk−1)α)] +
K∑
k=K
qPφ (k)z∗kθk + (z∗0)qPφ (0)θ0.
Step 7: Reformulation of the Lagrangian, continued
We want to use the previous results to reformulate the Lagrangian. First, observe
that L = A+B with B being defined as:
B := ρ[
∫ J
0
qAφ (v, β∗)dv + UAφ (0, β∗)− UAD(J, β∗)]
+(
K∑
k=0
δk)[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, β∗)}f(j)dj − UAφ (0, β∗)].
Making use of
∑K
k=0 δk = ρ = 1, we can reformulate B:
B =
∫ J
0
{(j + F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, β∗)}f(j)dj − UAD(J, β∗).
L becomes:
L =
K−1∑
k=1
∫ J
0
{qPφ (j, k)[θk + (θk − θk−1)
α
β∗k
] + (j + F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)}β∗kf(j)dj
−UAD(J, β∗) +
K∑
k=K
qPφ (k)z∗kθk + z∗0qPφ (0)θ0 +
∫ J
0
(j + F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, 0)f(j)β0dj
+F (0)
K−1∑
k=1
qPφ (0, k)[β∗kθk + (θk − θk−1)α)].
Step 8: Construction of the variables by point-wise maximization
Let qφ∗(·) be the point-wise maximizer of L. We choose the variables that are not
determined up to now, z∗0 , {β∗k}K−1k=0 , α, such that qφ∗(·) = qRSW (·).
For any k ∈ O it is straightforward to observe that qPφ∗(k) = 1. Moreover, θ0 = 0
implies qPφ∗(j, 0) = 0 and qAφ∗(j, 0) = 1 ∀j ∈ ΘA.
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These both decisions are consistent with the RSW allotment policy.
Now consider k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}. We want to show that we can find z∗0 , {β∗k}K−1k=0 , α
that satisfy feasibility and induce the same allotment policy as the RSW. In order to
do so, we fix a generic k in the above interval and show that we can construct β∗k
such that the allotment policy is identical to the RSW. Afterwards, we verify that
we have constructed probabilities. β∗k is the solution to:
θk + (θk − θk−1) α
β∗k
= j(k) + F (j(k))
f(j(k)) .
Recall from the construction of the RSW that the right-hand side is equal to:
θk + (θk − θk−1)
∑K
v=k(1− δ∗v)
δ∗k
.
We thus equate:
θk + (θk − θk−1) α
β∗k
= θk + (θk − θk−1)
∑K
v=k(1− δ∗v)
δ∗k
.
⇐⇒ β∗k = α
δ∗k
K∑
v=k
(1− δ∗v)
.
Note, since
∑K
v=k(1− δ∗v) > 0 (see the proof of lemma 2.2) each β∗k is weakly above
zero and bounded. We thus need to show that by choosing α appropriately, we can
assure
∑K−1
k=1 β
∗
k + β∗0 = 1. This implies that we can interpret each β∗k as probability.
Define Ψ := ∑K−1k=1 δ∗k∑K
v=k(1−δ∗v)
, and observe that:
∑K−1
k=1 β
∗
k = αΨ. Moreover, since∑K
k=1 β
∗
k =
∑K−1
k=1 z
∗
k we need z
∗
0 + α = 1 − αΨ to assure that the welfare weights
sum to 1 (i.e., (ii) in (F2)). Set z∗0 = α, then α = 12+Ψ . With this choice the condition
on the probability reads:
K−1∑
k=1
β∗k + β∗0 = 1 ⇐⇒ αΨ + β∗0 = 1
Hence,
β∗0 =
2
2 + Ψ = 2α < 1.
For fixed Ψ, part (i) and (iii) of (F2) are left to verify. That is, β∗0 − z∗0 = α and
β∗0 − z∗0 ≥ 0.
The last condition holds because z∗0 = α. The first condition is satisfied by the
choice of β∗0 .5
Step 9: Optimality of point-wise maximization
5If K > K, then we face the conditions:
(i) α = z∗K − β∗K ≥ 0,
(ii) β∗0 − z∗0 ≥ 0,
(iii) z∗K + z∗0 = β∗0 + β∗K ,
(iv)
∑K−1
k=1 β
∗
k + β∗0 + β∗K = 1.
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Consider the reformulated Lagrangian objective (under the above constructed prob-
abilities, welfare weights and multipliers). By construction, we know that qRSW
maximizes L point-wise, and φRSW is such that complementary slackness is sat-
isfied. Since qRSW is monotonic, we thus know that the solution to the relaxed
program (P2)′ satisfies the ignored global incentive constraints. Since φRSW is also
feasible in problem (P2), we know it is a solution to this latter program.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Let us first define φe:
Ex-ante optimal Allocation.
(qaφe(j, k), taφe(j, k)) =
{
(1, haφe(j) + Ek[h
p
φe(k)]− hpφe(k)) if j >k ,
(0, haφe(j) + Ek[h
p
φe(k)]− hpφe(k)) if j ≤ k.
(qpφe(j, k), t
p
φe(j, k)) =
{
(0, hpφe(k)− Ek[hpφe(k)]− haφe(j)) if j >k ,
(1, hpφe(k)− Ek[hpφe(k)]− haφe(j)) if j ≤ k.
Where
haφe(j) = qaφe(j)j −
∫ j
0
qaφe(v)dv,
hpφe(k) = q
p
φe(k)θk−1 −
k−1∑
v=1
(θv − θv−1)qpφe(v), if k > 1
hpφe(1) = h
p
φe(0) = 0.
We prove that φe is an ex-ante optimal allocation by applying Lemma A.2, i.e., we
specify Z(k) = B(k) ∀k ∈ ΘP and verify that φe is a solution to (P3)z :
By the definition of φe, it holds that qAφe(j) = qAD(j) ∀j ∈ ΘA and qPφe(k) = qPD(k) ∀k ∈
ΘP . Moreover, UAφe(j) = UAD(j) ∀j ∈ ΘA.
Given this, the measure that weights the different agent types individual rationality
constraints, Λ(j), being such that Λ(j) = F (j) ∀j ∈ ΘA is consistent with condition
(ii).
Condition (iv) of lemma A.2 now becomes:
qφe ∈ arg max
q
K∑
k=0
∫ J
0
[qPφ (j, k)θk + jqAφ (j, k)]βkf(j)dj.
Condition (iv) is satisfied, since φe induces efficient collusion by definition. Con-
dition (iii) has slack, since Z(k) = B(k) (i.e., neither the principal’s upward nor
Using the formula for β∗k , i.e., β
∗
k = α
δ∗
k∑K
v=k
(1−δ∗v)
, together with (i) we first observe: β∗K = δ∗Kz∗K .
Thus α = (1 − δ∗K)z∗K > 0 satisfies (i). For given z∗0 , we choose β∗0 := α + z∗0 , and thus (iii) is
satisfied. (ii) is satisfied, since −z∗0 + β∗0 = −z∗0 + α + z∗0 > 0. Finally observe that (iv) is satisfied
if αΨ + α + z∗0 = 1, that is, α =
1−z∗0
1+Ψ , or z
∗
K =
1−z∗0
(1−δ∗
K
)(1+Ψ) . It remains to show that we can find
1 > z∗K , z∗0 > 0 satisfying this constraint. Note that the right-hand side is continuous and decreases
in z∗0 . We set z∗0 = 1 then z∗K = 0. Hence, if we choose z∗0 < 1 but close enough to 1, then a feasible
z∗K is determined by the above representation of constraint (iv).
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downward incentive constraints bind). Note, the transfer scheme {tPφe(k)}Kk=0, de-
fined above, satisfies the principal’s upward adjacent incentive constraints with
equality.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 2.7
An allocation that leads to efficient collusion cannot be supported in equilibrium if
it leaves the largest principal type with strictly lower payoff than UPRSW (K). There-
fore, choose without loss of generality the most preferred ex-ante optimal allocation
of principal type K, φe.
We want to verify that this allocation leaves every type of the principal with weakly
larger payoff than the RSW allocation, if it leaves type K with weakly larger payoff
than UPRSW (K). By hypothesis:
UPφe(K) ≥ UPRSW (K).
Using the incentive-compatible representation of utilities, we thus have:
UPφe(K) = qPφe(K)(θK − θK−1) + UPφe(K − 1)
≥ qPRSW (K)(θK − θK−1) + UPRSW (K − 1) = UPRSW (K).
Since qPφe(K) = qPφe(K) ≤ qPRSW (K) , the above inequality implies:
UPφe(K − 1) ≥ UPRSW (K − 1).
Making use once again of the incentive-compatible representations of utilities:
UPφe(K − 1) = qPφe(K − 1)(θK−1 − θK−2) + UPφe(K − 2)
≥ qPRSW (K − 1)(θK−1 − θK−2) + UPRSW (K − 2) = UPRSW (K − 1).
Since we know that qPRSW (k) ≥ qPφe(k) for all k ∈ ΘP , by the fact that the RSW
allocation implies inefficient collusion in favor of the principal, the above inequality
implies that UPφe(K − 2) ≥ UPRSW (K − 2). Continuing with this reasoning for all
types below K − 2, it follows that every type of principal prefers φe to the RSW
allocation.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 2.8
Consider the following condition:
Condition 1. Suppose that
(i) J = ∆ + θK , θk − θk−1 = θk+1 − θk := ∆ for all k ∈ ΘP and there exist arbitrarily
small, but positive, δ1 such that :
max
k∈{1,...,K}
|(θk − θk−1)
βk
B(k − 1)− F (θk)
f(θk)
| = δ1,
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(ii ) For any type profile with j = θk, it is the case that
F (θk)
f(θk)
≥ (θk − θk−1)B(k − 1)
βk
,
(iii) F (θk)f(θk) −
(θk−θk−1)
βk
B(k − 1) is weakly increasing in k.
(iv) f(j) is differentiable for any j > 0.
First, note that distributions that δ-close distributions imply condition 1 if δ :=
maxk>0 f˜(k) is sufficiently small. This is the case, because the principal’s type dis-
tribution, as being specified in definition 2.8, satisfies for any k > 0:
(θk − θk−1)
βk
B(k − 1) = ∆ F (θk)
f˜(k) + ∆f(θk)
,
with f˜(k) non-negative. Hence, (i) and (ii) are satisfied. Observe also, the differ-
ence defined in (iii) reads:
F (θk)
f(θk)
(
f˜(k)
f
f˜(k)
f(k)+∆
)
Both terms are weakly increasing, and so is the product. Because f(·) is assumed
to be differentiable, f˜(k) becomes arbitrarily small if ∆ becomes arbitrarily small.
The maximal δ1, or f˜(k), will be jointly determined by equations (A.11) and (A.12),
presented below.
Assume that condition 1 is satisfied. We show that φzK=1 = φe. To do so, let us
solve ˜(P3)z with zK = 1. We show that the solution, φzK=1, is equal to φe. Given
this, it follows by lemma 2.7 that φe is an equilibrium allocation.
Let us claim that φzK=1 = φe. Given this, we know that UAD(j) = UAφe(j) ∀j ∈ ΘA
and thus can choose any measure Λ(j) such that condition (iv) of lemma A.2 is
satisfied, i.e.:
qφzK=1 ∈ arg maxq
K∑
k=0
∫ J
0
[qPφ (j, k){θk + (θk − θk−1)
B(k − 1)
βk
}
+(j − Λ
−(j)− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)]βkf(j)dj.
We construct Λ(j) the following way:
For j = θk = 0, let:
Λ(0) = 0.
For all 0 < j < J , such that there exists some k with θk = j, let:
Λ(j = θk) = F (θk)− f(θk)βk
θk−θk−1
B(k − 1), (A.7)
which is positive by condition 1 (iii).
Choose Λ(J) = 1.
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For any j ∈ (θk−1, θk) with k ≥ 1 let
Λ(j) = (j − θk−1)Λ(θk)− Λ(θk−1)
θk − θk−1 + Λ(θk−1),
and for j ∈ (θK , J) let
Λ(j) = (j − θk−1)Λ˜
−(J)− Λ(θk−1)
θk − θk−1 + Λ(θk−1),
where
Λ˜−(J) := F (J)− f(J)
βK
θK−θK−1
B(K − 1).
First, observe that by condition 1 (iii) and (iv), Λ(j) ≥ 0 ∀j and Λ(j) − Λ(j′) ≥ 0
for any j ≥ j′. Therefore, condition (ii) of lemma A.2 is satisfied. Moreover, for
future reference note that F (j) ≥ Λ(j) for all j. To see this, fix any j ∈ (θk−1, θk)
and observe:
F (j)− Λ(j) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ F (j)− (j − θk−1)Λ(θk)− Λ(θk−1)
θk − θk−1 − Λ(θk−1) ≥ 0
By the definition of Λ(θk−1), i.e., (A.7):
⇐⇒ F (j)−F (θk−1) +B(k−2)f(θk−1)
βk−1
(θk− θk−1) ≥ (j − θk−1)(θk − θk−1)(Λ(θk)−Λ(θk−1))
⇐⇒ F (j)− F (θk−1)
j − θk−1 +B(k−2)
f(θk−1)
βk−1
(θk − θk−1)
j − θk−1 ≥
1
(θk − θk−1)(Λ(θk)−Λ(θk−1))
(A.8)
By definition of Λ(θk), (A.7), the right-hand side of (A.8) reads:
F (θk)− F (θk−1)
θk − θk−1 −
f(θk)
βk
B(k − 1) + f(θk−1)
βk−1
B(k − 2)
Moreover, since the left-hand side of (A.8) satisfies
F (j)− F (θk−1)
j − θk−1 +B(k−2)
f(θk−1)
βk−1
(θk − θk−1)
j − θk−1 >
F (j)− F (θk−1)
θk − θk−1 +B(k−2)
f(θk−1)
βk−1
,
the implication that is to be shown holds if
f(θk)
βk
B(k − 1)(θk − θk−1) ≥ F (θk)− F (j).
⇐⇒ (θk − θk−1)
βk
B(k − 1) ≥ F (θk)− F (j)
f(θk)
(A.9)
This is true because the right-hand side of (A.7) can be bounded strictly from above
by F (θk)f(θk) . This bound is, by condition 1 (ii), arbitrarily close to the left-hand side of
(A.7).
It is left to show that (iv) of lemma A.2 is satisfied.
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Denote the virtual valuations by
V V (j) := j − Λ
−(j)− F (j)
f(j) ,
.
V V (k) := θk + (θk − θk−1)B(k − 1)
βk
.
Optimality implies that, for any given type profile, the player with the higher vir-
tual valuation receives the right. By construction of Λ(j), it follows that V V (j) =
V V (k) whenever j = θk. Thus, assuming the virtual valuations to be non-decreasing,
we can allot the right to the principal whenever θk ≥ j, and to the agent when-
ever j > θk. By condition 1, (i) and assumption 1 we know that the principal’s
virtual valuation is non-decreasing. It is therefore left to show that V V (j) is non-
decreasing. To do so, take the (left-hand side) derivative with respect to j. We de-
note by λ−(j) the left-hand side derivative of Λ(j), i.e., λ−(j) := limj′<j,j′→j |Λ
−(j)−Λ−(j′)
j−j′ |
:
dV V (j)
dj
= 2− f
′(j)
f2(j)F (j) +
f ′(j)
f2(j)Λ
−(j)− λ
−(j)
f2(j) . (A.10)
First, observe that
2− f
′(j)
f2(j)F (j) +
f ′(j)
f2(j)Λ
−(j) > 0. (A.11)
To see this, note that j+F (j)f(j) is increasing by assumption 1. Hence: 2− f
′(j)
f2(j)F (j) > 0.
Now, if f ′(j) ≥ 0, then inequality (A.11) is clearly satisfied. If f ′(j) < 0, then the
inequality (A.11) is also satisfied, since Λ−(j) ≤ F (j) as shown above.
Secondly, observe that maxj∈ΘA |λ−(j)| = maxk∈ΘP |Λ(θk)−Λ(θk−1)θk−θk−1 | = maxj∈ΘA |
F (θk)
θk−θk−1−
f(θk)
βk
B(k− 1)− F (θk−1)θk−θk−1 +
f(θk−1)
βk−1 B(k− 2)| is arbitrarily small, since condition 1 (ii)
implies that ∀k ∈ ΘP there exists a positive, but arbitrarily small δ such that
f(θk) =
F (θk)
(θk−θk−1)
βk
B(k − 1)
− δ f(θk)(θk−θk−1)
βk
B(k − 1)
. (A.12)
Hence, the right-hand side of equation (A.10) is increasing in j.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Step 1
Definew(j) := ∑Kv=2 1[j ∈ (θv−1, θv]]θv−1 and denote the c.p.f. ofw(·) by F˜ (·). Note
that F˜ (θk) =Prob(j ≤ θk+1) = F (θk+1).
Observe that the linear-separable transfer scheme, h, associated with φe, being
defined in the proof of proposition 2.2, is such that E(j,k)∈Θ[hPφe(k) + hAφe(j)] =
E(j,k)∈Θ[min{θk, w(j)}] and thus UPφe(0) = E(j,k)∈Θ[min{θk, w(j)}] and UPφe(K) =∑K
k=1 F (θk)(θk − θk−1) + E(j,k)∈Θ[min{θk, w(j)}].
Define V := min{θk, w(j)}, and note that the c.p.f. reads Pr(V ≤ v) = F˜ (v) +
B(v)− F˜ (v)B(v), with support on ΘP . As Pr(v) is a right-continuous function, we
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can rewrite the expectation operator as Stieltjes integral. Hence,
E(j,k)∈Θ[min{w(j), θk}] =
∫ θK
0
vdPr(v)
For any v > 0 let Pr−(v) := limv′→v,v′<v Pr(v′), i.e., the left-hand side limit and
define Pr−(0) := Pr(0). Define B−(·) and F−(·) similarly. Thus, Pr−(·) = F˜−(·) +
B−(·)− F˜−(·)B−(·). Applying partial integration leads:
E(j,k)∈Θ[min{w(j), θk}] = θK −
∫ θK
0
Pr−(v)dv.
Hence,
UPφe(K) =
K∑
k=1
F (θk)(θk − θk−1) + θK −
∫ θK
0
Pr−(v)dv
⇐⇒ UPφe(K) =
K∑
k=1
F (θk)(θk−θk−1)+θK−
∫ θK
0
B−(v)(1−F˜−(v))dv−
∫ θK
0
F˜−(v)dv,
= θK −
∫ θK
0
B−(v)(1− F˜−(v))dv
Step 2
Recall that the RSW payoff reads
UPRSW (K) = (θK − θK−1) + UPRSW (K − 1) =
K∑
v=1
F (j(v))(θv − θv−1) < θK ,
where the last inequality follows from assumption 2.
Step 3
We now want to verify the existence of B˜(·) such that the highest principal type is
indifferent between φe and the RSW allocation.
Observe, if β0 = B(0)→ 1, then
UPφe(K)→
K∑
k=1
F (θk)(θk − θk−1)
Hence,
UPRSW (K)− UPφe(K)→
K∑
k=1
F (j(k))(θk − θk−1)−
K∑
k=1
F (θk)(θk − θk−1) > 0,
because F (j(k)) > F (θk) for all k > 0. Moreover, if βK → 1, i.e., B(k) converges to
0 for any k < K, then UPφe(K)→ θK and thus
UPRSW (K)− UPφe(K)→
K∑
k=1
F (j(k))(θk − θk−1)− θK < 0.
Hence, efficient collusion can be supported.
Finally, note that UPRSW (K)−UPφe(K) is continuous in every element of the vector β.
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It therefore follows by the intermediate value theorem that there exists some B˜(·)
such that the above difference is equal to 0. Of course, this B˜(·) can be chosen to
have full-support on ΘP .
Step 4
Finally, we show that if Bˆ(·) first order stochastically dominates Bˇ(·), then the prin-
cipal’s payoff from efficient collusion whenB(·) = Bˆ(·) is larger than ifB(·) = Bˇ(·).
The respective payoff difference reads:
UPφe(K)|B(·)=Bˆ(·) − UPφe(K)|B(·)=Bˇ(·)
= −
∫ J
0
Bˆ−(v)(1− F˜−(v))dv − (−
∫ J
0
Bˇ(v)(1− F˜−(v))dv)
=
∫ J
0
(Bˇ−(v)− Bˆ−(v))(1− F˜−(v))dv.
This term is positive as Bˇ(v) ≥ Bˆ(v) ∀v ∈ ΘP .
A.9 Lemma A.2: Characterization of undominated (equilib-
ria) Allocations
We first give a non-constructive characterization of undominated (equilibria) al-
locations. This characterization is extremely useful to prove proposition 2.2, the-
orem 2.11 and lemma 2.8. Moreover, lemma 2.6 is a direct consequence of this
characterization.
Definition A.1. An allocation φ is β-undominated, or undominated, if there exist weakly
positive welfare weights {zk}Kk=0 (with zk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP ) such that φ solves
max
φ
K∑
k=0
zkU
P
φ (k) (P˜4)z
subject to:
φ is β˜−feasible
Whenever φ is a solution to (P4)z being defined similar to problem (P˜4)z but augmented
by the constraints
(PIR)Sk UPφ (k) ≥ UPRSW (k) ∀k ∈ ΘP ,
if of collusion in a SPA, or by the constraints
(PIR)Fk UPφ (k) ≥ θk ∀k ∈ ΘP ,
if of collusion in a FPA, we say that φ is an undominated equilibrium allocation.
Note that the definition of a β˜-feasible allocation is different for cases of collusion
in a FPA or SPA.
Lemma A.2. For given welfare weights, fix a β-feasible allocation, φ, satisfying (PIR).
Suppose that
(i) there exists a number z˜ ≥ 0 together with a (weakly increasing) function, Z˜(k), such
that Z˜(0) = z˜0, Z˜(K) = z˜ and Z˜(k) − Z˜(k − 1) = z˜k, where z˜k > 0 only if UPφ (k) =
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UPS (k), and UPS (k) denotes, depending whether we consider collusion in the SPA or FPA,
either UPRSW (k) or θk,
(ii) there exists a measure, Λ(j), such that : dΛ(j) := λ(j) > 0 only if UAφ (j) = UAD(j) ,
Λ(j) is weakly increasing, Λ(0) ∈ [0, 1] and Λ(J) = 1. Let Λ−(j) := limj′→j,j′<jΛ(j′)
for any j > 0 and Λ−(0) := λ(0),
(iii) [UPφ (k + 1, k + 1)− UPφ (k, k + 1)](Z(k) + Z˜(k)− (1 + z˜)B(k))+ = 0,
[UPφ (k − 1, k − 1)− UPφ (k, k − 1)]((1 + z˜)B(k − 1)− Z(k − 1)− Z˜(k − 1))+ = 0.
Moreover, qPφ (k) ≥ qPφ (k − 1), and for any k > 0 there is b˜k ≥ 0 such that b˜k[qPφ (k) −
qPφ (k − 1)] = 0.
(iv) For any (j, k) ∈ Θ qφ(j, k) satisfies:
qφ(j, k) ∈ arg max
qA,qP∈[0,1]2,qA+qP≤1
[qP {θk(1 + z˜) + b˜k − b˜k+1
βk
)
−(θk+1−θk)(Z(k) + Z˜(k)− (1 + z˜)B(k))
+
βk
+(θk−θk−1)((1 + z˜)B(k − 1)− Z(k − 1)− Z˜(k − 1))
+
βk
}
+(1 + z˜)(j − Λ
−(j)− F (j)
f(j) )q
A],
and the resulting qAφ (j) is weakly increasing in j.
Then φ is a solution to (P˜4)z . Moreover, if we drop condition (i), then φ is a solution to
(P˜4)z if it satisfies (ii),(iii) and (iv) with z˜ = 0 and Z˜(k) = 0 ∀k ∈ ΘP .
For completeness, note that lemma A.2 provides sufficient conditions for optimal-
ity. By this, environments, that is, F (·), B(·) and Z(·) that give rise to bunching
allotments with respect to the agent are ignored. We do not consider bunching al-
lotments, because those situations are not relevant for any result presented in this
paper. To derive a complete characterization, optimal control techniques as in Jul-
lien, 2000 could be employed.
Proof. Define (P4)′z by weakening the ex-post budget-balanced constraint in (P˜4)z
to ex-ante budget-balanced ˜(BB). A standard result from mechanism design im-
plies that in programs as the one considered here, ex-post balanced-budget can be
weakened to ex-ante budget-balanced (e.g., see Börgers and Norman (2009)).
We are given some specified {zk}Kk=0. Suppose φ satisfies the hypothesis of lemma A.2.
We want to show that it is solution to (P4)′z .
We start by relaxing (P4)′z .
Step 1: (AIC)
We work with the necessary conditions and later verify that the sufficient condi-
tions for incentive compatibility are satisfied.
Note,
∂UAφ (jˆ,j)
∂j ≤ 1, for all qAφ (jˆ), tAφ (jˆ).
By Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal, 2002 we thus know that the incentive-compatible
form of the utility is given by:
UAφ (j) =
∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0),
where UAφ (0) = qAφ (0)0 + tAφ (0) is the utility of the lowest agent type and tAφ (0).
A.9. Lemma A.2: Characterization of undominated (equilibria) Allocations 101
Moreover, UAφ (j) is absolutely continuous in j.
Step 2: (AIR)
By the above necessary condition, individual rationality reads :∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0)− UAD(j) ≥ 0.
Define
J˜φ := arg min
j∈ΘA
{
∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv − UAD(j)},
which might be a set of (possibly infinitely many) types.
At this point, take any j˜ ∈ J˜φ∗ . It immediately follows that UAφ (j˜) ≥ UAD(j˜) implies
(AIR)j for all j.
We replace (AIR) by UAφ (j˜)− UAD(j˜) ≥ 0 and denote the relevant multiplier by ρ.
Step 3: ˜(BB)
Making use of step 1, we obtain the following representation for the transfers:
tAφ (j) = qAφ (j)j −
∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv − tAφ (0) ∀j ∈ ΘA.
Applying partial integration leads:
EjtAφ (j) =
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0).
We thus replace ˜(BB) by:∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0) + EktPφ (k).
We denote the multiplier by δ.
Step 4: Lagrangian
We are ready to state the Lagrangian objective:
maxL :=
K∑
k=0
zkU
P
φ (k)
+ρ[
∫ j˜
0
(qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0)− UAD(j˜)]
+
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k + 1, k)] +
K∑
k=1
vk,k−1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k − 1, k)]
+
K∑
k=0
z˜k[UPφ (k)− UPS (k)]
+δ
K∑
k=0
βk[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0) + tPφ (k)]
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+
K∑
k=1
b˜k[qPφ (k)− qPφ (k − 1)],
where vk,k+1 and vk−1,k denote the multiplier on the adjacent (PIC) constraints
with v−1,0 = vK,K+1 = 0. Let z˜k be the multiplier on (PIR)k. b˜k is the multiplier
on the condition that any allocation that satisfies (PIC) must feature a weakly in-
creasing allotment policy with respect to the principal.
Complementary slackness requires:
ρ[
∫ j˜
0
qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0)− UAD(j˜)] = 0,
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k + 1, k)] = 0 ∀k < K,
vk,k−1[UPφ (k, k)− UPφ (k − 1, k)] = 0 ∀k > 0,
z˜k[UPφ (k)− UPS (k)] = 0 ∀k,
δ[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j)}f(j)dj − tAφ (0, β˜) + EktPφ (k)] = 0 ∀k,
b˜k[qPφ (k)− qPφ (k − 1)] = 0 ∀k. (A.13)
The choice variables are the following:
{tAφ (0), tPφ (k), qAφ (·, k), qPφ (·, k)}Kk=0.
Step 6: Necessary conditions for an optimum
As first step we use the first order conditions of the choice variables tAφ (0) and
tPφ (ΘP ) and construct (non-negative) multipliers being consistent with complemen-
tary slackness under the hypothesis that φ solves the problem.
The derivative with respect to tAφ (0) satisfies:
ρ− δ
K∑
k=0
βk = 0.
Hence ρ = δ.
For any k, the derivative with respect to tPφ (k) satisfies :
− zk − z˜k − vk,k+1 + vk+1,k − vk,k−1 + vk−1,k = −βkδ. (A.14)
Summing over the K conditions (A.14) leads:
1 + z˜ = δ
K∑
k=0
βk,
with z˜ := ∑Kk=0 z˜k.
We thus set
ρ := 1 + z˜, δ := (1 + z˜).
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Iterating on the conditions (A.14) suggests the following choice of v·,·:
vk−1,k − vk,k−1 = (1 + z˜)B(k − 1)− Z(k − 1)− Z˜(k − 1),
where Z(k) := ∑kv=0 zv, Z˜(k) := ∑kv=0 z˜v.
By complementary slackness vk−1,kvk,k−1 = 0.6 Thus set:
vk−1,k := ((1+z˜)P (k−1)−Z(k−1)−Z˜(k−1))+, vk,k−1 := (Z(k−1)+Z˜(k−1)−(1+z˜)B(k−1))+.
Step 7: Reformulation of the Lagrangian terms: (PIC)
Given the above necessary conditions, we aim to manipulate the Lagrangian in
order to derive an expression that allows us to verify the optimality of φ. As first
step, consider the following expression:
A :=
K∑
k=0
(zk+z˜k)UPφ (k)+
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)−UPφ (k+1, k)]+
K∑
k=1
vk,k−1[UPφ (k, k)−UPφ (k−1, k)]
+
K∑
k=0
δβk[tPφ (k)].
Note that
vk,k+1[UPφ (k, k)−UPφ (k+1, k)] = −vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k+1)−qPφ (k))−(tPφ (k+1)−tPφ (k))],
and
vk,k−1[UPφ (k, k)−UPφ (k−1, k)] = vk−1,k[θk(qPφ (k)− qPφ (k−1))− (tPφ (k)− tPφ (k−1))].
Substituting in A and using (A.14) leads:
A =
K∑
k=0
(zk+z˜k)θkqPφ (k)−
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k+1)−qPφ (k))]+
K∑
k=1
vk,k−1[θk(qPφ (k)−qPφ (k−1))].
Adding (A.13) we receive
A =
K∑
k=0
[(zk+z˜k)θk+b˜k−b˜k+1))]qPφ (k)−
K−1∑
k=0
vk,k+1[θk(qPφ (k+1)−qPφ (k))]+
K∑
k=1
vk,k−1[θk(qPφ (k)−qPφ (k−1))],
where b˜0 = b˜−1 := 0. Applying some algebra manipulations we receive:
A =
K∑
k=0
qPφ (k)[b˜k − b˜k+1 + θk(zk + z˜k + vk,k+1 + vk,k−1)− θk+1vk+1,k − vk−1,kθk−1].
Again, by the first order conditions w.r.t. tP (k) (A.14) and the assumed form of the
multipliers:
θk(zk+z˜k+vk,k+1+vk,k−1)−θk+1vk+1,k−vk−1,kθk−1 = θkβk(1+z˜)−(θk+1−θk)vk+1,k+(θk−θk−1)vk−1,k
6Suppose vk−1,k, vk,k−1 > 0. In this instance complementary slackness requiresUPφ (k−1, k−1) =
UPφ (k, k−1) andUPφ (k, k) = UPφ (k, k−1), which impliesUPφ (k−1, k−1) = UPφ (k, k). A contradiction,
whenever qPφ (k) > 0 ( which is satisfied for any k > 0).
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= θkβk(1+z˜)−(θk+1−θk)(Z(k)+Z˜(k)−(1+z˜)B(k))++(θk−θk−1)((1+z˜)B(k−1)−Z(k−1)−Z˜(k−1))+.
A now reads:
A =
K∑
k=0
qPφ (k)βk{θk(1 + z˜) +
b˜k − b˜k+1
βk
)
−(θk+1−θk)(Z(k) + Z˜(k)− (1 + z˜)B(k))
+
βk
+(θk−θk−1)((1 + z˜)B(k − 1)− Z(k − 1)− Z˜(k − 1))
+
βk
}.
Step 7: Reformulation of the Lagrangian, continued
We want to use the previous results to reformulate the Lagrangian. First observe
that L = A+B, with B being defined as:
B := ρ[
∫ j˜
0
qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0)− UAD(j˜)]
+δ[
∫ J
0
{(j − 1− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j)}f(j)dj − UAφ (0)].
If we are able to show that φ maximizes L (and complementary slackness is satis-
fied), then we know that φ is a solution to (P˜3)z .
We first manipulate
ρ[
∫ j˜
0
qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0)− UAD(j˜)]
further. Reconsider J˜φ. By hypothesis, there exists Λ(j) :=
∫ j dΛ(j) such that
Λ(J) = 1, Λ(0) = 0 and dΛ(j) := λ(j) > 0 only if j ∈ J˜φ. We perform the fol-
lowing manipulations:
ρ[
∫ j˜
0
qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0)− UAD(j˜)]
= ρΛ(J)[
∫ j˜
0
qAφ (v)dv + UAφ (0)− UAD(j˜)]
= ρ
∫ J
0
[
∫ j˜
0
qAφ (v)dv − UAD(j˜) + UAφ (0)]dΛ(j).
Since λ(j) > 0 only if j ∈ J˜φ the above term is equal to
ρ
∫ J
0
[
∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv − UAD(j) + UAφ (0)]dΛ(j)
= ρ{
∫ J
0
[
∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv]dΛ(j)−
∫ J
0
UAD(j)dΛ(j) + UAφ (0)}.
Applying partial integration leads:
ρ{Λ(J)
∫ J
0
dUAφ (j)−
∫ J
0
Λ−(j)dUAφ (j)−
∫ J
0
UAD(j)dΛ(j)) + UAφ (0)]}
= ρ{
∫ J
0
(1− Λ−(j))dUAφ (j)−
∫ J
0
UAD(j)dΛ(j)) + UAφ (0)]}
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= ρ{[
∫ J
0
qAφ (j))(1− Λ−(j))dj −
∫ J
0
UAD(j)dΛ(j) + UAφ (0)]},
where the last step follows from the absolute continuity of UAφ (j).
Making, in addition, use of δ = ρ = (1 + z˜) we can reformulate B:
B =
∫ J
0
{(1 + z˜)(j − Λ
−(j)− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j)}f(j)dj
−(1 + z˜)
∫ J
0
UAD(j)dΛ(j).
L reads:
L =
K∑
k=0
∫ J
0
[qPφ (j, k){θk(1 + z˜ +
b˜k − b˜k+1
βk
)
−(θk+1−θk)(Z(k) + Z˜(k)− (1 + z˜)B(k))
+
βk
+(θk−θk−1)((1 + z˜)B(k − 1)− Z(k − 1)− Z˜(k − 1))
+
βk
}
+(1 + z˜)(j − Λ
−(j)− F (j)
f(j) )q
A
φ (j, k)]pkf(j)dj
−(1 + z˜)
∫ J
0
UAD(j)dΛ(j)−
K∑
k=0
z˜kU
P
S (k)
+F (0)
K∑
k=0
qPφ (k, 0)βk{θk(1 + z˜) + b˜k − b˜k−1)
−(θk+1−θk)(Z(k) + Z˜(k)− (1 + z˜)B(k))
+
βk
+(θk−θk−1)((1 + z˜)B(k − 1)− Z(k − 1)− Z˜(k − 1))
+
βk
}.
Step 8
By assumption, φ maximizes the Lagrangian point-wise and satisfies complemen-
tary slackness. Moreover, qφ is monotonic by assumption. Therefore, φ also solves
the original program (P˜4)z .
A.10 Proof of Lemma 2.9
Let bP (k) (bA(j)) be principal type k’s (agent type j’s) bid function. The follow-
ing strategies constitute an equilibrium of the FPA, played with belief β˜ about the
principal, and a degenerate belief concentrated on the largest agent type J :
Define kˆ := arg maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(J − θkˇ) and for any k such that k ≥ kˆ + 1, define
bk := B˜(kˆ)B˜(k)θkˆ +
∑k
v=kˆ+1 β˜v
B˜(k) J and bkˆ := θkˆ. Moreover, for any k, such that k ≥ kˆ + 1,
define αk :=
∏K
v=k
θk−bk
θk−bk−1 .
• Principal type k ≤ kˆ submits a bid equal to bP (k) = θk.
• Principal type k with k ≥ kˆ + 1 submits a bid b on the interval (bk−1, bk] with
cdf
FPk (b) =
B˜(k − 1)
β˜k
b− bk−1
J − b .
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• Agent type J submits a bid on the interval (bkˆ = θkˆ, bK ] according to the cdf:
FA(b) = 1[b ∈ (bk−1, bk]]{αk b− bk−1
θk − b + F
A(bk−1)},
and point mass at θkˆ equals F
A(θkˆ) = 1−
∑K
k=kˆ+1 αk
bk−bk−1
θk−bk .
• Agent type j’s with j < J optimal bid, bA(j), is given by
bA(j) ∈ arg max
kˇ≤kˆ
B˜(kˇ)(j − θkˇ).
Proof. Let us define by ΠA(J, b) the payoff of agent type J from playing the FPA
given the above stated strategies of the principal. Similarly, define by ΠP (k, b) the
payoff of principal type k.
Observe first, given the principal’s strategy, and the fact, which is verified later on,
that agent type J is indifferent between submitting any bid on the interval [θkˆ, bK ]
it must be the case that any agent type j < J optimally bids bA(j) ≤ θkˆ. Hence, any
such type solves
bA(j) ∈ arg max
kˇ≤kˆ
B˜(kˇ)(j − θkˇ).
Moreover, given the principal’s degenerate belief concentrated on the largest agent
type J , and the latter’s strategy, every principal type, k with k ≤ kˆ maximizes his
expected payoff when bidding bP (k) ≤ θk. Hence, bP (k) = θk is an optimal action.
Moreover, also observe that
θk − bk ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ (θk − J) + B˜(kˆ)
B˜(k)
(J − θkˆ) ≥ 0.
This is true, because by definition kˆ := arg maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(J − θkˇ), that is,
B˜(kˆ)(J − θkˆ) ≥ B˜(k)(J − θk) ∀k ∈ ΘP .
Also, note that bk ≥ 0 for all k ≥ kˆ, because JB˜(k) ≥ (J − θkˆ)B˜(kˆ).
Now, let us verify that the principal’s bid cdf’s are indeed probability measures.
FPk (bk−1) = 0 is satisfied by construction. To see that FPk (bk) =
B˜(k−1)
β˜k
bk−bk−1
J−bk = 1
is true, note:
J − bk = B˜(kˆ)
B˜(k)
(J − θkˆ)
and
bk − bk−1 = (B˜(kˆ)
B˜(k)
− B˜(kˆ)
B˜(k − 1))θkˆ + (
∑k
v=kˆ+1 β˜v
B˜(k)
−
∑k−1
v=kˆ+1 β˜v
B˜(k − 1) )J
= ( −β˜kB˜(kˆ)
B˜(k)B˜(k − 1))θkˆ + (
β˜kB˜(kˆ)
B˜(k)B˜(k − 1))J.
Hence,
B˜(k − 1)
β˜k
(bk − bk−1) = B˜(kˆ)
B˜(k)
(J − θkˆ).
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Therefore,
FP (bk) =
B˜(kˆ)
B˜(k)
B˜(k)
B˜(kˆ)
= 1.
Now consider agent type J , and let us verify that he is indifferent between bidding
on the interval [θkˆ, bK ]. To do so, note that when submitting a bid b ∈ [bk−1, bk],
agent type J wins according to the probability β˜kFPk (b) + B˜(k − 1). Any such bid
implies the payoff, ΠA(J, b), with
ΠA(J, b ∈ (bk−1, bk]) = (J − b)[β˜kFPk (b) + B˜(k − 1)]
Observe that for any b ∈ (bk−1, bk] it is the case that
dΠ(J, b)
db
|b∈(bk−1,bk] = β˜k
B˜(k − 1)
β˜k
− B˜(k − 1) = 0
Moreover, since the principal’s bid strategy has no point mass, agent type J is in-
different between any bid on [bkˆ, bK ].
To argue for global optimality, note that
ΠA(J, b = θkˆ) = B˜(kˆ)(J − θkˆ)
and
ΠA(J, , b = bK) = J − bK = B˜(kˆ)(J − θkˆ)
Submitting a bid above bK cannot be optimal, as a bid of bK is sufficient to win the
auction with certainty. Moreover, by the definition of kˆ it follows that agent type J
does not want to submit a bid strictly below θkˆ.
Now, consider a principal type k with k ≥ kˆ + 1. Let us verify that he is indifferent
between bidding b ∈ (bk−1, bk]. To do so, note that when submitting a bid b ∈
(bk−1, bk], principal type k wins the auction with probability αk b−bk−1θk−b + F
A(bk−1)
where
FA(bk−1) =
k−1∑
v=kˆ+1
αv
bv − bv−1
θv − bv + 1−
K∑
v=kˆ+1
αv
bv − bv−1
θv − bv
= 1−
K∑
v=k+1
αv
bv − bv−1
θv − bv − αk
bk − bk−1
θk − bk .
Any such bid implies the payoff, ΠP (k, b) , :
ΠP (k, b ∈ (bk−1, bk]) = (θk − b)[αk b− bk−1
θk − b + F
A(bk−1)]
Hence ,
dΠP (k, b)
db
|b∈(bk−1,bk]) = αk − FA(bk−1) = αk
θk − bk−1
θk − bk +
K∑
v=k+1
αv
bv − bv−1
θv − bv − 1
We want to argue that this quantity is zero and principal type k is thus indifferent
between submitting any bid on the specified interval. To do so, let us start with
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k = K.7 dΠ
P (K,b)
db |b∈(bK−1,bK ]) reads:
αK
θK − bK−1
θK − bK − 1 = 0 ⇐⇒ αK =
θK − bK
θK − bK−1 ,
which is true by the definition of αK . For any k ∈ {kˆ + 1, ...,K − 1} we want to
verify the indifference condition by backward induction. Let us fixK−1. We need:
dΠP (K − 1, b)
db
|b∈(bK−2,bK−1]) = 0 ⇐⇒ αK−1
θK−1 − bK−2
θK−1 − bK−1 + αK
bK − bK−1
θK − bK = 1
⇐⇒ αK−1 = (1− bK − bK−1
θK − bK−1 )
θK−1 − bK−1
θK−1 − bK−2 =
θK − bK
θK − bK−1
θK−1 − bK−1
θK−1 − bK−2 ,
which follows from the definition of αK−1. Now, the induction hypothesis is
αk − FA(bk−1) = 0, ∀k ∈ {kˆ + 2, ...,K − 2} (A.15)
Consider k = kˆ + 1. We need to verify that
αkˆ+1 − FA(bkˆ) = 0
Let us use
FA(bkˆ) = F
A(bkˆ+1)− αkˆ+1
bkˆ+1 − bkˆ
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ+1
,
to derive at:
αkˆ+1 − FA(bkˆ) = αkˆ+1 − FA(bkˆ+1) + αkˆ+1
bkˆ+1 − bkˆ
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ+1
= αkˆ+1
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ+1
− FA(bkˆ+1)
Making use of the induction hypothesis, (A.15), this reads:
= αkˆ+1
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ+1
− αkˆ+2 = αkˆ+2(
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ+1
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ
θkˆ+1 − bkˆ+1
− 1) = 0,
where the last step follows from the definition of αk.
Let us argue for global optimality of the principal’s strategy. We start with type
kˆ + 1. When submitting a bid weakly below θkˆ, he receives payoff zero, which is
lower than
FA(bkˆ+1)(θkˆ+1 − bkˆ+1) = Π(kˆ + 1, b = bkˆ+1).
Moreover, ΠP (kˆ + 1, b) is continuous on the interval b ∈ ∪k≥kˆ+1(bk, bk+1], since
there are no other point masses in agent type J ’s bidding strategy. ΠP (kˆ + 1, b) is
decreasing on this interval, because for each sub-interval (bk, bk+1], there is k with
k > kˆ + 1 being indifferent between any bid on this sub-interval. From a similar
argument global optimality of bP (k) for any k with k > kˆ + 1 follows.
Finally, observe that the stated strategy of the agent, FA(·), is indeed a distribution.
7Recall that terms involving types that do not exist are zero, e.g.,
∑K
k+1 αv
bv−bv−1
θv−bv = 0
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We have seen that for any k ∈ {kˆ, ...,K − 1} it holds that FA(bk) = αk+1. Using the
definition of FA(bK) and αK , we thus observe: FA(bK) = αK bK−bK−1θK−bK + αK = 1.
Moreover, FA(θkˆ) = F
A(bkˆ) = αkˆ+1 ≥ 0.
A.11 Proof of Lemma 2.10
Observe first, given any agent type j and any action, d = kˇ, of the latter, it is
a (weakly) dominant strategy for the principal to report his type truthfully: The
principal receives payoff
1[kˆ > kˇ]θk + 1[kˆ ≤ kˇ]θkˇ,
from reporting to be kˆ. Hence, if d = kˇ ≥ k, any report kˆ ≤ kˇ, in particular kˆ = k,
leaves principal type k with the highest possible payoff, given d. If d = kˇ < k, the
principal strictly prefers any report kˆ > kˇ, in particular kˆ = k, to any other report.
Now consider the agent: We want to argue that any agent type j optimally sub-
mits report d = arg maxkˇ∈ΘP B˜(kˇ)(j − θkˇ). By the construction of m˜, agent type
j receives (ex-post) payoff equal to 1[k ≤ d][j − θd], conditional that principal
type k realizes and truthfully reports his type. Hence, for any belief β˜ the agent
holds about the principal, the former optimally submits a report that maximizes∑K
k=0 β˜k1[k ≤ d][j − θd] = B˜(d)(j − θd). Thus, by lemma 2.9 every agent type
receives exactly his outside option.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 2.4
The on-path play of the equilibrium is such that every type of the principal offers
the game form m˜, and the agent accepts the collusive side game.
If the principal offers the game form m˜ and the agent rejects, the FPA is played
non-cooperatively with off-path belief about agent type J .
If the principal offers a game form m′ that differs from m˜, the continuation game
is played with a degenerate off-path belief concentrated on principal type 0, i.e.,
β˜0 = 1.
Consider any continuation equilibrium starting at the beginning of period 2 after
the proposal of m′ with m′ 6= m˜ and the agent holding a degenerate off-path belief
concentrated on principal type 0. It is the agent’s turn to decide whether to accept
or to reject m′.
Suppose first the agent rejects m′. Let us consider the non-cooperative play of the
FPA, being played with β˜0 = 1. For any belief the principal might hold about the
agent, the non-cooperative play of the FPA is such that principal type 0 bids his
valuation, θ0 = 0, and agent type j bids θ0 and wins the auction auction against
principal type 0. Given this, every principal type above θ0 optimally submits a bid
above, but arbitrarily close to, θ0, wins the auction and receives payoff θk − θ0.
The (continuation) equilibrium play of the continuation game that starts with the
agent’s decision whether or whether not to accept m′ is such that the agent ratifies
m′ only if he expects to receive larger payoff than his expected outside option, the
payoff from playing the auction non-cooperatively against principal type 0, i.e.,
UAD(j, β˜0 = 1) = β˜0(j − θ0) = j.
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Hence, any (β˜0 = 1)-feasible allocation leaves the agent with payoff weakly larger
than UAD(j, β˜0 = 1) = jqAD(j, 0)− θ0 = j.
As last step, we argue that principal type’s k payoff cannot be larger than θk. We
start with type 0. He cannot receive larger payoff than θ0, since this is the solution
of the following problem, which defines types 0 largest payoff in a world where his
type were commonly known:
max
φ
UPφ (0)
such that
φ is β˜0 = 1− feasible
This is true, because a (β˜0 = 1)-feasible allocation satisfies ∀j ∈ ΘA:
(AIR)j0 j − θ0 ≤ UAφ (j, k = 0),
(AIC)j0 j ∈ arg max
jˆ∈ΘA
UAφ (j, jˆ, k = 0),
(PIC)0 0 ∈ arg max
kˆ∈ΘP
UPφ (k = 0, kˆ),
and
∀(j, k) ∈ Θ (BB)j,k.
If the allotment of the right is efficient, that is, agent type j with j ≥ θ0 = 0 re-
ceives the right against principal type 0, (AIR)j0 is satisfied with equality for all
types of the agent. Consequently, principal type 0 can absorb the entire collusive
surplus. Moreover, since an efficient allocation is induced, the collusive surplus is
also maximized.
Now consider principal type k ≥ 1. An upper bound for the deviation-payoff he
receives from the proposal of m′ is given by his most preferred (β˜0 = 1)-feasible
allocation. This allocation is defined as solution of the following problem:
max
φ
UPφ (k)
such that ∀j ∈ ΘA
(AIR)j0 j − θ0 ≤ UAφ (j, k = 0),
(AIC)j0 j ∈ arg max
jˆ∈ΘA
UAφ (j, jˆ, k = 0),
(PIC)0 0 ∈ arg max
kˆ∈ΘP
UPφ (k = 0, kˆ),
and
∀(j, k) ∈ Θ (BB)j,k.
Observe first that by (PIC)0 it must be the case that tPφ (k) ≥ 0: If tPφ (k) < 0 princi-
pal type 0 would report kˆ > 0 and receive payoff strictly larger than θ0.
Given this, the solution of the above problem features tPφ (k) = 0 and qPφ (·, k) = 1 if
k ≥ 1. As a consequence, principal type k receives at most the payoff θk, which is
weakly lower than the payoff from offering m˜.
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Proof of Lemma 2.11
Step 1
To avoid pathological cases, let us verify that m˜ can be perturbed slightly such that
every agent type has strict incentives to accept the side mechanism and the play of
the perturbed version of m˜ specifies a unique equilibrium.
Consider the following simultaneous move mechanism, mo. Let the agent’s mes-
sage / action be d ∈ ΘP . Let the principal’s message /action be kˆ ∈ ΘP . Given
the report profile (d, kˆ) = (kˇ, k), the following allotment and transfers result, where
µ ∈ (0, 1), is a given parameter:
∀d ∈ ΘP :
(qAmo(d, k), tAmo(d, k)) =
{
(0,−tPmo(d, k)) ∀k ∈ ΘP .
If k = 0:
(qPmo(d, k), tPmo(d, k)) =
{
(0, 2J) ∀d ∈ ΘP .
∀k > 0 :
(qPmo(d, k), tPmo(d, k)) =
{
(µB(k),−UPmo(k − 1, k) + θk+θk−12 µB(k)) ∀d ∈ ΘP .
Observe that for every type report/action profile and any β˜,mo induces a β˜-feasible
allocation. Moreover, according to mo every agent type receives strictly larger pay-
off than from playing the auction non-cooperatively against the principal. In addi-
tion, according to mo the principal has strict incentives to report his type truthfully,
for any action d, the agent might choose.
As a consequence, the mechanism ˆ˜m, defined as convex combination between m˜
and mo, is such that every principal type k has a unique optimal type report, kˆ = k,
and the agent strictly prefers the play of m˜ to the play of the default game.
By proposing ˆ˜m with sufficiently high probability mass on m˜ principal type K re-
ceives payoff arbitrarily close to θK . Hence, only allocations which leave principal
type K with payoff θK can arise in equilibrium.
Step 2
We next verify that the play of m˜ given any prior belief β implements the most
preferred allocation of the largest principal type. Because of the quasilinear envi-
ronment, there is a unique most preferred allocation. Since this allocation leaves
type K with exactly the payoff θK , this in turn implies that no other allocation in-
duces this payoff to the largest type of the principal. To do so, we apply lemma A.2
and drop condition (i). We choose zK = 1 and zk = 0 for any k < K.
Observe first that by lemma 2.9 every agent type’s outside option is satisfied with
equality. We therefore can choose Λ(j) = F (j) ∀j ∈ ΘA.
Moreover, for any j ∈ ΘA define kˇ(j) := max{arg maxkˇ∈ΘP (kˇ)(j − θkˇ)}. Then
it follows from the lemma 2.10 that the allocation implemented by m˜ with prior
belief abut the principal, say φm˜, reads:
(qAφm˜(j, k), t
A
φm˜(j, k)) =
{
(1, θkˇ(j)) if k ≤ kˇ(j),
(0, 0) if k > kˇ(j).
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(qPφm˜(j, k), t
P
φm˜(j, k)) =
{
(0,−θkˇ(j)) if kˇ(j) ≥ k,
(1, 0) if kˇ(j) < k.
Since this allocation is implemented by m˜, it is β-feasible. It is therefore left to
verify that the above allocation is also the most preferred β-feasible allocation of
the largest principal type, i.e., we need to verify that the allotment policy is consis-
tent with condition (iv) of lemma A.2, that is, with point-wise maximization of the
Lagrangian objective.
To do so, first consider the set ΘˇP of principal types, such that k ∈ ΘˇP if and only
if ∃j : kˇ(j) = k. Because B(kˇ)(j − θkˇ) is continuously increasing in j, for any
k > 0 with k ∈ ΘˇP , there exists a threshold agent type jm˜(k), such that, kˇ(jm˜(k)) =
{k′, k}, where k′ is k’s downward-adjacent neighbor in ΘˇP . Hence,
B(k)(jm˜(k)− θk) = B(k′)(jm˜(k)− θk′)
⇒ jm˜(k) = θk + B(k
′)
B(k)−B(k′)(θk − θk′) ∀k ∈ Θˇ
P \ 0. (A.16)
Furthermore, because B(kˇ)(j − θkˇ) is increasing in j, jm˜(k) is non-decreasing in
k ∈ ΘˇP .
Moreover, jm˜(kˇ(J)) ≤ J and
B(kˇ(J))(J − θkˇ(J)) ≥ B(k)(J − θk) ∀k > kˇ(J)
⇒ J ≤ θk + (θk − θkˇ(J))
B(kˇ(J))
B(k)−B(kˇ(J)) ∀k > kˇ(J).
Since the lowest agent type is zero and θ0 = 0, it follows that the lowest element in
ΘˇP is zero. Moreover, for any such k ∈ ΘˇP , there is a threshold agent type, jm˜(k)
such that principal type k receives the right according to the play of m˜ if j < jm˜(k)
and the agent receives the right against principal type k if j ≥ jm˜(k). Now consider
k /∈ ΘˇP . Let k′, k′′ be two adjacent types in ΘˇP and k′ < k < k′′. Then
B(k′′)(jm˜(k′′)− θk′′) = B(k′)(jm˜(k′′)− θk′) > B(k)(jm˜(k′′)− θk), (A.17)
and thus k receives the right in every event in which type k′′ receives the right.
Hence, the resulting allotment policy can equivalently be described by a sequence
of increasing threshold agent types {jm˜(k)}k∈ΘP according to:
qAφm˜(j, k) =
{
1 if j ≥ jm˜(k),
0 if j < jm˜(k).
qPφm˜(j, k) =
{
0 if jm˜(k) > j ,
1 if jm˜(k) ≤ j.
In addition, observe that the allocation of the play of m˜ is such that the principal’s
upward adjacent incentive constraints are satisfied with equality, because for any
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k ∈ ΘP the following holds:
UPφm˜(k + 1, k) = F (jm˜(k + 1))θk +
K∑
v=k+2
(F (jm˜(v))− F (jm˜(v − 1)))θv
= F (jm˜(k))θk +
K∑
v=k+1
[F (jm˜(v))− F (jm˜(v − 1))]θv) = UPφm˜(k, k)
As a consequence, to verify condition (iv) of lemma A.2 we can define the incre-
ments of the Lagrangian objective as:
V V A(j) := j − Λ(j)− F (j)
f(j) = j,
V V P (k) := θk + (θk − θk−1)B(k − 1)
βk
, if k − 1, k ∈ ΘˇP .
Observe that for any k−1, k ∈ ΘˇP , it is the case that V V P (k) = V V A(j(k)). Because
the agent’s virtual valuation, V V A(j) = j, is increasing in j, this also implies that
the above described allotment policy is consistent with point-wise maximization
of the Lagrangian objective, i.e., condition (iv) of lemma A.2 is satisfied, for any
{k, j} ∈ ΘˇP × ΘA. Moreover, for any k ∈ ΘˇP , V V P (k) is also weakly increasing,
because jm˜(k) is, and for any k > kˇ(J) it holds that V V P (k) > J .
It is left to consider those types of the principal k /∈ ΘˇP . Let k′, k′′ be two adjacent
types in ΘˇP with k′ < k < k′′. According to the claimed optimal solution, k is
pooled with type k′′. Define the virtual valuation of type k the follwing way
V V p(k) := θk + (θk − θk′) B(k
′)
B(k)−B(k′) > jm˜(k
′′), (A.18)
where the inequality follows from (A.17).
To verify that this is indeed optimal, we make use of condition (iii) and pool the
principal’s virtual valuations the following way: Let
b˜k′+2 = (V V P (k′ + 1)− jm˜(k′′))βk′+1,
and for any k ∈ {k′ + 2, ..., k′′ − 1} (if such a type exists), let
b˜k+1 =
k∑
v=k′+1
(V V P (v)− jm˜(k′′))βv.
By construction the resulting (pooled) virtual valuation, say ˜V V P (k), being defined
as
˜V V P (k) := V V P (k) + b˜k
βk
− b˜k+1
βk
,
satisfies
˜V V P (k) = jm˜(k′′).
Moreover, for any such (pooled) k it is the case that ˜V V P (k) = jm˜(k′′) > jm˜(k′) =
V V P (k′) and thus the above described allotment policy is consistent with condition
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(iv) of lemma A.2.
We finally must verify that any such b˜k+1 is non-negative. This follows by the fact
that k /∈ ΘˇP : Suppose to the contrary that for some b˜k+1 < 0, and take the lowest
such k > k′. Then
k∑
v=k′+1
(V V P (v)− jm˜(k′′))βv < 0
⇒
k∑
v=k′+1
[θvB(v)− θv−1B(v − 1)] < (B(k)−B(k′))jm˜(k′′)
⇒ B(k)θk −B(k′)θk′ < (B(k)−B(k′))jm˜(k′′)
⇒ θk + (θk − θk′) B(k
′)
B(k)−B(k′) < jm˜(k
′′).
Hence,
B(k)(jm˜(k′′)− θk) > B(k′)(jm˜(k′′)− θk′).
This is a contradiction to (A.18).
Proof of Lemma 2.12
Let both the principal and the agent hold fixed, but arbitrary beliefs about each
other. Denote the corresponding cdfs by F˜ (·) and B˜(·) and define by ΠA(j) agent
type j’s expected payoff induced by the un-cooperative Bayes-Nash-equilibrium
play of the FPA, in undominated bidding strategies. Let j := inf{j ∈ ΘA|F˜ (j) > 0}.
We first verify that ΠA(j) = maxkˇ∈ΘP {B˜(kˇ)(j−θkˇ), 0}. This establishes the unique-
ness of the continuation equilibrium of the game that begins after the proposal of
m˜. We then use this feature to prove that the grand game has a unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Lemma A.3.
ΠA(j) = max
kˇ∈ΘP
{B˜(kˇ)(j − θkˇ), 0}
Proof. First note that the agent can secure himself the payoff of maxkˇ∈ΘP {B˜(kˇ)j −
θkˇ, 0}, by bidding 0 or θˇk.
Therefore, assume without loss of generality that ΠA(j) > 0. We show that there
exists k, such that ΠA(j) = B˜(k)(j − θk).
In the following we denote by bA(j) and bP (k) the agent’s and the principal’s equi-
librium strategies, which might be bid distributions.
Observation A.1. Take any b ∈ supp(bA(j)) and any j′ > j. Then, b ≤ max supp(bA(j′))
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that b > max supp(bA(j′)). Then, j′ submits all his
bids below j. Moreover, since bA(j) is an equilibrium strategy, the expected win-
ning probability of j strictly increases in his bid, for all bids in the support of bA(j).
Since both j and j′ have the same belief about the principal, this implies that the
expected winning probability of j′ is lower than the one of j. A contradiction to
incentive compatibility.
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Definition A.2. For fixed equilibrium bidding strategy (or bid distribution) of the agent,
denote by ΠP (j, k) the expected payoff of principal type k induced by his equilibrium strat-
egy, conditional on the realization of j.
Observation A.2. Let k′ ∈ {k ∈ supp(β˜)|ΠP (k′) > 0}. Then ΠP (k′, j) > 0.
Proof. We want to show that ΠP (j, k) > 0. Suppose that ΠP (j, k) = 0. Then, there
is j > j such that ΠP (j, k) > 0 and thus ΠP (j, k) > ΠP (j, k). Hence, there is a
bid b ∈ supp(bP (k)), b < θk, such that submitting this bid implies that k wins with
strictly positive probability against j. By observation A.1, this implies that he also
wins with strictly positive probability against j, when submitting this bid. Thus,
ΠP (j, k) > 0.
Observation A.3. Suppose an agent and a principal type receive strictly positive payoffs.
If the supports of their bid distributions are not disjoint, then not both bid distributions can
have a mass point at the same bid.
Proof. Any bid in the joint bid support is strictly lower than both the type of the
agent and the principal. If both distributions have a mass point at the same bid,
then at least one type has a better strategy: the strategy that has a mass point arbi-
trary above the mass point of the opponent.
Now, take the lowest principal type that receives strictly positive payoff, say k. Ob-
serve that ΠP (k, j) > 0 by observation A.2. Moreover, k’s bid distribution cannot
have a mass point: observation A.3 implies that he then receives zero payoff against
j. Moreover, min supp(bA(j)) ≥ θk−1, because otherwise θk−1 could garner positive
payoff, by bidding above, but close to min supp(bA(j)). If min supp(bA(j)) > θk−1,
then k must have a mass point at min supp(bA(j)). Otherwise j strictly prefers to
bid θk−1 than supp(bA(j)). Hence min supp(bA(j)) = θk−1.
Because θk−1 is in the support of bA(j), the payoff of the agent reads B˜(k − 1)(j −
θk−1).
Lemma A.4. The unique continuation equilibrium that begins after the proposal of m˜ is
such that all agent types accept the mechanism.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a continuation equilibrium being such that some
agent types reject the mechanism with positive probability. Denote the set of these
agent types by ΘAR. The principal’s belief about the agent can only have support in
ΘAR. Moreover, for any j ∈ ΘAR it must be the case that ΠA(j) ≥ maxk∈ΘP {B˜(kˇ)(j −
θkˇ), 0}+ . However, this is a contradiction to lemma A.3.
Take any allocation, induced by some perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Call it φ and
observe that φ is β-feasible, by inscrutability. By assumption φ 6= φβm˜ and no prin-
cipal type wants to propose m˜. Recall from lemma A.4 that K can secure himself
payoff equals θK −  by proposing m˜. Hence, for any  > 0, it is the case that
UPφ (K) ≥ θK − .
As in step 2 in the proof of lemma 2.11 we focus on the problem of finding principal
type K’s payoff maximizing allocation, out of the class of all β-feasible allocations.
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Recall, for any prior β, the unique solution to this problem is φβm˜. Since φ is an
equilibrium allocation, it is β-feasible and therefore UPφ (K) < θK . Define ˜ :=
θK − UPφ (K) and observe that UPm˜ > UPφ (K) for any  < ˜.
A.14 Proof of Remark 2.3
Let us first show that the equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion with respect
to the principal. Suppose φm˜ fails the Intuitive Criterion. Then there is a game
form m′ and a type of the principal, say k, for which the following applies: By
hypothesis, in the continuation game that is played after the proposal of m′ with
point-belief belief about k, k must receive larger payoff than θk. Yet, this cannot be
the case, since k’s largest (β˜k = 1)-feasible payoff is equal to θk.
Now consider the agent. Suppose φm˜ fails the Intuitive Criterion. Then there exists
a type of the agent, say j. By hypothesis, j receives from the non-cooperative play
of the FPA with the principal holding degenerate belief concentrated on j strictly
larger payoff than in equilibrium. However, we can apply lemma 2.9 to conclude
that in this case he would receive payoff maxkˇ∈ΘP B(kˇ)(j − θkˇ), which is exactly
type j’s equilibrium payoff.
Moreover, the allocation induced by m˜ is also ratifiable (see Cramton and Palfrey,
1995). Because agent type J is indifferent between accepting and rejecting m˜, the
chosen off-path belief is a credible veto belief, and part (ii) of the definition of rati-
fiable is satisfied.
A.15 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Suppose collusion is in a SPA. We want to argue that we always can find one equi-
librium allocation that is weakly more efficient than the unique equilibrium if col-
lusion is in a FPA.
Recall from the proof of theorem 2.11 that the equilibrium in the FPA can be de-
scribed by a sequence of weakly increasing threshold-types, {jm˜(k)}Kk=0, such that
principal type k receives the right against any agent type strictly below jm˜(k).
For the ease of exposition, we focus on the case according to which θk + (θk −
θk−1)B(k−1)βk is non-decreasing in k. Let us term this condition (R). By equations
(A.16) and (A.17), (R) implies that the set ΘˇP has no holes and principal types not
receiving the right with certainty are not pooled. We remark in footnotes which
steps of the proof change if this condition fails.
We want to verify that the following allocation is always an equilibrium in the SPA:
Define {j˜(k)}Kk=0 := {min{j(k), jm˜(k)}}Kk=0, where j(k) is the RSW threshold, de-
fined in the proof of lemma 2.2. Principal type k receives the right if and only
if the agent’s type realizes below j˜(k). Because {j˜(k)}Kk=0 is defined as the mini-
mum of two weakly increasing sequences, it is itself a weakly increasing sequence
and therefore induces a weakly increasing, both for the agent and for the princi-
pal, allotment policy. Hence, there exists a linear-separable transfer scheme such
that the allotment policy can be implemented in an incentive-compatible manner.
We choose this scheme such that every principal’s type upward adjacent incentive
constraint is satisfied with equality. In addition, the scheme consists of a lump-sum
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payment to the agent, such that the largest agent type receives exactly his outside-
option. Since jm˜(k), j(k) ≥ θk for any k, and by the fact that the non-cooperative
play of the SPA leads an efficient allotment of the good, every agent types individ-
ual rationality constraint is satisfied if and only if it is satisfied for the largest agent
type.
Observe, by construction j˜(k) ≤ jm˜(k) and thus the above described allocation,
termed φ˜, is less inefficient than the unique equilibrium allocation if collusion is in
the FPA.
In order to argue that the above described allocation is an equilibrium allocation, it
is therefore left to verify that every type of the principal is left with weakly larger
utility than the RSW payoff.
This is done in several steps: To begin with, note that the allocation φ ˜RSW that
is the RSW allocation with entry fee (i.e., the agent is asked to pay a lump-sum
transfer to the principal such that type J receives payoff UAD(J)), if there is a pool at
the top, leaves every type of the principal with strictly larger payoff than the RSW
allocation.
Given this, we show that φ˜ dominates φ ˜RSW from the principal’s perspective (and
if there no pool at the top, we show that φ˜ dominates the RSW allocation). To do
so, we proceed iteratively: We start with the lowest principal type, say k′, with
j(k′) > jm˜(k′). Note k′ > 1, since j(0) = θ0 = jm˜(0). We then verify that every
type of the principal prefers the allocation φ˜k′ , which differs from φ ˜RSW only by
the fact that qP ˜RSW (j, k
′) = 1[j < j(k′)] is replaced by qP
φ˜k′
(j, k′) = 1[j < jm˜(k′)],
to the allocation φ ˜RSW .
8 We therefore can without loss of generality replace φ ˜RSW
by φ˜k′ . We then fix the lowest type above k′, say k′′, with j(k′′) > jm˜(k′′) and
verify that every type of the principal prefers the allocation φ˜k′′ , that is defined in
a similar manner as φ˜k′ , to the allocation φ˜k′ . Continuing in this fashion, we finally
end up at allocation φ˜ and are certain that the latter allocation leaves every type of
the principal with larger payoff than the RSW payoff.
Given k′, define the allotment policy {qA
φ˜k′
(j, k), qP
φ˜k′
(j, k)} = {1[j ≥ jφ˜k′ (k)],1[j <
jφ˜k′
(k)]}, where the sequence of threshold types is given by: {jφ˜k′ (k)}
K
k=0 = {min{j(k), jm˜(k)}}k
′
k=0∪
{j(k)}Kk=k′+1. By definition, jφ0(k) = j(k) for all k ∈ ΘP .
The allocation φ with φ ∈ {φ0, ..., φK}, then reads:
(qAφ (j, k), tAφ (j, k)) =
{
(1, hAφ (j) + Ek[hPφ (k)]− hPφ (k)− C) if j > jφ(k),
(0, hAφ (j) + Ek[hPφ (k)]− hPφ (k)− C) if j ≤ jφ(k).
(qPφ (j, k), tPφ (j, k)) =
{
(0, hPφ (k)− Ek[hPφ (k)]− hAφ (j) + C) if j > jφ(k),
(1, hPφ (k)− Ek[hPφ (k)]− hAφ (j) + C) if j ≤ jφ(k).
Where
hAφ (j) = qAφ (j)j −
∫ j
0
qAφ (v)dv,
8If condition (R) fails, then types of the principal between k′′, k′′′ ∈ ΘˇP with k′′ < k′′′ are pooled
according to the play of m˜ and receive the right against every agent type lower than jm˜(k′′′). Let k′
be the largest principal type in the pool with j(k) > jm˜(k′′). Then, for all other types between k′ and
k′′′ it must be necessarily the case that j(k) > jm˜(k′′′). We construct φ˜k′′′ that differs from φ ˜RSW only
by the fact that those types between k′ and k′′′ receive the right against every agent type lower than
jm˜(k′′′).
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C =
∫ J
0
[qAD(j)− qAφ (j)]dj
hPφ (k) = qPφ (k)θk−1 −
k−1∑
v=1
(θv − θv−1)qPφ (v), if k > 1
hPφ (1) = hPφ (0) = 0.
For latter references, observe that for any k > 0 the utility reads:
UPφ (k) =
k∑
v=1
F (jφ(v))(θv − θv−1) +
K∑
v=1
F (jφ(v))[θv−1 − 1−B(v)
βv
(θv − θv−1)]βv
+
∫ J
0
qAφ (j)(j +
F (j)
f(j) )f(j)dj −
∫ J
0
qAD(j)dj
Step 1
Fix the lowest type k such that φ˜0 6= φ˜k, i.e., such that j(k) > jm˜(k). Let us first
consider
UP
φ˜0
(k′)− UP
φ˜k
(k′) =∫ j(k)
jm˜(k)
{[θk + (θk − θk−1)B(k − 1)
βk
]− (j + F (j)
f(j) )}f(j)βkdj (A.19)
We want to argue that this difference is necessarily negative. Because of the reg-
ularity assumption on the agent’s type distribution, a sufficient condition is given
by:
θk + (θk − θk−1)B(k − 1)
βk
≤ jm˜(k) + F (jm˜(k))
f(jm˜(k))
Now, recall from (A.16) that the left-hand side is equal to jm˜(k), and thus
jm˜(k) ≤ jm˜(k) + F (jm˜(k))
f(jm˜(k))
,
which is true.9 10
9If condition (R) fails, we jointly decrease the allotment probability of all types in the pool being
defined in the previous footnote (8). That is, for every type between k′ and k′′′. Doing so, one can
establish that for type k′′′ the following holds UP
φ˜0
(k′′′)−UP
φ˜k′′′
(k) < 0 (see the next footnote, 10). The
resulting allocation, φ˜k′′′ , satisfies the principal’s upward adjacent incentive constraints. Therefore it
follows by the same arguments as in Step 2, that every principal type in the considered pool prefers
φ˜k′′′ to φ˜0.
10Note,
Up
φ˜0
(k′′′)− Up
φ˜k
(k′′′) =
k′′′∑
v=k′
(F (j(v))−F (jm˜(v)))[(θv−θv−1)+θv−1βv−(1−B(v))(θv−θv−1)]−
∫ J
0
[qaφ˜(j)−qaφ˜0(j)][j+
F (j)
f(j) ]f(j)dj =
k′′′∑
v=k′
∫ j(v)
jm˜(k′′′)
[θv+
B(v − 1)
βv
(θv−θv−1)−(j+F (j)
f(j) )]f(j)βvdj <
k′′′∑
v=k′
∫ j(v)
jm˜(k′′′)
[θv+
B(v − 1)
βv
(θv−θv−1)−jm˜(k′′′)]f(j)βvdj
< [F (j(k′′′))− F (jm˜(k′′′)]
k′′∑
v=k′
[θv +
B(v − 1)
βv
(θv − θv−1)− jm˜(k′′)]βv],
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Step 2
Finally, observe that UP
φ˜k
(k − 1) = UP
φ˜k
(k)− F (j˜(k))(θk − θk−1) is larger than
UPφ0(k − 1) = UPφ0(k)− F (j(k))(θk − θk−1),
because UP
φ˜k
(k − 1)− UPφ0(k − 1) > (F (j(k))− F (j˜(k))(θk − θk−1) > 0.
Moreover, because qPφk(k
′) = qPφk−1(k
′) for all k′ ≤ k − 1,
UP
φ˜k
(k′)− UPφ0(k′) = UPφ˜k(k − 1)− U
P
φ0(k − 1) > 0 ∀k′ < k − 1.
Similarly, UP
φ˜k
(k + 1) = UP
φ˜k
(k) + qP
φ˜k
(k + 1)(θk+1 − θk) is larger than
UPφ0(k + 1) = U
P
φ0(k) + q
P
φ0(k + 1)(θk+1 − θk),
because qP
φ˜k
(k′) = qPφ0(k
′) for any k′ > k. As a consequence,
UP
φ˜k
(k′)− UPφ0(k′) = UPφ˜k(k)− U
P
φ0(k) > 0 ∀k′ > k.
Since the same arguments as above apply for any k such that j(k) > jm˜(k), we
consider proposition 2.5 as proven.
A.16 Proofs of Section 2.5.1: The Intuitive Criterion
Proof of Lemma 2.13 The next lemma states a sufficient condition such that equi-
librium does not fail the CK criterion. That is, if there does not exists any separating
menu in the below sense, then the equilibrium does not fail the criterion.
Lemma A.5. Suppose the equilibrium fails the CK criterion. Then there exist a principal
type k and a (β˜k = 1)-feasible menu, say φSk , separating principal type k and k − 1. That
is, UP
φS
k
(k − 1) ≤ UP (k − 1), UP
φS
k
(k) > UP (k).
Proof. For the fixed off-path mechanism m′, define a set of side mechanisms Mˆm′ ,
such that mˆ ∈ Mˆm′ if and only if any principal type k not in Ξ1(m′) receives in the
continuation game after the proposal of mˆ ∈ Mˆm′ payoff lower than equilibrium
utility - for any belief β1 ∈ B1(m′). We know that Mˆm′ is non empty, since m′ is
included in this set by the assumption on the failure of the CK criterion.
where the first inequality follows from the regularity assumption on the agent’s type distribution and
the second from the fact that the principal’s virtual valuation is positive.
Recall the definition of k′′ in footnote 13 and observe that the last quantity is weakly smaller than
zero, because
k′′′∑
v=k′
[θv +
B(v − 1)
βv
(θv − θv−1)− jm˜(k′′)]βv ≤
k′′′∑
v=k′′+1
[θv +
B(v − 1)
βv
(θv − θv−1)− jm˜(k′′′)]βv = 0
⇐⇒ B(k′′′)(jm˜(k′′′)− θk′′′) = B(k′′)(jm˜(k′′′)− θk′′) = 0,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that for any k ∈ {k′′ + 1, ..., k′′′ − 1} it holds that
jm˜(k′′′) < θk + B(k−1)βk (θk − θk−1) and the last equality is satisfied by the definition of jm˜(k
′′′).
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Define for all k ∈ ΘP the secured payoff UPm′(k), the following way:
UPm′(k) := sup
m∈Mˆm′
min
β˜∈B1(m′),UPm(k)∈M(k,β˜,m)
UPm(k),
Next, consider the sequence of problems, defined for all kˇ ∈ ΘP as:
max
φ
UPφ (k) (P )kˇ
(AIC)jk, (AIR)
j
k, (PIC)k ∀j ∈ ΘA, ∀k ∈ Ξ1(m′),
UPφ (k) ≤ UP (k) ∀k /∈ Ξ1(m′),
(BB)j,k,
where the constraints refer to the agent’s incentive-compatibility and individual
rationality constraints - imposed at the ex-post level given any k ∈ Ξ1(m′) -, and the
principal’s interim incentive constraint if his type is in the set Ξ1(m′). Otherwise the
principal’s payoff induced by φ is required to be weakly less than his equilibrium
utility.
Firstly, note that there exists an allocation satisfying the constraints, namely φRSW :
It satisfies (PIC)k, (AIC)jk, (AIR)
j
k ∀(j, k) ∈ Θ and thus ∀j ∈ ΘA,∀k ∈ Ξ1(m′).
Moreover, since UP (k) is an equilibrium payoff UPRSW (k) ≤ UP (k) ∀k ∈ ΘP and
thus ∀k /∈ Ξ1(m′).
Secondly, denote the solution to (P )k by φk and define φ′ : φ′(·, k) = φk(·, k). Then
observe that, by construction, φ′ is feasible in any (P )k and UPφ′(k) = UPφk(k).
Thirdly, note that UPφ′(k) = UPm′(k):
Suppose first that UPφ′(k) > UPm′(k). This contradicts the definition of UPm′(k). By
proposing a convex combination between φo11 and φ′ principal type k can secure
himself for any β˜ ∈ B1(m′) a payoff strictly larger than UPm′(k). Moreover, since φo
induces any type of the principal a strictly smaller payoff than the RSW allocation,
it follows that the direct revelation mechanism implementing the convex combina-
tion between φo and φ′ is a feasible side mechanism, i.e., an element of Mˆm′ .
Now suppose that UPφ′(k) < UPm′(k). We aim to derive a contradiction. As first step,
we define the following set:
Hm′(k, β˜) := {UPφ (k)|∃φ :
(AIC)j
β˜
, (AIR)j
β˜
, (PIC)k ∀(j, k) ∈ ΘA × supp(β˜), UPφ (k) ≤ UP (k) ∀k /∈ Ξ1(m′)}.
In words, the set Hm′(k, β˜) fixes a belief and varies over all m ∈ Mˆm′ . Note first,
the revelation principle implies that the continuation game starting after an offer
of any m ∈ Mˆm′ together with β˜ ∈ B1(m′) induces an allocation φ such that UPφ (k)
is an element of Hm′(k, β˜). We abuse notation a bid and call any such allocation
β˜-feasible.
Also note that the quasilinear environment implies that Hm′(k, β˜) is a convex set.
11Recall that φo is defined as allocation that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and individual
rationality with strict inequality.
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Moreover, from the definition of the secured payoff it follows that for any β˜ ∈
B1(m′) it is the case that UPm′(k) ∈ Hm′(k, β˜) : UPm′(k) > UPφ (k) for any β˜′-feasible
allocation φ, some β˜′ ∈ B1(m′) and some k implies a contradiction to the fact that
UPm′(k) is defined as the value of a minimization problem with respect to the belief.
UPm′(k) < UPφ (k) for any β˜′-feasible allocation φ, some β˜′ ∈ B1(m′) and some k can-
not be the case since by hypothesis UPφ′(k) < UPm′(k) and UPφ′(k) ∈ Hm′(k, β˜) ∀β˜ ∈
B1(m′). Since Hm′(k, β˜) is a convex set, the claim follows.
We thus note that there exists a payoff, being feasible for any β˜ ∈ B1(m′). Invoking
the revelation principle, we observe:
UPm′(k) ∈ {UPφ (k)|∃φ :
(AIC)jk, (AIR)
j
k, (PIC)k ∀(j, k) ∈ ΘA × Ξ1(m′), UPφ (k) ≤ UP (k) ∀k /∈ Ξ1(m′)}.
The hypothesis Um′(k) > UPφ′(k) thus implies a contradiction. There is a game
form m′ that is feasible in (P )k and leads a higher payoff than the solution value of
program (P )k. Finally, we want to show that the allocation φ′ implies the existence
of a separating menu.
First, take any principal type in k′ ∈ Ξ2(m′) and note that
UPφ′(k′) = Um′(k′) ≥ min
β˜∈B1(m′)
M(k′, β˜,m′) > UP (k′)
The first inequality follows from the fact that m′ is not necessarily the game form
that induces the supremum,12 and the last inequality follows from the failure of the
CK criterion.
Now fix the lowest type k′ ∈ Ξ2(m′) and define the set
Ξ3(k′,m′) := {k ∈ {0, ..., k′ − 1}|k ∈ Ξ1(m′), k + 1 ∈ Ξ3(k′,m′)} ∪ k′
In words, Ξ3(k′,m′) is a subset of types in Ξ1(m′) with no "holes". That is, k′ is the
largest element of Ξ3(k′,m′). k′ − 1 ∈ Ξ3(k′,m′) if and only if k′ − 1 ∈ Ξ1(m′) and
k′ − 2 ∈ Ξ3(k′,m′) if and only if k′ − 2, k′ − 1 ∈ Ξ1(m′) and so on ... .
If k′ − 1 13 is not in Ξ1(m′), we have found a separation menu by the construction
of the maximization problem (P )k′ . Hence, assume that k′ − 1 is in Ξ1(m′).
If for any type k ∈ Ξ3(k′,m′) it is the case that UP (k) ≥ UPφ′(k) we are done, as we
can simply take the highest type, say k′′, with this feature. Then we know that there
exists a separation menu for k′′ + 1.
We thus fix the highest principal type not in Ξ3(k′,m′). This type is strictly below
k′ − 1. Denote him by k′′′.14 By definition of Ξ3(k′,m′), k′′′ cannot be in Ξ1(m′).
12Recall that M(k′, β˜,m′) is the continuation payoff of principal type k′ in the continuation game,
following m′ under belief β˜ ∈ B1(m′).
13Such a type exists, since we can assume without loss of generality that k = 0 is not in Ξ2(m′):
k = 0 cannot be in Ξ2(m′) since in this instance, type 0 would need to profit, in particular, if the agent
held degenerate belief concentrated on type 0. By the features of the RSW allocation, the lowest
principal type cannot receive higher utility than his RSW payoff, when the agent has a degenerate
belief concentrated on this type.
14Such a type exists, since we can assume without loss of generality that k = 0 is not in Ξ2(m′), as
argued in footnote 13 above. Moreover, if k = 0 is in the set Ξ3(k′,m′) (and thus in the set Ξ1(m′)), it
cannot be the case that all types in Ξ1(m′) prefer φ′ to the equilibrium mechanism: Otherwise all types
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By construction, we therefore have found a separating menu between the lowest
principal type in Ξ3(k′,m′), k′′′ + 1, and k′′′.
We now turn to the necessary part. Suppose that some principal type k has a sep-
aration menu. We aim to construct a deviation mechanism that makes the equilib-
rium allocation failing the CK criterion.
In order to proceed, consider first the following sequence of linked menu-maximization
problems, (P4)k.
max
φ(·,0)
UPφ(·,0)(0) (P4)0
such that ∀j ∈ ΘA:
(AIR)j0, (AIC)
j
0
(BB)j,0 tAφ(·,0)(j) + tPφ(·,0)(j) ≥ 0,
and for any k = 1, ...,K and given φ(·, 0), ..., φ(·, k − 1),
max
φ(·,k)
UPφ(·,k)(k) (P4)k
such that ∀j ∈ ΘA:
(AIR)jk, (AIC)
j
k
(PIC)+k−1 {maxUPφ(·,k−1)(k − 1), UP (k − 1)} ≥ UPφ(·,k)(k − 1)
(BB)j,k tAφ(·,k)(j) + tPφ(·,k)(j) ≥ 0,
where each (P4)k defines an optimal - from principal type k’s point of view -
menu offer to the agent, such that k − 1’s upward adjacent incentive constraint
((PIC)+k−1) is satisfied. Each (P4)k is subject to agent’s ex-post individual rational-
ity and incentive-compatibility constraints, given k.
Note the similarity between (P4)k and the sequence of linked-(menu)-maximization
problems (P˜1)k, which we solved to characterize the RSW allocation. In both pro-
grams, the agent’s individual rationality and interim incentive-compatibility con-
straints are imposed for every type of the principal at the ex-post level. According
to (P˜1)k the principal’s upward adjacent incentive constraints bind. The problems
in program (P4)k are still linked but subject to a weakened (PIC).
In order to construct the deviation mechanism, we solve the class of maximization
problems (P4)k by starting with the lowest principal type. We set k′ equal to the
first k such that UP (k) ≤ UPφ(·,k) and replace (PIC)+k′ by the constraint UPφ(·,k′)(k′) ≥
UPφ(·,k′+1)(k′). Clearly, the assumption of the existence of a separation menu implies
that k′ is well-defined. Finally note, if for any k it holds that UPφ(·,k)(k) ≥ UP (k) then
UPφ(·,k+1)(k + 1) ≥ UPφ(·,k)(k + 1) as the agents outside option is eased in the type of
the principal.
Given the similarity between (P4)k and (P˜1)k it should be clear (we omit the proof)
that we can describe φ(·, k) by a binary 0,1 allotment policy in which agent types
from k = 0 to k′ would weakly (and at least k′ strictly) prefer some φ satisfying (AIR)jk,(AIC)
j
k and
(PIC)k for all k ∈ {0, ..., k′}: a contradiction to the fact that the equilibrium payoff weakly dominates
the RSW payoff. I.e., φ′ would be the RSW allocation. But by assumption, k′ prefers the utility
induced by φ′ strictly to his equilibrium payoff. This leads a contradiction, sinceUP (k′) ≥ UPRSW (k′).
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below some threshold, j˜(k) with j˜(k) ≥ θk, receive the compensation j˜(k) − θk.
Types above receive the right at price θk′ . Similar to the RSW allocation, a lump-
sum transfer might be paid to the agent if the principal cannot use the allotment
probability to separate from his downward-adjacent neighbor. That is, there might
exists a pool at the top of principal types with lowest element indicated by K.
We now construct a side mechanism, the deviation mechanism, that makes the
equilibrium failing the CK criterion. In the deviation mechanism the agents mes-
sage space is augmented. Together with his type the agent reports a number d ∈
{0, 1}. Moreover, define the function l : {0, 1} × ΘP → R2 that elicits the agent’s
belief. If the agent reports d = 0 he receives a payment, DA, if and only if the
principal reports to have type below k′
(lA(0, kˆ), lP (0, kˆ)) =
{
(−DA, DP ) if kˆ < k′ ,
(,DP ) if kˆ ≥ k′ .
(lA(1, kˆ), lP (1, kˆ)) =
{
(0, 0) ∀kˆ ∈ ΘP .
DA is chosen such that no agent type rejects the deviation mechanism. That is
−DA > tP (0)+UAD(J). DP is chosen such to assure a non-negative budget surplus,
i.e., DP = −DA. Recall, the objects tP (kˆ), qP (jˆ, kˆ) refer to the considered equilib-
rium allocation. Given this, the deviation mechanism is defined by the outcome
function φ0CK(jˆ, kˆ, d):
kˆ < k′:
(qAφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
A
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ, d)) =
{
(0,max{tP (kˆ), 0} − lA(d, kˆ)) ∀jˆ .
(qPφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
P
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ, d)) =
{
(qP (jˆ, kˆ), tP (kˆ) + lP (d, kˆ)) ∀jˆ .
kˆ ≥ k′ :
(qAφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
A
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ, d) =
{
(0, θkˆ − j˜(kˆ) + lA(d, kˆ)) if jˆ ≤ j˜(kˆ) ,
(1, θkˆ + l
A(d, kˆ)) if jˆ > j˜(kˆ) .
(qPφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
A
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ) =
{
(1, θkˆ − j˜(kˆ) + lP (d, kˆ)) if jˆ ≤ j˜(kˆ) ,
(0,−θkˆ + lP (d, kˆ)) if jˆ > j˜(kˆ) .
kˆ = K
(qAφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
A
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ, d)) =
{
(0,−θK + lA(d, kˆ)) ∀jˆ .
(qPφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
P
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ, d)) =
{
(1,−(θK−1 − UPφ0CK (K − 1)) + l
P (d, kˆ)) ∀jˆ .
kˆ > K
(qAφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
A
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ, d)) =
{
(0, lA(d, kˆ)) ∀jˆ .
(qPφ0CK (jˆ, kˆ, d), t
P
φ0CK
(jˆ, kˆ, d)) =
{
(1,−(θK−1 − UPφ0CK (K − 1)) + l
P (d, kˆ)) ∀jˆ .
Finally, replace φ0CK by the convex combination between φ
o, being defined in lemma 2.3
as allocation that satisfies the agent’s incentive constraints and individual rational-
ity constraints strictly, and φ0CK with mass approaching unity on the latter outcome
function.
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Denote the resulting allocation by φCK and the mechanism implementing it, upon
unanimous ratification of all agent types, by mCK .
Lemma A.6. Whenever there exists a deviation mechanism, the equilibrium fails the CK
criterion.
Proof. By construction, mCK is accepted by any agent type for any belief about
the principal. Moreover, for any belief about the principal mCK has a unique and
truthful, concerning the bidders’ type reports, equilibrium. Moreover, the set of
types that profit frommCK in comparison to equilibrium for some belief, Ξ1(mCK),
includes at least k′ and no type below k′. Finally, for any belief with support only
on types in the set Ξ1(mCK), every type of the agent reports d = 1 and k′ receives
larger payoff than in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.6 We start by verifying the conditions for the (non-)existence
of the separation menu, defined in the text. Having established this result, the
proposition 2.6 is a direct consequence.
We begin with the necessary conditions:
Lemma A.7. If k pays a strictly positive subsidy and k − 1’s upward adjacent incentive
constraint is not satisfied with equality, then there exists a separating menu.
Proof. The following menu is a separation menu. Take qPφ(·,k) = qP (k), tPφ(·,k) =
tP (k) − . Where  > 0 is chosen such that k − 1 does not prefer the allocation
induced by the menu to his equilibrium allocation and the agent’s ex-post individ-
ual rationality constraints, given type k, are satisfied. Such an  exists, since when
setting it equal to zero, both k− 1’s incentive and the agent’s individual rationality
constraints are satisfied with strict inequality.
Lemma A.8. If for any principal type k with qP (k) < 1 there does not exist a separating
menu, then k receives a subsidy.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary of what we want to show that k pays a strictly posi-
tive subsidy. We want to verify that in this instance type k has a separation menu.
By lemma A.7 assume without loss of generality that k−1’s upward adjacent incen-
tive constraint is satisfied with equality. For some , δ > 0, construct the following
menu: qPφ(·,k) = qP (k) +  and tPφ(·,k) = tP (k) + θk−1+ δ.
We choose  positive, but arbitrarily small, such that this menu satisfied (AIR)k.
This is feasible, since qP (k) +  < 1 and (AIR)k is satisfied with strict inequality for
 = 0 (by the assumption of the subsidy). This feature, or feasibility, is preserved
for  arbitrarily small and also for any positive δ. For 0 < δ < (θk−θk−1) type k−1
does not profit from this menu, but k does so.
Hence, we have found a separating menu.
Next we prove the sufficient conditions:
Lemma A.9. Whenever (i) k − 1’s upward adjacent incentive constraint is satisfied with
equality, (ii) k receives a subsidy and (iii) qP (k) ≥ F (θk), then there does not exist a
separating menu.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a separating menu. Since k − 1’s
upward adjacent incentive constraint is satisfied with equality in equilibrium, there
only can exists a separating menu if qP
φS
k
> qP (k): Suppose to the contrary qP
φS
k
≤
qP (k). In this instance UP
φS
k
(k− 1) = UP
φS
k
(k)− qP
φS
k
(θk − θk−1) ≥ UP (k)− qP (k)(θk −
θk−1) = UP (k−1), which is a contradiction to the definition of the separating menu.
However, qP
φS
k
> qP (k) together with the hypothesis that k does not receive a sub-
sidy implies UP
φS
k
(k) < UP (k): First, observe that the hypothesis that k is subsidized
implies that the equilibrium menu, φEk , induces k a payoff U
P
φE
k
(k), strictly smaller
than UP (k). However, as qP
φS
k
> qP (k) ≥ F (θk) the allocation is already (weakly)
inefficient, given type k. As a consequence, when increasing the inefficiencies,
that is, increasing qP
φS
k
, the payoff principal type k receives, UP
φS
k
(k), furthermore
decreases.
Lemma A.10. Fix a type k such that qP (k) = 1. Suppose k − 1’s upward adjacent
constraints is satisfied with equality, then there does not exist a separating menu.
Proof. Along the same lines as in the proof of lemma A.9 it can be established that
if k − 1’s upward adjacent constraint is satisfied, a separation menu must feature
1 = qP (k) < qP
φS
k
. Clearly, a contradiction.
With these above observations we can proof the assertions of proposition 2.6.
Lemma A.11. An equilibrium survives the CK criterion only if the induced allotment
policy is inefficient in favor of the principal.
Proof. Assume first that K ≥ J . Suppose that qP (k) = F (θk) for any k, and assume
that the equilibrium allocation satisfies the CK criterion. We now argue that there
is at least one type k with qP (k) < 1 paying a strictly positive subsidy. First, define
k′ as the highest type with qP (k′) < 1. We know that the upward adjacent incentive
constraint of k′ is satisfied with equality, because k′ + 1 pays a strictly positive
subsidy. To see this, note that the allocation is efficient and qP (k′+1) = 1. Therefore
k′ + 1’s equilibrium menu specifies the transfer tP
φE
k′+1
= 0. Furthermore, it must be
the case that tP (k′ + 1) > 0. Otherwise it would follow that UP (k′) ≥ θk′ for all
types of the principal and with strict inequality for some. This is the case, because
θk−UP (k) is increasing in k, as (θk−θk−1)−(UP (k+1)−UP (k)) ≥ (θk−θk−1)−(θk−
θk−1)qP (k)) > 0. But this implies that agent’s individual rationality is violated, by
accounting logic: It follows by (AIR) that ∑Kk=0 UP (k) ≤ ∑Kk=0 θk, since the right-
hand side is the upper bound of the left-hand side given any β-feasible allocation.15
Hence, k′+1 pays a subsidy and thus, by lemma A.7, the upward adjacent incentive
constraint of k′ is satisfied with equality.
15Suppose we want to maximize
∑K
k=0 U
P (k), subject to (AIR)k, (AIC)k ∀k ∈ ΘP , but drop the
(PIC) constraint. In this instance every element of the sum takes the value θk: Each principal can
offer a menu that sells the right to the agent at price θk and otherwise allots the right to the principal at
zero compensation. This mechanism implies utility of θk for each principal type k. Since the implied
allotment policy is efficient and every agent type receives exactly his outside option, it follows that
this is also the solution when imposing the weaker (AIR) and (AIC) constraints. Therefore we
constructed an upper bound on the sum of principal (equilibrium) utilities.
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We conclude that the following is true
θk′ − tP (k′ + 1) = UP (k′)
Hence, UP (k′) < θk′ . But this implies that k′ pays a strictly positive subsidy, since
his equilibrium menu induces payoff θk′ .
By lemma A.8 it thus follows that there exists a separating menu for type k′ and we
thus have derived a contradiction to the hypothesis that the allocation satisfies the
CK criterion.
Now suppose that K < J , i.e., qP (K) < 1. Clearly, K pays a strictly positive sub-
sidy: Otherwise he would receive utility UP (K) = θK , which implies, by a similar
argument as above, a contradiction to (AIR). Therefore there exists a separation
menu for K.
Lemma A.12. The RSW allocation survives the CK criterion. Moreover, whenever qPRSW (K) =
1, the allocation termed "RSW with entry fee" survives the CK criterion.
Proof. The RSW allocation survives the CK criterion:
If the RSW allocation is the equilibrium allocation, then, by the characterization
of the RSW allocation, the principal’s upward adjacent incentive constraints are
satisfied with equality. Moreover, all types with qPRSW (k) < 1 pay and receive zero
subsidy. Hence, by lemmas A.9 and A.10 there does not exist a separating menu
for any principal type.
The RSW allocation with entry fee survives the CK criterion:
If the RSW with entry fee allocation is the equilibrium allocation, then, by the char-
acterization of the RSW allocation, the principal’s upward adjacent incentive con-
straints are satisfied with equality. Moreover, by the characterization of the RSW
allocation, it follows that all types with qPRSW (k) < 1 receive a subsidy: The trans-
fer according to the RSW with entry fee allocation is strictly smaller than according
to the RSW allocation, i.e., to the equilibrium menu. Thus, there does not exist a
separation menu for any type of the principal.
Lemma A.13. Whenever qPRSW (K) < 1 only the RSW allocation survives the CK crite-
rion
Proof. Suppose there exists some equilibrium allocation satisfying the CK criterion.
In the following we show that it is necessarily the RSW allocation.
First note, all types of the principal receive a weakly positive subsidy. Fix any type
k, such that qP (k) = 1. Since qPRSW (k) < 1 and UP (k) ≥ UPRSW (k), the fact that k
receives zero subsidy according to the RSW allocation immediately implies that k
receives a strictly positive subsidy in equilibrium. A type k with qP (k) < 1 cannot
pay a strictly positive subsidy, since otherwise lemma A.8 implies the existence of
a separation menu.
This immediately implies that every type receives zero subsidy. If at least one type
receives a strictly positive subsidy, the agent’s interim individual rationality con-
straint would be violated by account logic. But if every principal type receives zero
subsidy, then qP (k) ≤ qPRSW (k), as otherwise UP (k) < UPRSW (k).
Moreover, we know that qP (k) ≥ qPRSW (k). Suppose to the contrary that qP (k) <
qPRSW (k). We claim that there exists at least one type of the principal being below k
that receives a strictly positive subsidy.
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We verify this claim by induction and start with k−1. If type k−1 does not receive
a strictly positive subsidy, then incentive compatibility implies that he must receive
a strictly larger equilibrium payoff than UPRSW (k − 1). This is the case because the
hypothesis qP (k) < qPRSW (k) together with the zero subsidy condition imply that
UP (k, k−1) > UPRSW (k, k−1) = UPRSW (k−1, k−1). Hence, qP (k−1) < qPRSW (k−1).
By a similar argument one can establish that UP (k− 2) > UPRSW (k− 2) and qP (k−
2) < qPRSW (k − 2). Continuing this reasoning for all k > 0, we eventually we end
up by at k = 0. By incentive compatibility, we thus know that UP (0) > UPRSW (0).
However, according to the RSW allocation, principal type 0 receives the largest
feasible payoff, given the agent knew the type of the principal. Consequently, this
implies that type 0 receives a strictly positive subsidy in equilibrium. We thus
conclude that qP (k) = qPRSW (k) for all k.
A.17 Proof of Proposition 2.7
First observe that the only equilibrium that satisfies the CK criterion is the RSW
allocation.
The proof consists of several steps. We first assume that it is without loss of gener-
ality to assume that the r ≥ θ0 and then verify this claim in step 4.
We begin by stating the welfare objective:
Step 1:
W (φRSW , r) =
K∑
k=0
1[θk ≥ r]F (jr(k))θkβk+
K∑
k=0
1[θk ≥ r]
∫ J
jr(k)
jf(j)djβ(k)+
K∑
k=0
1[θk < r]βk
∫ J
r
f(j)jdj.
At r ∈ (θk, θk+1) the derivative of W (φRSW , r) with respect to r reads:
dW (φRSW , r)
dr
|r∈(θk,θk+1) =
K∑
k=0
1[θk ≥ r]{dF (jr(k))
dr
θk−djr(k)
dr
jr(k)f(jr(k))}βk−B(r)f(r)r.
At r = θk the welfare change induced by a marginal increase of r reads:
W (φRSW , r > θk)−W (φRSW , r = θk) = drdW (φ
RSW , r)
dr
|r>θk,r→θk − βkF (r)r.
Step 2:
We first consider dW (φ
RSW ,r)
dr |r>θ0,r→θ0+β0rf(r). Observe that for any k>0: dF (jr(k))dr θ˜k−
jr(k)f(jr(k))djr(k)dr ≥ 0, whenever djr(k)dr ≤ 0, since θk ≤ jr(k). We assume for the
moment that this is the case.
Making use of dF (jr(k))dr = f(jr(k))
djr(k)
dr , we thus can bound
dW (φRSW ,r)
dr |r>θ0,r→θ0 +
β0rf(r) from below by:
(θ1 − jr(1))β1f(jr(1))djr(1)
dr
This quantity is strictly positive whenever djr(1)dr < 0.
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In order to see why this is the case, consider the RSW allocation. jr(1) is determined
by the equation:
−F (jr(1))(jr(1)− θ1) + (1− F (jr(1))(θ1 − r) = 0
⇐⇒ −F (jr(1))(jr(1)− r) + θ1 − r = 0.
By the implicit function theorem this defines:
djr(1)
dr
= (1− F (jr(1))−(F (jr(1)) + f(jr(1))(jr(1))− r) < 0,
which verifies the claim.
Now fix any k > 0 and note that jr(k) is determined by:
−F (jr(k))(jr(k)− θk) + (1− F (jr(k))(θk − r) + F (jr(k))(θk−1 − r) = UPRSW (k − 1)
⇐⇒ θk − r − F (jr(k))(jr(k)− θk−1) = θk−1 − r − F (jr(k − 1))(jr(k − 1)− θk−1)
⇐⇒ θk − θk−1 − F (jr(k))(jr(k)− θk−1) + F (jr(k − 1))(jr(k − 1)− θk−1) = 0.
Now, by the implicit function theorem
djr(k)
djr(k − 1) =
f(jr(k − 1))(jr(k − 1)− θk−1) + F (jr(k − 1))
f(jr(k))(jr(k)− θk) + F (jr(k)) > 0.
By induction it does follows, that djr(1)dr < 0 and thus
djr(k)
dr < 0 for all k ∈ ΘP .
Step 3:
Now we want to argue that a non-trivial reserve price dominates a trivial reserve
price in terms of welfare. Therefore, compare the difference in welfare:
limr→θ0,r>θ0W (φRSW , r)−W (φRSW , r = θ0) = dr
dW (φRSW , r)
dr
|r→θ0,r>θ0−β0F (θ0)θ0
= dr[
K∑
k=1
{dF (jr(k))
dr
θk − djr(k)
dr
jr(k)f(jr(k))}βk −B(0)f(θ0)θ0]− β0F (θ0)θ0.
As argued above
∑K
k=1{dF (jr(k))dr θk − djr(k)dr jr(k)f(jr(k))}βk > 0. Hence, whenever
F (θ0) = 0 and B(0) = β0 → 0, then a reserve price r > θ0 welfare dominates a
reserve price r = θ0.
Step 4:
Suppose the lowest type of the principal (and of the agent) is larger than 0, that is,
θ0 > 0. Then a reserve price of r = θ0 leads the same welfare as a reserve price of
r < θ0.
Firstly, observe that a reserve price of r = θ0 does not exclude a strictly positive
mass of bidder types. Hence, whenever r = θ0 implies the same RSW thresholds
as r < θ0, both reserve prices imply the same welfare. To see that this is the case,
suppose first that r < θ0. In this instance UPRSW (0) = θ0 − r and, given this, jr(1) is
defined as solution to:
F (jr(1))(θ0 − r)− F (jr(1))(jr(1)− θ1) + (1− F (jr(1)))(θ1 − r) = θ0 − r
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⇐⇒ θ1 − F (jr(1))1− F (jr(1))(jr(1)− θ1) = θ0.
In contrast, if r = θ0 then UPRSW (0) = 0 and with this jr(1) solves:
F (jr(1))0− F (jr(1))(jr(1)− θ1) + (1− F (jr(1)))(θ1 − r) = 0
⇐⇒ θ1 − F (jr(1))1− F (jr(1))(jr(1)− θ1) = r = θ0.
As a consequence jr=θ0(1) = jr<θ0(1). By similar arguments as in step 2 above it
follows that jr=θ0(k) = jr<θ0(k) ∀k ∈ ΘP which was to be shown.
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B.1 Details on Rewriting the Problem
Full Participation. Full participation is a consequence of the fact that litigation
utility is convex in beliefs and Proposition 2 from Celik and Peters (2011).
Lemma B.1. It is without loss of generality to assume full participation in the optimal
mechanism.
Value of Vetoing. Any off-path belief structure that satisfies the intuitive criterion
leads to a player independent value Vi(k), which is
V (l) = (1− p)κ− 1
κ
, and V (h) = 0.
Given the constant outside option, the channels identified by Celik and Peters
(2011) and Cramton and Palfrey (1995) are not present in our model as off path
beliefs are less important.
Reduced Form Problem à la Border (2007). We reduce the problem by replacing
the settlement shares, Xi, by the settlement values, zi. For any given matrix of
breakdown probabilities, G, this reduction is possible if and only if each settle-
ment share is both individually feasible (condition (F ), below) and ex-post imple-
mentable (condition (EPI), below). The following lemma states these conditions.
With some abuse of notation, let p(m) be the ex-ante probability that player i is of
type m, that is p(l) = p and p(h) = 1− p.
Lemma B.2. For every message m ∈ {l, h}, let mc := {k ∈ {l, h}|k 6= m}, and fix some
feasible G and zi ≥ 0 for every i. Then there exists an ex-post feasible Xi that implements
zi if and only if the following constraints are satisfied:
• ∀{m,n} ∈ {h, l}2 :
p(m)zi(m) + p(n)z−i(n) ≤ (EPI)
1− Pr(Γ)− (1− γ(mc, nc))p(mc)p(nc)
• ∀m ∈ {h, l} and i = 1, 2:
zi(m) ≤ 1− γi(m) (IF )
Moreover, if γi(l) ≥ γi(h) then zi(l) ≤ 1− γi(l) and (IC li) imply equation (IF ).
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Note that a necessary condition for individual feasibility (IF ) is that it holds in ex-
pectations, that is the weighted sum of settlement values cannot exceed the proba-
bility of successful ADR,∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
m∈{l,h}
p(m)zi(m) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ). (AF )
The High-Cost’s IC and the Low-Cost’s PC bind. Next, we eliminate all settle-
ment values with help of the following lemma stating that in the optimal mecha-
nism the high-cost type’s incentive constraint and the low-cost type’s participation
constraint bind for both players.
Lemma B.3. It is without loss of generality to assume that (IChi ) and (PC li) hold with
equality in the optimal mechanism.
The result is a direct consequence of the different costs. High-cost types care more
about settlement than about breakdown. Thus, incentive compatibility requires
a large value of settlement, zi(h), for them. However, there is no reason for the
mediator to set zi(h) too high, as the h-type would never veto ADR. We can express
(IChi ) as
zi(h) + γi(h)Ui(h|h) ≥ zi(l) + γi(l)Ui(h|l). (IChi )
If this inequality is strict, the mediator can reduce the value of settlement, zi(h),
without affecting the breakdown probability Pr(Γ) or any of the other constraints.
Similarly the mediator can reduce the value of settlement, zi(l), if l-types’ partic-
ipation constraint is not binding, as any negative effect on l-types incentive con-
straint (IC li) is of second order compared to the positive effect on h-types incentive
constraint, (IChi ). By readjusting the settlement value for h-types, zi(h), incentive
compatibility for both types can always be guaranteed. The l-types participation
constraint is
zi(l) + γi(l)Ui(l|l) ≥ V (l). (PC li)
Using (PC li), (IChi ) and Lemma B.3 we can eliminate all settlement values, zi, and
express the result only in terms of breakdown valuations, γi(m)Ui(k|m).
Breakdown Probabilities and Beliefs. Breakdown beliefs pi(l|k) are a result of
breakdown probabilities. The belief that player 1 is type l, given 2 reported m is
p1(l|m) = pγ(l,m)
pγ(l,m) + (1− p)γ(h,m) .
Observation B.1. Any pi(l|m) is homogeneous of degree 0 in G.
Thus, any set of beliefs pi(k|m) induced by some G is induced by G′ = αG, too.
Lemma B.4. Fix any feasible G with 1 ≥ γ(l, h), γ(h, l), γ(l, l) ≥ 0 and define
qi(m) :=
p
1− p
1− pi(l|m)
pi(l|m) .
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Then the induced information structure P > 0 satisfies:
γ(h, l) = q1(l)γ(l, l) ≤ 1 γ(l, h) = q2(l)γ(l, l) ≤ 1; (C)
γ(h, h) = q2(h)q1(l)γ(l, l) ≤ 1 q2(h)q1(l) = q1(h)q2(l),
where the last equation ensures consistency with the prior. Conversely, for any γ(l, l) ∈
(0, 1] and P > 0 satisfying (C) there exists a feasible G.
The Fully Reduced Problem. By Lemma B.4 all breakdown probabilities are lin-
ear in γ(l, l). If we plug all breakdown probabilities into the aggregate feasibility
constraint, (AF ), we get an expression of the form
2V (l)− γ(l, l)Q(P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS of (AF )
≤ 1− γ(l, l)R(P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−Pr(Γ)
, (B.1)
where γ(l, l)Q(P ) := ∑i∑m p(m)zi(m) − 2V (l). Assumption 1 implies Q(P ) ≥
R(P ) and we can reformulate
1 ≥ γ(l, l) ≥ ν
Q(P )−R(P ) =: γ
∗(P ), (AF ′)
with ν = 2V (l) − 1 independent of P . Reducing γ(l, l) reduces Pr(Γ). Thus, con-
straint (AF ′) binds at the optimum, and γ(l, l) = γ∗(P ). Plugging into Pr(Γ), we
get
min
P
R(P )γ∗(P ) (P1’)
subject to the remaining constraints (IC li), (IF ), (EPI) and γ∗(P ) ≤ 1 and any
solution to (P1) is also a solution to (P1′).1
Irrelevance of Signals.
Lemma B.5. It is without loss of generality to assume that the mediator does not release
public signals.
Proof. Suppose we augment the mediator’s protocol by public signals, being re-
leased after the breakdown of mediation. Let S be the set of these signals, with
generic element s. If Γ = 1 denotes the event of breakdown, and Γ = 0 denotes
the event of settlement, then Pr(s,Γ = 1, ci, c−i) is the joint probability that signal
s and the type profile ci, c−i realizes and breakdown occurs. Each realized signal
s gives rise to a system of first-order beliefs, i.e. player’s beliefs about the other
player’s payoff-type. Thus, each such element gives rise to a different play of the
litigation game. Denote by Ui(c|c−i, s, cˆ) type c’s payoff in this game, when having
reported to be cˆ and choosing an optimal strategy and his opponent is of type c−i.
Then, player i type h’s incentive constraint reads:∑
s∈S
∑
c−i
[Pr(s,Γ = 0, cˆi = h, c−i)zi(s, cˆi = h, c−i) + Pr(s,Γ = 1, cˆi = h, c−i)Ui(h|c−i, s, hˆ)]
≥
∑
s∈S
∑
c−i
[Pr(s,Γ = 0, cˆ = l, c−i)zi(s, cˆ = l, c−i) + Pr(s,Γ = 1, cˆi = l, c−i)Ui(h|c−i, s, lˆ)]
1Problem (P1’) is in fact equivalent to problem (P1) whenever P > 0. As every argument is
continuous in P this limitation only becomes relevant once (P1’) has no minimum.
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Let zi(cˆ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
c−i Pr(s,Γ = 0, cˆi, c−i)z(s, cˆ = h, c−i) and note∑
c−i
Pr(s,Γ = 1, cˆi, c−i)Ui(ci|c−i, s, cˆi) = Pr(s,Γ = 1, cˆi)Ui(ci|s, cˆi)
Hence, the incentive constraint becomes:
zi(h)− zi(l) ≥
∑
s∈S
Pr(s,Γ = 1, cˆi = l)Ui(h|s, lˆ)− Pr(s,Γ = 1, cˆi = h)Ui(h|s, hˆ)
Moreover, type l’s participation constraint becomes:
zi(l) +
∑
s∈S
Pr(s,Γ = 1, cˆi = l)Ui(l|s, lˆ) ≥ V (l)
Given those constraints, let us repeat the steps from above. Then, Q(P ) and R(P ),
being defined in equation (B.1), satisfy the following relation:
Q(P )
R(P ) =
∑
i
∑
s∈S
{Pr(s,Γ = 1, l)
R(P ) [Ui(l|s, l)− (1− p)Ui(h|s, l)] +
Pr(s,Γ = 1, h)
R(P ) (1− p)Ui(h|s, h)}
Let us define Hi(l, s) := 1p [Ui(l|s, l) + (Ui(l|s, l) − (1 − p)Ui(h|s, l))] and Hi(h, s) :=
Ui(h|s, h). Then
Q(P )
R(P ) =
∑
i
∑
s∈S
∑
ci
Pr(s,Γ = 1, ci)
R(P ) p(ci)Hi(ci, s)]
Now, observe that by Bayes’ rule Pr(s,Γ=1,ci)R(P ) p(ci) = Pr(s, ci|Γ = 1) = Pr(ci|s,Γ =
1)Pr(s|Γ = 1). Thus:
Q(P )
R(P ) =
∑
i
∑
s∈S
∑
ci
Pr(ci|s,Γ = 1)Pr(s|Γ = 1)Hi(ci, s)
Since Pr(s|Γ = 1) is independent of i and ci we arrive at:
Q(P )
R(P ) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s|Γ = 1)
∑
i
∑
ci
Pr(ci|s,Γ = 1)Hi(ci, s)
First, observe that Q(P )R(P ) is maximized for degenerated signals. Denote by s
∗ the
solution to argmaxs∈S
∑
i
∑
ci Pr(ci|s,Γ = 1)Hi(ci, s). Q(P )R(P ) is therefore maximized
whenever s∗ is released with certainty. Finally note that any P that maximizes Q(P )R(P )
also solves equation (P1’). The objective of the latter problem reads vR(P )R(P )
1
Q(P )
R(P )−1
and is minimized if and only if Q(P )R(P ) is maximized.
Public signals improve the mechanism compared to the optimal solution without
public signals if and only if only one low-cost type’s incentive constraint is binding.
In this case, the mediator can release two public signals s1 and s2, each of which
induce the same posteriors, but with players’ roles reversed. In this way, slack from
one player’s low-types incentive constraint can be used to ease the other player’s
low-types incentive constraint. Besides this, the solution has the same feature as
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the one presented in lemma 3.7. Hence, for finding the optimal solution, we can
focus on the same problem as without public signals, but replace the low cost-
types’ incentive constraints by a pooled version.
B.2 Forces of Asymmetry
We first consider the optimal symmetric mechanism. Notice that the designer of a
symmetric mechanism has only one choice variable ρ˜ := ρ1 = ρ2. In a symmetric
mechanism, Corollary 3.1 holds and any subscripts can be dropped. In combination
with type-independent beliefs we get U(h|h) = U(h|l) = 0. By incentive compat-
ibility, (ICh), settlement values must thus be equal, i.e. z(l)=z(h)=z. Using the
participation constraint, (PC l), the settlement value z can be expressed as
z = V (l)− γ(l)U(l|l).
Ignoring any effect on U(l|l), an increase in ρ˜ increases the settlement-value the
mediator needs to offer. This effect is strengthened as ρ˜ decreases U(l|l). Next,
consider the total resources distributed
2z = 1− Pr(Γ). (AF )
As ρ˜ increases, breakdown decreases and the mediator can distribute more re-
sources in case of settlement.
Combining the two equations yields
2V (l)− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ν
= 2γ(l)U(l|l)− Pr(Γ). (B.2)
Using Corollary 3.2 and (3.2) we can rewrite equation (B.2)
ν =γ(l)
(
(1− ρ˜)(κ− 1)
κ
− p
ρ˜
)
⇔ ν =2 γ(l)p
ρ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Pr(Γ)
((1− ρ˜)ρ˜
p
(κ− 1)
κ
− 1
)
.
Solving for Pr(Γ) yields
Pr(Γ) = ν2
((1− ρ˜)ρ˜
p
(κ− 1)
κ
− 1
)−1
which is minimized for ρ˜ = 1/2. Thus, the optimal symmetric solution to (P1′) is
obtained for breakdown probability ρ˜ = 1/2.
A symmetric mechanism is, however, never optimal. This follows from the differ-
ences in the resources needed to sustain a certain level of either ρi. First, observe
that despite any asymmetry, (ICh2 ) still requires that the settlement value of the
high type z2(h) = z2(l). As U2(h|h) = 0, the breakdown value is 0 and expected
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settlement valuation of player 2 is
z2 := z2(l) = V (l)− γ2(l)U(l|l) = V (l)− (1− ρ2)
ρ1
(κ− 1)
κ
pγ(l, l).
The first equality comes from (PC l2) and second from the results of Corollary 3.2
and the equations in (3.2).
For player 1, on the other hand the results change more substantially under asym-
metry. Player 1h’s incentive constraint is
z1(h) = z1(l) +
(
γ1(l)− γ1(h)
)
U1(h|h). (ICh1 )
As U1(h|h) 6= 0 the mediator pays an information rent to player 1 if γi(l) 6= γi(h).
Thus, the ex-ante expected valuation of player 1 under settlement is
pz1(l)+(1− p)z1(h) = z1(l)+(1− p)
(
γ1(l)− γ1(h)
)
U1(h|h)
= z1(l) + γ1(l)
(
1− p
ρ1
)
U1(h|h) (B.3)
where the first uses (ICh1 ) and the second uses Corollary 3.2 to simplify. Simplify-
ing this using (PC l1), (3.2), and Ui(·, ·) yields
z1 := V (l)−
((1− ρ1)
ρ2
)
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
symmetric part
+
(
p
ρ1
− p
ρ2
)
κ− 1
κ
pγ(l, l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
asymmetric part
.
While the symmetric part is always present, the asymmetric is only non-zero in
asymmetric cases. As ρ1 > ρ2 in such cases the asymmetric part is genereically
negative. Marginal effects on the second part cancel out with those on z2. As the
asymmetric part is additive separable in ρi, the optimum of ρi is independent of
the choice of ρ−i.
B.3 Proofs
B.3.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. The proof is along the lines of Siegel (2014). However, as the proof is instruc-
tive and our setup differs slightly, we spell it out here. We first show that at least
one type of one player has 0 expected utility. Second, we show that at most one
type has an atom at 0. Third, we constructively show that the equilibrium exists
and then show that it is indeed unique given (M ). Then we calculate ∆ to state
Corollary 3.1.
Step 1: One player has 0 expected utility and no atoms at positive scores. We
prove this by contradiction. Suppose that both players and both types expect a util-
ity larger 0. That means the smallest score s > 0 in the union of the best-responses
of all players wins the contest with positive probability as otherwise it is no best
response. As a result, the smallest score is an atom in the strategy of at least one
type of each player. But then, there exists an  in the neighborhood of s such that
the probability of winning increases with more than  ∗ κcl. Deviating to s +  is
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profitable for that type of player, and thus s cannot be an atom in her strategy.
Therefore, at least one player earns an expected utility of 0 for sure. Note that this
player may very well have an atom at 0 as there is no need to win the good with
positive probability for an atom at 0. However, if both players had a type with an
atom at 0 at least one of them can profitably deviate to a positive neighborhood of
0 winning against the atom scoring opponent with a probability that exceeds the
cost of scoring. Thus, at most one player has an atom at 0.
Step 2a: Construct the equilibrium. First, consider the following strategy of player
2l: she uniformly mixes on (∆l,h,∆l,l] with density f2,l(t) = cl/p2(l, l). Then, player
1l is indifferent between playing any point on s ∈ (∆l,h,∆l,l] as
U1(l, s) = F2(∆l,h) + p2(l|l)(s−∆l,h) cl
p2(l|l) − cls =
= F2(∆l,h)−∆l,hcl.
We want to construct strategies with constant density and non-overlapping strate-
gies, thus the length of the top interval L(t) is the solution to
L(t)f2,l(t) = 1.
To make player 2l indifferent as well, player 1l plays a similar strategy only flipping
the probabilities from p1 to p2. As we assumed p1(l|l) ≥ p2(l|l), the mass of player
1l is only fully exhausted on the top interval iff p1(l|l) = p2(l|l). If this is not the
case, player 1 has some mass left to place. She does so on the middle interval
(∆h,h,∆l,h]. For the same reasons as above, she assigns density f1,l(t) = cl/p1(l|h)
to this interval to make player 1h indifferent.
The length of the medium interval can be calculated by acknowledging that player
1l needs to place all mass available to her and not placed on the top interval on this
interval.
By a similar exercise we can find the length of the interval (0,∆h,h) and by this the
absolute values of all ∆.
Step 2b: Show that no (global) deviation is possible. What remains to be shown is
that any player that scoring on more than one interval is in fact indifferent between
those and that no global deviation is possible.
Note that the indifference across intervals follows from the intervals being con-
nected. Consider for example player 1l. From the above we know that
U1(l, s = ∆l,h) = U1(l, s = ∆l,l)
but also that
U1(l, s = ∆h,h) = U1(l, s = ∆l,h).
Thus, it must be the case that
U1(l, s = ∆h,h) = U1(l, s = ∆l,l).
The same holds true for player 2h. The two other player-type tuples place there
scores on a single interval only. Note that, since player 1h has positive mass only
on (0,∆h,h] it can in fact earn an expected utility greater 0 if and only if player 2h
does not enter the auction with positive probability.
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To exclude global deviation observe that player 2h would only deviate to anything
on the interval (∆l,h,∆l,l] if the probability of winning increases faster in the top
interval than in the middle interval, that is the density is smaller in the top interval,
f1,l(m) =
cl
p1(l|l) ≥
κcl
p1(l|h) = f1,l(t),
which is ruled out by (M ).
For 1h, the deviation could be made into the middle or the top interval if
κcl
p2(h|h) ≥
cl
p2(h|l) ,
which again is ruled out by monotonicity. As player 1h prefers the bottom interval
to anything in the m she must prefer scoring at ∆l,l to ∆h,l. However as player 2h
does not prefer to score at ∆l,l it follows that ∆l,l > 1/κcl. Thus player 1h does not
want to deviate. Similar arguments hold for the second player, such that we can
conclude that global deviations are not beneficial.
Step 3: Uniqueness. For uniqueness observe first that there is only one monotonic
equilibrium, that is an equilibrium such that the lowest score of player i, type l, is
weakly above the highest score of player i, type h. This follows directly from the
equilibrium construction.
Second, we need to show that no non-monotonic equilibrium exists. We do so by
contradiction, that is suppose there exists a score shi > s
l
i such that s
k
i is in the set of
best responses for player i type k, BR(k). Then, it must hold that
Ui(h, s = shi ) ≥ Ui(h, s = sli)
⇔
∑
k
pi(k|h)F−i,k(shi )− κclshi ≥
∑
k
pi(k|h)F−i,k(sli)− κclsli
⇔
∑
k
pi(k|h)(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,k(sli)) ≥ κcl(shi − sli). (B.4)
Similarly, as sli is a best response for l it must hold that∑
k
pi(k|l)(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,k(sli)) ≤ cl(shi − sli). (B.5)
But, as F−i,k(·) is always positive and pi(h|·) = 1 − pi(l|·), inequalities (B.4) and
(B.5) only hold if
pi(l|h)
κcl
∑
k
(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,h(sli)) ≥
pi(l|l)
cL
∑
k
(F−i,k(shi )− F−i,h(sli)).
As the sum is identical on both sides, this boils down to the inverse of (M ), a con-
tradiction.
(Addendum) Step 4: Equilibrium expected utilities. The length of the top interval,
(∆l,h,∆l,l], is p2(l|l)/cl that of the bottom interval, (0,∆h,h), is p1(h|h)/κcl and that
of the middle interval (∆h,h,∆l,h] is
p1(l|h)
κcl
(1− f1,l(t)
f2,l(t)
) = p1(l|h)
κcl
(1− p2(l|l)
p1(l|l)).
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Putting the respective probability masses on the different intervals leaves player 2
with some mass µ ≥ 0. This is placed on scoring 0 and constitutes F2,h(0).
Notice that scoring ∆l,l wins the auction for sure at cost of ∆l,lcl for both players,
type l, and player 1 scoring (arbitrarily close) to 0 wins the auction with probability
F2,h(0) at almost no cost.
B.3.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. First, consider player 2h. She earns an expected utility of 0 on-path. Post-
deviation she can always choose a score of 0 to secure this utility.
Second, consider player il. Independently of her report she can always choose
a score ∆l,l and win with probability 1. As this is also part of the best response
on-path and the probability is 1 in that case as well, she can only be better of by
choosing a score different than ∆l,l.
Finally consider player 1h after reporting to be type l. She holds belief p2(h|l) while
her opponent plays the equilibrium strategies. If she were to score 0, then by our
tie-braking assumption she would enjoy a utility at least as good as the equilibrium
utility if p2(h|l) ≥ p2(h|h). Thus, in those cases she is weakly better of.
If, however, p2(h|l) < p2(h|h) then player 1 suffers whenever scoring against an h-
type compared to the on-path game as the probability of winning decreases while
costs stay the same. However, scoring against the low-cost type and at the same
time earning a higher expected utility than in the default game can, by the constant
density of player 2’s low-cost type on the support of her equilibrium strategy, only
mean scoring to the very top, that is ∆l,l which yields negative utility to a high type
by the construction of the equilibrium.
B.3.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. First, notice that player il benefits if and only if p−i(l|l) > p−i(l|h). The if part
follows directly from the density of the opposing player on the top interval which
is f−i,l(t) = cl/p−i(l|l). As p−i(l|h) is smaller than this, scoring at ∆l,h is strictly
preferred to ∆l,l, but ∆l,l yields the same result as the on-path game.
The only-if party follows as for p−i(l|l) = p−i(l|h) would induce type independent
beliefs and therefore the same result as the on-path game. For p−i(l|l) < p−i(l|h),
however, scoring at the top, i.e. ∆l,l is preferred leading to no changes in expected
utilities at all.
As p−i(l|l) < p−i(l|h) implies p−i(h|h) < p−i(h|l) we know that player 1, type
h is better off, as scoring 0 yields him already a higher payoff by p2(h|l)F2,h(0) >
p2(h|h)F2,h(0). Player 2 strictly prefers to score at ∆h,h compared to 0 as the density
of her opponent is given by f1,l(b) = cl/p1(h|h) which leads to a (strictly) increasing
utility on the bottom interval. Thus scoring at ∆h,h must yield strictly positive
utility.
The only setup in which neither party has a type that strictly profits from deviating
is that of type-independent beliefs.
B.3.4 Proof of Proposition 3.1 (together with lemmas B.1 to B.4)
The proof of the proposition is along the lines described in appendix B.1.
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Proof of Lemma B.1
Proof. We show that the condition stated on the optimality of full participation
stated in Proposition 2 of Celik and Peters (2011) is satisfied. That is, given the
independent prior p, there is no Bayes’ plausible belief structure p˜ = (p, p) such
that the expected utility Ui(k, p˜, p) < Ui(k, p, p) for any type k. The condition is a
direct consequence of expected contest utilities under a type-independent prior as
defined in Corollary 3.1. For type independent priors utilities are in fact linear in
beliefs except for a kink at the point where utilities become flat. However, around
that point utilities are convex and Jensen’s inequality yields the desired result.
Proof of Lemma B.2
Proof. We apply theorem 3 of Border (2007) which says the following:
Border (2007), Theorem 3: The list P= (P1, ..., PN ) of functions is the
reduced form of a general auction p= (p1, ....pn) if and only if for every
subset A ⊂ T of individual-type pairs (i, τ) we have∑
(i,τ)∈A
Pi(τ)µ•(τ) ≤ ({t ∈ T : ∃(i, τ) ∈ A, ti = τ}).
An individual type pair in our setting is given by (m, i), in what follows we are
going to abuse notation slightly by treating p(m) such that p(l) = p and p(h) = 1−p.
The general auction p in our setup is defined by a list
qi(m,n) := xi(m,n).
We want to implement p by the list P containing
Qi(m) := qi(m, l)µi(l|m) + qi(m,h)µi(h|m)
where
µi(n|m) := µ(m,n)
µ•i (m)
,
µ(m,n) := p(l)p(m)1− γ(m,n)1− Pr(Γ) ,
µ•i (m) := p(m)
1− γi(m)
1− Pr(Γ) .
Plugging in yields,
Qi(m) =
p(l)(1− γ(m, l))xi(m, l) + p(h)(1− γ(m,h))xi(m,h)
1− γi(m) = xi(m).
To state the conditions let in addition
mc :=
{
y ∈ {l, h}|y 6= m}.
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Applying the above quoted theorem of Border (2007) to this and reformulating
everything in terms of zi allows us to conclude that X can be implemented via
zi ≥ 0 if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
• ∀{m,n} ∈ {h, l}:
p(m)zi(m) + p(n)z−i(n) ≤ (EPI)
1− Pr(Γ)− (1− γ(mc, nc))p(mc)p(nc)
• ∀m ∈ {h, l} and i = 1, 2:
zi(m) ≤ 1− γi(n) (IF )
• ∀i = 1, 2
zi(l)p(l) + zi(h)p(h) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ) (BC2)∑
i∈{1,2}
∑
k∈{l,k}
p(k)zi(k) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ) (AF )
• ∀{m,n} ∈ {h, l}2 and i = 1, 2:∑
k∈{l,h}
pi(k)zi(k) + pz−i(n) ≤ 1− Pr(Γ). (BC4)
Note that in our setup equation (IF ) implies (BC2) and equation (AF ) which im-
plies (BC4). For the second claim, recall (IC li), that is
γi(h)Ui(h|l) + zi(h) ≤ γi(l)Ui(l|l) + zi(l).
Hence,
zi(h) ≤ γi(l)Ui(l|l)− γi(h)Ui(l|h) + zi(l) ≤ (γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(l|l) + zi(l), (B.6)
where the last equality follows from Lemma 3.2.
If γi(l) ≥ γi(h) and zi(l) ≤ 1− γi(l) we can rewrite (B.6) to
zi(h) ≤ (γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(l|l) + zi(l) ≤ 1− γi(h),
which indeed is equation (IF ).
Proof of Lemma B.3
Proof. We proof this by contradiction. Suppose there exists a feasible X that forms
an optimal mediation protocol without (IChi ) binding for some i. That is, without
loss of generality assume that for player 1 it holds that
z1(h)− z1(l) > γ1(h)U1(h|h)− γ1(l)U1(h|l).
Recall that
z1(h) = p(1− γ(h, l))x1(h, l) + (1− p)γ(h, h)x1(h, h),
but then if X was feasible before, it remains feasible if we reduce x1(h, l) such that
(ICh1 ) holds with equality. Changing this has no effect on the right hand side of the
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inequality and (IC li) gets relaxed as it is
z1(h)− z1(l) ≤ γ1(h)U1(l|h)− γ1(l)U1(l|l)
Similarly, suppose (PC li) is not binding, then
zi(l) > Vi(l)− γi(l)Ui(l|l).
Provided that zi(l) > 0 the mediator could react, by changing zi(l) such that the
participation constraint is binding. Then, she can reduce z1(h) such that the high-
cost types incentive constraint is binding which leads to anotherX with both (PC li)
and (IChi ) binding that is feasible and delivers the same value to the objective.
If zi(l) = 0, this procedure is not possible, but then the mediator could use the ho-
mogeneity of degree 1 of γi(k) and the homogeneity of degree 0 w.r.t. G to satisfy
(PC li) by multiplying all elements of G by α < 1. Again, if zi(h) > 0 the increase in
in zi(h) can always be off-set by reducing Xi appropriately which is always possi-
ble. If zi(h) is indeed 0, then multiplyingG by α has if at all only a positive effect on
incentive compatibility. Thus, it is without loss of generality to assume that (PC li)
holds indeed.
Proof of Lemma B.4
Proof. Recall that the elements of P can be rewritten such that e.g. the probability
of meeting player 1l, given a report m2 = l is
p1(l|l) = pγ(l, l)
pγ(l, l) + (1− p)γ(h, l) . (B.7)
As p1(l|l) > 0 which is guaranteed by γ(l, l) > 0 the probability representation for
γ(h, l) follows immediately, that is
γ(h, l) = 1− p1(l|l)
p1(l|l)
p
1− pγ(l, l).
Repeating the same exercise for any γ(k,m) yields the desired representation.
The last equation of (C) can be obtained noticing that given we have established all
other results from (C) and using the homogeneity of degree 0 of P w.r.t G we can
rewrite G as
G = γ(l, l)G′ = γ(l, l)
(
1 q2(l)
q1(l) q2(h)q1(l)
)
.
We know that G′ induces the same P as G in particular we know that
p1(l|h) = pγ(h, l)
pγ(h, l) + (1− p)γ(h, h) =
pq2(l)
pq2(l) + (1− p)q2(h)q1(l)
which after rearranging yields the desired
q1(l)q2(h) = q1(h)q2(l). (C)
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As all we have done have been rearrangements, the converse holds as well, that is,
for a given P and γ(l, l) > 0 that satisfy equation (C) we can establish a feasible G
such that P and γ(l, l) is induced by G.
B.3.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1 (together with Lemmas 3.4 to 3.7)
We proof the proposition in several steps. In line with the text, we first solve the
“unconstrained problem” (P1′) which is also the proof of Lemma 3.5.2 After that
we introduce (IC li) and proof Lemma 3.6 before finally introducing the remaining
constraints with the proof of Lemma 3.7. Throughout this proof we make use of
the following lemma
Lemma B.6. At any optimum of (P1′), the monotonicity condition (M ) is always satisfied.
The proof of this lemma can be found at the end of the appendix as it is neither
constructive nor relevant to understand the main argument. However, with help
of this lemma, we can restrict the choice set of the mediator to the set of induced
beliefs that result in monotonic equilibria as discussed in Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. Rewrite p2(l|h) with help of Lemma B.4
p2(l|h) =
(
1− p1(l|l)
)
p2(l|l)p1(l|h)
p2(l|l)p1(l|h)− p1(l|l)
(
1− p2(l|l)− p1(l|h)
) . (B.8)
p2(l|h) > p2(l|l) if equation (B.8) divided by p2(l|l) is larger 1 that is
p2(l|h)
p2(l|l) = (1− p1(l|l))
p1(l|h)
p2(l|l)p1(l|h)− p1(l|l)
(
1− p2(l|l)− p1(l|h)
) > 1.
Rewriting yields,
(1− p1(l|l))p1(l|h) > p2(l|l)p1(l|h)− p1(l|l)(1− p2(l|l)− p1(l|h))
⇔ p1(l|h)− p1(l|l) > (p1(l|h)− p1(l|l))p2(l|l),
which holds if and only if p1(l|h) > p1(l|l).
Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. Notice that the unconstrained problem is (P1′) is a problem of three elements
P = (p1(l|l), p2(l|l), p1(l|h) only, as the fourth is directly defined via consistency
equation (C). We calculate the unconstrained optimum in several steps. First, we
show that at the optimum the objective is not differentiable with respect to at least
one of the three choices variables. Second, we show that if p1(l|l) is either p1(l|h)
or p2(l|l)m then it is p1(l|l) = p1(l|h) and calculate this optimum. Finally, we show
that a deviation to p1(l|l) = 1 is not optimal.
2Recall that “unconstrained” refers to (P1′) which includes all constraints that bind at all points
already in the problem definition.
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Step 1: No optimum in the differentiable interior exists. To proof this claim we
are going to proof that the objective Obj(P ) := R(P )v/(Q(P ) − R(P )) is locally
concave at any critical point in p1(l|l) in what we call the “differentiable interior”,
meaning that such a critical point is in fact a local maximum in p1(l|l), which is
sufficient to proof the claim. Let us begin with defining the differentiable interior.
Definition B.1 (Differentiable Interior). The differentiable interior of problem (P1’)
is the set of all P such that for each 1 > p(k|m) > 0 the left-derivative and the
right-derivative of Obj(P ) with respect to all variables coincides.
Next, for the ease of notation define ρ = (ρ1(l), ρ2(l), ρ1(h)) :=
(
p∗1(l|l), p∗2(l|l), p∗1(l|h)
)
Step 1a: Transform R(P ) and Q(P ).
Observe that
R(P ) = Pr(Γ)
γ(l, l) =
p2
ρ1(l)ρ2(l)ρ1(h)
(ρ1(l)(1− ρ2(l)) + ρ2(l)ρ1(h)) .
Defining the function
Y˜ := Y ∗ ρ1(l)ρ2(l)ρ1(h)
p2
allows us to rewrite (dropping the argument to simplify notation)
Obj = R˜v
Q˜− R˜ .
Notice that R˜ is linear in any variable of ρ. Step 1b: Define necessary conditions
for an optimal interior point. Suppose (P1′) has indeed an optimal point in the
differentiable interior. Then a necessary condition on this point is that it is indeed
a critical point in all three variables, that is
Obj′(ρ) := ∂Obj(ρ)
∂ρ
= ν
(Q˜(ρ)− R˜(ρ))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f(ρ)
(
R˜′(ρ)Q˜(ρ)− Q˜′(ρ)R˜(ρ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(ρ)
= 0 (FOC)
for every ρ ∈ ρ. Noticing that f(ρ) 6= 0 for any ρ by definition, the necessary first
order condition boils down to g(ρ) = 0. Another necessary condition for a local
minimum is that any critical point in any ρ is not locally concave in this variable.
If it was locally concave in any ρ this means that we are at a local maximum in this
variable ρ and that the second order conditions for a minimum are never fulfilled.
Formally, this means that at any critical point ρcp it needs to hold that
Obj′′(ρcp) = f ′(ρcp)g(ρcp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by equation (FOC)
+f(ρcp)g′(ρcp) ≥ 0 (B.9)
for every ρcp ∈ ρcp. The first term is 0 by the standard envelope argument, such
that (B.9) boils down to
Obj′′(ρcp) = f(ρcp)g′(ρcp) = f(ρcp)
(
R˜′′(ρcp)Q˜(ρcp)− R˜(ρcp)Q˜′′(ρcp)
)
≥ 0.
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By the linearity of R˜ and the observation that R˜ ≥ 0 by construction, a necessary
and sufficient condition for (B.9) to hold is simply
Q˜′′(ρcp) ≤ 0 (B.10)
for every ρcp ∈ ρcp. Step 1c: Show that the necessary conditions never hold for
ρ1(l). To complete the claim of step 1 we are now going to show, that Q˜(ρ1(l)) is
indeed a convex function.
To see this observe first by plugging in we can reduce γi(l) = γ(l, l)p/ρ−i(l) which
in turn means that while γ˜2(l) is constant in ρ1(l), γ˜1(l) is linearly increasing in ρ1(l).
In addition, we do not need to worry about γ2(h) as player 2h has no expected
utility by Corollary 3.1. Further we can rewrite using Corollary 3.1 and Lemma B.4
γ˜1(h)U1(h|h) = γ(l, l)1− p (1− ρ1(h))ρ1(h) (ρ1(l)− ρ2(l))
(κ− 1)
κ
which is linearly increasing in ρ1(l) and positive. Rewriting yields
γ(l, l)Q˜ =
∑
i
γ˜i(l) (Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)) + γ˜1(h)(1− p)U1(h|h)
it suffices to show that
hi(ρ1(l)) = γ˜i(l)
(
Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)
)
is convex for every i.
For h2, observe that by Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, player 2h only gains from deviating if
ρ1(h) > ρ1(l) . In such a case player 2h, best post-deviation strategy is to play ∆h,h
with probability 1, which yields utility
U2(h|l) = p1(h|l)−∆h,hκcl. (B.11)
Bidding the same on-path is in the best response set of player 2 yielding
U2(h|h) = p1(h|h)−∆h,hκcl = 0. (B.12)
Subtracting equation (B.12) from equation (B.11) yields
p1(h|l)− p1(h|h) = ρ1(h)− ρ1(l) = U2(h|l) (B.13)
and thus U2(h|l) is linear in ρ1(l). As γ˜2(l) is constant in ρ1(l), h2(ρ1(l)) is convex
if and only if U2(l|l) is convex in ρ1(l) which can easily be verified by the utilities
derived in (U). The last step is now to show that h1(ρ1(l)) is convex as well.
To see this, observe first that whenever deviation is profitable for player 1, type h,
she would deviate by playing ∆h,h. But, ∆h,h is in fact the lower bound of player
1, type l and thus in such a case we can rewrite
U1
(
h|l, p2(h|l) > p2(h|h)
)
= U1(l|l) + (1− κ)cl∆h,h.
As γ˜1(l) = ρ1(l)ρ1(h)p we can use the expression derived in Corollary 3.1 to estab-
lish that γ˜1(l)U1(l|l) is linear in ρ1(l) and thus convex.
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What remains is to show that −ρ1(l)∆h,h is weakly convex. This can be established
using that ∆h,h = p1(h|h)/κcl which is independent of ρ1(l) which proofs the claim.
Step 2: ρ1(l) ∈ {ρ2(l), ρ1(h)}.
By assumption ρ1(l) ≤ ρ2(l) is ruled out. Second, fix some ρ2(l) and ρ1(h). If
ρ1(l) ∈ [ρ2(l), ρ1(h)] then Obj(ρ1(l) = 1) > Obj(ρ1(l) = ρ1(h)). Further we know
that Obj is continuously differentiable on ρ1(l) ∈ (max{ρ2(l), ρ1(l)}, 1). By Step 1
we know that every interior point is a maximum in ρ1(l).
Next, notice by Lemma 3.4 that for ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) ⇒ ρ2(l) > ρ2(h) ⇒ pi(h|h) >
pi(h|l)⇒ U2(h|l) = 0 and U1(h|l) < U1(h|h).
Now, notice that ρ1(l) = 1 can only be optimal if Obj is (LHS-)decreasing at ρ1(l) =
1 as there cannot be a local minimum in ρ1(l) by Step 1. To check this it suffices to
look at the sign determining function of the derivative which is, by Step 1, R′Q −
Q′R. Solving this for ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) yields a quadratic function in ρ1(l).
The sign-determining function at ρ1(l) = 1 is quadratic in ρ1(h), i.e. a condition
aρ1(h)2 + bρ1(h) + c < 0 (B.14)
where
a = (κ− 1 + ρ2(l)2) (B.15)
b = 1 + 2ρ2(l)− 2
(
ρ2(l)
)2 + p(1− κ) (B.16)
c =
(
ρ2(l)
)2
κ− ρ2(l)
(
(κ− 1)(1− p) + κ)+ (κ− 1)(1− p). (B.17)
Note first, that (B.14) is decreasing in ρ2(l), second note that for ρ2(l) = ρ1(h) con-
dition (B.14) becomes
(κ− 1)(1− p− 2ρ1(h))+ (ρ1(h))4 − 2(ρ1(h))3 + (ρ1(h))2(1 + 2κ) < 0. (B.18)
Note that this is minimal if κ is minimal and p is maximal. Therefore, it must hold
that
1/2 + ρ1(h))2
(
(ρ1(h))2 − 2ρ1(h) + 5
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>4
−2ρ1(h)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/4
< 0,
a contradiction. Thus, whenever ρ1(h) ≥ ρ2(l), choosing ρ1(l) = 1 is not preferred
to ρ1(l) = ρ1(h). Solving the first order conditions given ρ1(l) = 1 for 0 < ρ1(h) <
ρ2(l) yields that no critical point in both variables exists and therefore no interior
solution. As Obj is decreasing at ρ2(h) = 0, there cannot be any solution with
ρ1(l) = 1. Thus, ρ1(l) must either be equal to ρ1(h) or to ρ2(l).
Step 3: Calculate the optimum if ρ1(l) ∈ {ρ2(l), ρ1(h)}. By Step 1, we know that if
ρ1(l) ∈ [ρ2(l), ρ1(h)] the optimum involves ρ1 being equal to either of the bounds.
Therefore, we only need to consider the two cases for any ρ2(l) and ρ1(h).
Step 3a: The equilibrium for ρ1(l) = ρ2(l). First, consider ρ(l) = ρ1(l) = ρ2(l). By
Lemma B.4, ρ1(h) = ρ2(h) = ρ(h).
All payoffs are symmetric and, by Corollary 3.1, Ui(h|h) = 0 and, by Lemma 3.2,
Ui(h|l) = max{0, ρ(h)− ρ(l)). Finally, Ui(l|l) = (κ− 1)/κ+ (ρ(h)− ρ(l)κ)/κ.
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In addition, γ1(l) = γ1(h) = γ2(l) = p/ρ(l) and therefore
Q˜ = 2ρ(l)ρ(h)
p
(Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)).
Finally, as R˜ = ρ(l)(1− ρ(l) + ρ(h)) we can simplify Obj to
Obj(ρ(l), ρ(h)) = p(1− ρ(l) + ρ(h))2ρ(h)(Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Qˆ
− p(1− ρ(l) + ρ(h))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Rˆ
.
Employing the same technique as in Step 1, we know, as Rˆ is linear in both ρ(k)
any interior solution needs to have that Qˆ is concave in ρ(k).
Notice that the second derivative of Qˆwhen Ui(h|l) = 0 boils down to 4/κ as Ui(l|l)
is linearly increasing with factor 1/κ in ρ(h). Thus, any solution with ρ(l) ≥ ρ(h)
can be ruled out.
Second whenever ρ(l) < ρ(h) observe that Qˆ is linearly decreasing in ρ(l) with
factor 2ρ(h)p. Hence, the sign determining function of the first derivative Rˆ′Qˆ−Qˆ′Rˆ
becomes
Rˆ′(ρ(l))Qˆ− Qˆ′((ˆl))Rˆ|ρ(l)<ρ(h) = −2ρ(h)p
((
Ui(l|l)− (1− p)Ui(h|l)
)− Rˆ). (B.19)
Note that by construction Obj defines a probability and is thus in [0, 1]. Whenever
equation (B.19)=0, then Qˆ−Rˆ = (2ρ(h)p−1)Rˆwhich can only be positive if 2ρ(h)p =
1. As p < 1/2 this condition never holds. Therefore, we do not find an interior
solution when ρ(h) > ρ(l).
What remains are then boundary solutions with either of the ρ(k) ∈ {0, 1}.
If ρ(h) = 1 we need to go back to the original Q and R as our modifications are not
valid if ρi(k) 6= (0, 1).
This is for ρ(h) = 1
R = p2 2− ρ(l)
ρ(l)
Q = p2 2(1− ρ(l))
ρ(l) ,
which obviously violates Q > R and is thus not feasible. ρ(l) = 0 would violate
monotonicity and is ruled out by Lemma B.6.
Step 3b: The equilibrium for ρ1(l) = ρ1(h). It remains to show that an equilibrium
exists in which ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) = ρ1. Note that again by consistency in Lemma B.4
we get ρ2 = ρ2(l) = ρ2(h).
With this, we know that Ui(k|m) = Ui(k|k) for every i and k and U2(h|l) = 0,
Ui(l|l) = (1 − ρ2)κ−1κ , and U1(h|h) = U1(h|l) = (ρ1 − ρ2)κ−1κ . As γ˜i(l) = p/ρ−i we
get
Q˜ = 1
κp
ρ1(κ− 1)
(
(ρ1)2 − ρ1(1 + p)− ρ2(1− ρ2 − p)
)
and
R˜ = ρ1.
148 Appendix B. Appendix Chapter 3
Note that this means that for an optimum in ρ1 we need Q˜ = ρ1Q˜′(ρ1) and for an
optimum in ρ2 we would need Q˜′(ρ2) = 0.
Notice that
Q˜′(ρ2) =
ρ1(κ− 1)
κp
(1− p− 2ρ2)
⇒ ρ1Q˜′(ρ1)− Q˜ = (ρ1)
2(κ− 1)
κp
, (1 + p− 2ρ1)
and thus we arrive at the desired results. Checking second order conditions in each
variable yield that the function is convex in both arguments. As cross derivatives
are 0 at the optimum, the critical point is a minimum by the second order derivative
test.
Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof. Step 1: The unconstrained optimum satisfies (IC li) for p ≤ 1/3. AsUi(l|h) =
Ui(l|l) by Lemma 3.3 and with the help of Lemma B.3 stating that (IChi ) binds, we
can rewrite (IC li)
(γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(l|l) ≥ (γi(l)− γi(h))Ui(h|h). (B.20)
As Ui(l|l) ≥ Ui(l|h) by construction this holds if and only if (γi(l)− γi(h)) > 0.
Calculating the difference yields
γi(l)− γi(h) = p
ρ−i
ρi − p
1− p (B.21)
which is positive if and only if ρi ≥ p.
Recall from Lemma 3.5 that the optimal unconstrained ρ2 = 1−p2 which is larger p
if and only if p < 1/3.
Step 2: Describe the equilibrium including (IC li) for p > 1/3.
Step 2a: No solution with ρ1(l) > ρ1(h). First, we show that we do not want to
deviate to any ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) for p > 1/3. To do so, consider (IC l2). By Lemma 3.3
the RHS remains at 0, and U2(l|h) > U2(l|l). Thus, for (IC l2) to hold we would
still need that γ2(l) ≥ γ2(h). However, then also ˜γ2(l)− ˜γ2(h) needs to be positive.
Plugging in and simplifying, we find that
γ˜2(l)− γ˜2(h) = ρ1(h)ρ2(l)(1− p)− ρ1(l)p2(1− ρ2(l)) (B.22)
which is decreasing in ρ1(l). Hence, no deviation to ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) is profitable
since whenever IC holds for this deviation, it also holds for ρi(l) = ρi(h) which is
preferred by Lemma 3.5.
Step 2b: The proposed solution is indeed an optimum. Next, we need to show
that also no deviation to ρ1(l) < ρ1(h) is optimal. For this we use a guess and
verify approach to show that the proposed equilibrium with ρ2 = p is indeed an
optimum.
To do this, this solution needs to satisfy the first order conditions of the Lagrangian
at the proposed point. As we know from Step 2a we do not need to consider ρ1(l) >
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ρ1(h). Define g(ρ) ≤ 0 to be the incentive constraint, reformulated such that if
g ≤ 0, (IC l2) holds.3 The Lagrangian is given by
L(λ, µ,ρ) = Obj(ρ) + λgρ) + µ(ρ1(l)− ρ1(h)). (B.23)
Any solution to the constrained minimization problem ρ∗ must be such that it
solves the following problem
minL(·) (B.24)
and
λ, µ ≥ 0. (B.25)
It turns out that the proposed solution is such a point and further L is strictly con-
cave at this point, thus the problem is indeed locally minimized at ρ∗.
Step 2c: Show that no other solution exists. It is not clear whether the problem is
also globally minimized at this point, as both the objective as well as the constraint
do not satisfy the usual assumption needed for global optimality, in particular they
are not globally convex. However, fixing k we know the following two aspects:
(a) at p = 1/3 the solution is the same as the “unconstrained” optimum consid-
ered in Lemma B.3. For p > 1/3 the solution is worse than the unconstrained
optimum,
(b) as all functions are continuous in p the functional value and thus the equilib-
rium value must be continuous in p.
This means that if another solution (strictly better than the candidate) exists for
some pˆ > 1/3 then there also must exist some pˇ ∈ [1/3, pˆ] such that the equilibrium
values ρˆ of pˆ as a function of p yield the same outcome as the proposed equilibrium.
Further, as L is strictly convex at the proposed optimum, this alternative value ρˆ
must be bounded away in at least one of its variables.
Suppose the other optimal point is at some ρi(k) not in the neighborhood of ρ∗i .
Then by continuity, the mean value theorem, and the strict convexity of L at the
proposed point this point can only be optimal if the derivative of Obj w.r.t. ρi(k) is
0 at some point on (ρi(k), ρ∗i ).
As ρ1(l) has no extreme value on the interval (ρ2(l), ρ1(h)) by Step 1 in appendix B.3.5,
ρ1(l) must be the same in both optima.
But then, if ρ1(l) is constant, ρ1(h) is increasing on (a, 1). Then again ρ1(h) = 1
cannot be optimal. Thus, no other minimum exists and our proposed minimum is
the only and therefore global minimum.
Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof. Finally, introducing γ(l, l) ≤ 1 to the problem it is straightforward to com-
pute that the constraint has slack for any p ≥ 1/3.
Also, by computing ν/(Q(P )−R(P )) one can verify that it holds at ρ∗1, ρ∗2 whenever
k ≤ 2− 4p− 2p
2
1− 4p+ 3p2 .
3As ρ1 ≥ p at the imposed constrained optimum, we do not worry about (ICl1) which always has
slack.
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Further, if the constraint γ(l, l) ≤ 1 binds, we can use Lemma B.4 to see that
γ(l, h), γ(h, l) ≤ 1 if and only if ρi(l) ≥ p.
We know that at the unconstrained optimum with ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) and thus, we have
a boundary solution in those variables for a given ρ2(l). However, the solution with
respect to ρ2(l) is such that Obj′(ρ2(l)) = 0.
In addition we know by strict concavity that in fact the regime change happening
at ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) (from high-cost types having a beneficial deviation payoff to low
cost types having one), must be such that around the unconstrained optimum we
would not change the equation ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) as this would either provide us with a
free lunch lowering ρ1(h) to put slack on γ(l, l) ≤ 1. Then, as we change the regime
to ρ1(l) > ρ1(h) it must be that Obj′(ρ1(l)) > 0 as we started at the optimum. Thus,
we could lower ρ1(l) at no cost on the constraint to ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) as the constraint
can be rewritten as
ν/(Q(P )−R(P ))− 1 = Obj −R ≤ 0,
and R|ρ1(l)=ρ1(h) = p2/ρ1(l)ρ2(l).
As ρ1(l) = ρ1(h) remains to hold the problem
min
ρ1,ρ2
Obj
s.t. ρ2 ≥ p and γ(l, l) ≤ 1 is well-behaved such that we get the desired solution of
the lemma.
Finally, plugging the solution for every regime into the Border constraints (EPI)
and (IF ) shows that they hold at the optimum.
B.3.6 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. For the first result, observe that for p < 1/3, the solution at which ρ2 = p and
ρ1 = 2p + 1/(κ − 1) is always feasible and in line with γ(l, l) ≤ 1 and (IC li). The
corresponding probability of contest is given as
Pr(Γ,ρ∗) = (κ+ 1)p1 + 2(κ− 1)p, (B.26)
which is increasing in p and κ and becomes 1/2 for p = 1/3 and κ→∞.
Second, the optimal probability of a contest for p > 1/3 is
4p κp− (1− p)(κ− 2)(κ− 1)(7p2 − 2p− 1) + 4p, (B.27)
which is falling in p for p > 1/3. Thus, it suffices to look at the probability at
p = 1/3. But at this point it becomes
κ− 4
2κ− 5 , (B.28)
which again is bounded by 1/2.
The inverse u-shape follows from Pr(Γ,ρ∗) being concave on all intervals and that
the derivative is smooth pasting at p′, p′′, p′′′.
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Finally, monotonicity (and concavity) in κ follows from monotonicity and concavity
in κ for all regions as well as smooth pasting at the transition of the regions.
B.3.7 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. The results for the probability of being send to contest follow immediately
from the ex-ante symmetry and the equilibrium beliefs specified in Theorem 3.1
and 3.7.
The result on the expected share follows from Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.1. The
low-cost types expected utility from contest is weakly below her outside option V .
In order to fulfill the participation constraint in expectations, the player needs to be
compensated by a higher share if mediation fails. As player 1l has a higher proba-
bility to enter the contest, she also needs to receive a higher share than player 2l. A
weakly higher share for any l-type compared to the same player’s corresponding
h-type follows from h-types binding incentive compatibility. Finally, as player 1h
gains a positive expected utility in case of the contest her expected share can be
pushed down the most completing the proof.
B.3.8 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. The expected legal expenditure of player ik is by the uniform equilibrium
scoring functions given by
E[LEki ] =
∑
r∈{b,m,t}
Prob(ski ∈ r)
r + r
2
where b,m and t are the scoring ranges used in Figure 3.1 and the proof of Lemma 3.1.
Further, r denotes the upper bound of range r and r denotes the lower bound of
range r.
The expected scoring function of player 1 entirely depends on ρ2, that is
ρ1E[LEl1] + (1− ρ1)E[LEh1 ] = ρ1
ρ1(2− ρ1) + (ρ2)2(κ− 1)
2ρ1clκ
+ (1− ρ1)(1− ρ1)2clκ
= 1 + ρ2(κ− 1)
clκ
.
Thus, the equilibrium expected contest score of player 1 is the same as in a contest
without mediation whenever ρ2 = p.
The expected score of player 2 is computed in a similar manner but depends on
both ρ1 and ρ2. It is given by:
1
2clκ
((κ− 1)
κ
(
ρ1(ρ1 − 2) + (ρ2)2(κ− 1) + 2ρ2
)
+ 1
)
.
The derivative of this function w.r.t. to ρ1
κ− 1
κ2
(ρ1 − 1) < 0.
As ρ1 > p by Lemma 3.7 and ρ2 = p for p /∈ (p′, 1/3), it follows that total legal
expenditures post-mediation are indeed smaller than under the prior belief p.
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B.3.9 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. As participation is optimal by lemma B.1 and the optimal mechanism is
unique, no bargaining protocol can achieve a better result than Theorem 3.1. By
convexity of contest utilities in beliefs, no Bayes plausible signal structure over the
prior can make the receiver worse-off than the prior. Thus, the participation con-
straint of the mechanism holds in the bargaining game as well.
To show that take-it-or-leave-it bargaining performs worse in environments that
satisfy 1 we show that the low-cost type of Sender has always an incentive to devi-
ate to some offer 0 <  < 1− V (l) that yields a utility higher than V (l) which is her
on-path utility. We do so by considering the possible response of Receiver to such
an offer given any off-path βS describing the probability assessment of Receiver on
Sender in the contest game.
Any Receiver type accepts. As  < 1− V (l), Sender earns a utility larger V (l).
Any Receiver type rejects. The high-type only rejects an offer of  if she expects a
utility UR(h|βS) > , given her off-path belief βS . By Lemma 3.1 UR(h|βS , βR) > 0
only if βS < βR. Since any Receiver type rejects the offer, the belief on the receiver
is the same as the prior, that is βR = p. But βS < p implies via lemma 3.1 that
US(l|βS , βR) > V (l).
h-type Receiver rejects and l-type Receiver accepts. This case doesn’t exist, as
any offer that the h-type rejects is also rejected by the l-type as PBE requires type-
independent beliefs after the deviation (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1988) and l-types
have lower cost of evidence provision.
l-type Receiver rejects and h-type Receiver accepts. h-types only accept if  ≥
UR(h|βS , βR) that is
 ≥ (βR − βS)κ− 1
κ
.
If Receiver h, type l rejects, then Sender, type l gains (1 − p)(1 − ) which is larger
V (l) = (1 − p)(κ − 1)/κ as  goes to 0. Thus Receiver, type h must be indifferent.
Rewriting the above equation yields
βR =
κ
κ− 1 + βS .
In order to induce a belief of βR, Receiver, type h must choose to reject the offer
with probability
γR,h =
p
1− p
1− βR
βR
,
which follows analogously to Lemma B.4.
Plugging this into Sender l-types yields:
(1− p)(1− γR,h)(1− ) +
(
p+ (1− p)γR,h
)
(1− βS)κ− 1
κ
=
(1− p)(1− ) + p
βR
(
(1− βS)κ− 1
κ
− (1− βR)(1− )
)
.
Taking into account that βR is a function of βS this expression is continuous and
monotone in βS . βS is naturally bounded by 1 and βR. As we are looking for the
lowest utility, we can assign for any  > 0 it suffices to consider an upper and a
lower bound. For  close to 0 however, both βS = βR as well as βS = 1 yield
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a utility larger (1 − p)(κ − 1)/κ. Thus, Sender, type l always has an incentive to
deviate to some  irrespective of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of Receiver resulting
in an inferior solution which is actually strict as long as the case is not trivial by the
uniqueness of the proposed mechanism as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
B.3.10 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The proof relies on three features of the model which can be exploited to guarantee
a weaker participation constraint:
• the mediator can ex-ante commit to probabilistic private messages she sends
to parties following any given message profile (but before the acceptance de-
cision),
• the mediator can ex-ante commit to an additional probabilistic private mes-
sage she sends to parties following any message and acceptance profile (that
is after the acceptance decision),
• all type profiles lead to on-path to litigation with positive probability.
Proof. For PAIR we need that the expected share given one’s own type, that is xi(l)
is larger than the expected utility of a contest that occurs upon rejection of this
share. Suppose without loss of generality that an offer of 0 is rejected by all parties
and is used by the mediator to trigger litigation.
Two aspects facilitate the analysis: First, the mediator can choose a signal σ(m,d)
that depends on the received messages m as well as on the acceptance decision d
of both players. That is, the mediator has the possibility to define a post-mediation
protocol, too.
Recall from Theorem 3.1 that any type profile leads to litigation with positive prob-
ability. At the same time rejection by one party is enough to trigger litigation. Thus,
as we allow for private communication, the mediator is free to choose one of the
two messages sent to one party if she triggers rejection by the other party. The
mediator can therefore randomize not only between who takes the role of player
1, that is which Xi to use, but also between whom of the two player’s receives the
“trigger message” 0. For the non-triggering player the mediator can in fact ran-
domizes between all messages the player could receive on-path when the conflict
is settled. This way the player does not know whether she is treated as player 1 or
player 2 in the mediation protocol at the time of making her decision as to whether
to accept or reject the offer. She does in fact not even know whether rejecting the
offer makes any difference at all (as the opponent might have received an offer of
0 anyways). By Proposition 3.3, the mediator can choose Xi such that for any offer
xi(k) there exists an on-path continuation game in which the player is worse off
than xi(k). Hence, it is possible for the mediator to choose a signal σi conditional
on deviation that signalling the deviator is in this on-path subgame deterring devi-
ation altogether.
B.3.11 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. Whenever γi(k) 6= 1 the proof is the same as that of Proposition 3.6.
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The situation is however different if either of the players is sent to court with prob-
ability γi(k) = 1. According to Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.7, γi(h) < 1. In addition
at most one of the l-types has γi(l) = 1 on path.
This way the player knows that in one of the two mediation protocols she is al-
ways going to litigate anyways. Thus if x1(l, h) 6= x1(l, l), player 1 might have a
strong incentive to deviate as she knows whom she is facing in case her decision
is relevant at all. In all other cases she is going to litigate anyways and receives
V (l) as litigation payoff by Theorem 3.1 together with Lemma 3.1. Thus, it might
be optimal for her to reject anything but x1(l, l).
Suppose instead the mediator announces a mediation protocol X λ in which report-
ing two l-types follows mediation breakdown with full information disclosure with
probability  and a protocol as that derived in Section 3.4 otherwise. As  → 0,
the result gets arbitrarily close to that of Theorem 3.1. However, the mediator can
signal any l-type deviator that in fact the low-cost vs. low-cost litigation game is
played, causing the l-type to also except ex-post shares.
B.3.12 Proof of Lemma B.6
Proof. If condition (M ) is violated, the equilibrium is no-longer monotonic but in-
stead overlapping strategies might be possible. The reason for this is that if, e.g.
p1(l|l)κ < p1(l|h) the likelihood of meeting a low-cost type when being a high-
cost type is too high compared to being a low-cost type, such that the high-cost
type has a strong incentive to overscore the low-cost type. Further, by the consis-
tency condition equation (C) whenever the high-cost type faces a low-cost type,
she faces indeed a low-cost type that thinks she herself is facing a high-cost type
with very high probability. This provides an incentive for the h-type to compete
more aggressive and for the l-type to compete softer than under condition (M ). The
equilibrium scores in the non-monotonic equilibrium are as depicted in figure B.1.
Player 1l and player 1h overlap on the middle interval but are otherwise “close to
monotonic”. While the high-cost type of player 2 has a support covering the whole
scoring interval, player 2l only competes in the middle interval. In addition player
2h also has a mass point at 0. Solving for the optimal mechanism, it turns out that
s
b m t
Player 2 h
Player 1 h
Player 2 l
Player 1 l
0 ∆h,h ∆{l,h},{h,l} ∆l,h
FIGURE B.1: Strategy support of player 1 and 2 if monotonicity fails.
there is still no interior solution in p1(l|l). The mediator would set p1(l|l) equal to
any discontinuity point or at the respective borders. That is either p1(l|l) = 0 or
p1(l|l) = max{p2(l|l), p1(l|h)/κ}. If p1(l|l) = p2(l|l) = ρ(l) under non-monotonicity,
the first order condition of the mediator’s problem is monotone in ρ(l) and thus,
we would need ρ(l) = 0 which is never optimal. If p1(l|l) = p1(l|h)/κ utilities
converge to their monotone counterparts and thus, the solution is no different than
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that for monotonicity. Finally, p1(l|l) = 0 is never optimal as the objective is always
decreasing at this point.
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